That guidance (to paraphrase Hearst’s famous admonition to
Frederic Remington on the occasion of the Spanish-American War, “You furnish
the pictures, I’ll furnish the war,”) pretty much sums up the interaction of
the government of Japan and the Western media on the matter of the Chinese Air
Defense Identification Zone or ADIZ.
I’m not going to engage in Fisking by bulk here, but Western
outlets have unanimously spun the Chinese ADIZ as some reckless stunt to
challenge Japan over the Senkaku airspace.
Bullshit.
Basically, as I describe in an article for Asia Times
Online, China's Defense Zone Creates a Flap, the Chinese ADIZ does tweak Japan on the matter of the Senkakus by
extending the southeast corner of the envelope to cover the islands.
However, the ADIZ covers all of the East China Sea between
Japan and the PRC. It is not an
assertion of sovereignty. It creates a
zone in which unidentified aircraft are required to identify themselves to
Chinese authorities. It’s an early
warning system meant to provide time cushion in an era of high speed warplanes.
America has an ADIZ.
For aviation enthusiasts, here is a very interesting and
somewhat technical description provided by the FAA on enforcement of the USADIZ.
Spoiler: in principle, if not depth of detail, the
implementation looks pretty much like the Chinese ADIZ—except it’s stricter, requires
prefiling a flight plan, and specifies a rather onerous-looking tolerance of
plus/minus 5 minutes and 20 nautical miles for deviations from the plan.
Guess what. Japan
also has an ADIZ.
The Chinese ADIZ directly parallels and overlaps the
Japanese ADIZ—a fact that has escaped most of the press in its vaporings over
the issue. (From Taylor Fravel's tweet: yellow line = Chinese ADIZ; red line = Japanese ADIZ; red field = overlap.)
So, if properly implemented and respected by both sides, the Chinese ADIZ is
stabilizing, not destabilizing.
Abe told a parliamentary session that China's declaration of the zone above the islands (known as the Senkaku in Japan and Diaoyu in China) altered the state of affairs in the East China Sea and escalated a tense situation.
"The measures by the Chinese side have no validity whatsoever on Japan, and we demand China revoke any measures that could infringe upon the freedom of flight in international airspace," Abe said during an upper house session. "It can invite an unexpected occurrence and it is a very dangerous thing as well."
I’m assuming Abe’s refusal to accept the Chinese ADIZ draws
strength from US concerns about the PRC move voiced by Secretary of Defense
Chuck Hagel and Secretary of State John Kerry.
In contrast to previous PRC-Japan jostling, the United States has
clearly lined up with Japan and also went the extra mile to reaffirm that the mutual
defense treaty covers the Senkakus.
The DoD statement reads:
"The United States is deeply concerned by the People's Republic of China announcement today that it is establishing an air defense identification zone in the East China Sea. We view this development as a destabilizing attempt to alter the status quo in the region. This unilateral action increases the risk of misunderstanding and miscalculations.
"This announcement by the People's Republic of China will not in any way change how the United States conducts military operations in the region.
"The United States is conveying these concerns to China through diplomatic and military channels, and we are in close consultation with our allies and partners in the region, including Japan.
"We remain steadfast in our commitments to our allies and partners. The United States reaffirms its longstanding policy that Article V of the U.S.-Japan Mutual Defense Treaty applies to the Senkaku Islands."
In my personal opinion, the US statement is not relating to
China’s declaration of an ADIZ (after all, both the United States and Japan
have them) but in the fact that the PRC declared the ADIZ unilaterally and, in
its ambiguous wording of the regulations, conveyed the implication that US
warplanes in the zone might be expected to obey the instructions of whoever was
enforcing the Chinese ADIZ.
If the US military has one absolute imperative in East Asia,
it is its ability to sail where it wants and fly where it wants subject to some
extremely limited and carefully parsed limits imposed by international law (for
instance, by a judicious exploitation of loopholes in the Law of the Sea Treaty—which
the US hasn’t even ratified—the US Navy has openly repudiated Chinese
objections and affirmed the right to conduct military surveillance detrimental
to the PRC’s national security within the PRC’s Exclusive Economic Zone).
As for aircraft, the most famous incident relating to the
PRC, of course, was the collision of a Chinese fighter jet with a US EP-3 surveillance
plane over China’s EEZ off Hainan Island in April 2001.
Despite vociferous complaints by the PRC, the U.S. took an effective and
convincing stand that it had the right to continue the surveillance flights.
Based on a quick survey of the literature, US armed forces
assert the right to fly through any international airspace without
restriction. However, as a concession to
the anxieties of other governments about unidentified aircraft near their
borders, at least in the case of Peru, I did find that the US encouraged Peru
to check the flight plans on file and approach the planes, rather gingerly I
expect, to confirm their markings. In
other words, no radio chatter, no transponder stuff.
If the United States is going to initiate AirSea Battle, in
other words, it isn’t going to tip its hand when it enters the Chinese ADIZ, or
help out Chinese air defense by turning on its transponders.
The PRC is not going to be able to challenge that freedom
just by publishing some regulations.
Despite the US decision to tilt toward Japan on the ADIZ
issue, I expect that this story will join the platter of mislabeled China-threat
nothingburgers heaped up by the media, including but not limited to the “PRC
Coast Guard regs allow China to stop ships transiting the South China Sea”
canard and the “China claims Okinawa” BS.