[Simple answer: Saudi Arabia. Longer answer (including an explanation of how the PRC viewed the situation) below. A piece I did for Asia Times in March 2011. Since it seems to have vanished from the archive, I'm serving it up here as a reminder of what really brought Qaddafi down. I'm posting this with permission of AT, which has the copyright. Any other reprints/reposts should get permission from Asia Times.]
China and the Libyan Muddle
By Peter
Lee
The United Nations Security Council voted on Thursday at
UN headquarters in New York to approve a
no-fly zone over Libya
and "all necessary measures" to protect civilians from attacks by
forces led by Muammar Gaddafi.
The 10-0 vote included five abstentions, notably
permanent members China and Russia.
The other three permanent members backing the vote were Britain, France
and the United States.
The Arab League, a voluntary association of nations, last
week resolved that the
UN Security Council should declare a no-fly zone over Libya.
China’s attitude
takes few by surprise. And history will probably vindicate China’s mealy-mouthed and self-serving stance
that the response to the serial crises in the Middle East
should be guided by the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs
of nations.
And
history may vindicate China
even earlier than most people expect.
The most
interesting and dangerous element in the no-fly-zone debate is the dawning
awareness that “Responsibility to Protect”–R2P a.k.a. humanitarian intervention
in do-gooder jargon—is not just a Western monopoly
It’s not
just an opportunity for feel-good posturing by David Cameron and Nicolas
Sarkozy that gives the West another chance to assert its global moral
leadership.
Once the
intervention jinn is out of the bottle, there’s no telling who will seize the
R2P sword, or for what manner of end.
Saudi
Arabia
apparently believes in R2P when it comes to protecting a Sunni autocracy in
neighboring Bahrain…
…which
raises the disturbing possibility that Iran
has a R2P the Shi’ite majority in Bahrain…
…and maybe
the Arab world has a R2P the Palestinians next time Israel
rampages into the Gaza
strip…
If the
Arab world’s national revolutions blossom into regional wars, we will soon feel
intense nostalgia for the good old days when international affairs were
governed by the Treaty of Westphalia, which declared that what rulers did
inside their borders was nobody else’s business.
It is
unlikely that China
will work aggressively to claim the foreign policy high ground, either
regionally or in the UN Security Council.
That’s
because for China, the key
issue at stake in the Libyan conflict is not the slippery slope toward a
sovereignty and security crisis in the Middle East.
The key
issue is a simple and traditional matter of intense personal enmity between two
rulers equally opposed to the democratic wave sweeping the Middle
East.
Saudi
Arabia’s
King Abdullah detests Muammar Gaddafi and expects all of the kingdom’s
solicitous oil allies—of which China
is now the foremost—to lend a hand in compassing his overthrow.
The most
recent iteration of bad blood between Gaddafi and Abdullah goes back to 2003.
Gaddafi
confronted then Prince Abdullah over Saudi Arabia’s cooperation with the
West in the overthrow of Saddam Hussein.
Gaddafi
said that Abdullah had made “a deal with the devil”.
Abdullah
riposted that Gaddafi’s “lies were behind him and his grave was before him”.
Although
the Western press apparently regarded Abdullah’s remarks as little more than a
pithy Arabic aphorism, Gaddafi not unreasonably interpreted them as a death
threat.
Gaddafi
apparently decided to strike first.
Libyan
security services allegedly staged an inept but extremely well-financed
assassination attempt. The intent was to
barrage Abdullah’s Mecca
apartment with RPG fire and blame his murder on al Qaeda.
The plot
suffered from a dearth of dedicated and capable Saudi co-conspirators. One courier, confronted with the enormous
stash of cash earmarked for the attempt—over $1 million—simply abandoned the
money and fled in panic.
Saudi
Arabia
withdrew its ambassador to Libya
for nine months.
The Libyan
state-controlled press delivered some entertaining political invective in return:
The Libyan press on Friday launched
strong criticism against Saudi Arabia
because of its decision to summon its ambassador in Tripoli
and to expel the Libyan ambassador in Riyadh,
describing Saudi Arabia
as "the kingdom of darkness" ruled by Abu Jahel.
The Libyan state run al-Jamahereyah
said in its yesterday's editorial under the title "the Kingdom of black
comedy" that Saudi
Arabia might be the "best ambassador
for the pre Middle Ages era." The paper added that "Abu Jahel"
(the Saudi royal family) is still giving his rules in the life affairs of the
society and bans the woman from driving the car." The Libyan daily al-Zahf
al-Akhdar described Saudi
Arabia as "a swollen kingdom" and
issued an article showing the difference between the life of the common Saudi
citizen and the life of luxury members of the ruling family live. [1]
For
students of Islamic invective, “Abu Jahel” was the mocking title—“Father of
Ignorance”—given to a boss of Mecca
who refused to submit to Islam. He was
slain in the Battle of Badr in 624 AD that marked the triumph of Mohammed and
secured Islam’s ascendancy in Mecca.
Supposedly,
there was a reconciliation between Gaddafi and Abdullah, now King Abdullah, in
2007.
The
exchange plays more like a desert re-enactment of the scene in Godfather II
where Michael Corleone pretends to forgive his feckless brother Fredo, while
secretly plotting his demise.
Certainly,
Gaddafi’s apology left something to be desired, as French 24 reported:
"It has been six years that
you have been running away and scared of confrontation and I want to say 'Do
not be afraid'," Gaddafi said, addressing Abdullah. "After six years,
it has been proven that with ... the grave before you, it is Britain that made you and the
Americans that protected you." [2]
French24
continued:
It was not clear if Gaddafi
intentionally repeated the accusations or was explaining the incident he wanted
to apologise for.
Apparently expecting another
attack, Qatar's
emir Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani, chairing the summit, shouted down the
Libyan leader.
But Gaddafi, sporting sunglasses
and an orange hat and robes, continued his speech in a more clearly
conciliatory tone, drawing applause from delegates.
"For the sake of the (Arab)
nation, I consider the personal problem between you and me to be over and I am
prepared to visit you and receive a visit from you," he told the Saudi
king.
In the United States,
this is characterized as a “non-apology apology”.
As
Gaddafi’s difficulties multiplied in 2011, it was clear that Prince Abdullah
did not consider the personal problem over.
Prior to
the Arab League meeting in Cairo, the Gulf Co-Operation Council, a congerie of
authoritarian sheiks led by Saudi Arabia, delivered a ferocious condemnation of
Gaddafi’s behavior.
The GCC’s language
went far beyond the genteel wrist-slapping usually meted out to misbehaving
Arab potentates.
In a statement issued after their
meeting in Saudi Arabia's
capital Riyadh on Thursday, foreign ministers
from the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) called on the Arab League to take
measures to stop the bloodshed in Libya and to initiate contacts with
the National Council formed by the opposition.
"When it comes to Libya
I think the regime has lost its legitimacy," Hamad bin Jasem bin Jaber Al
Thani, the Qatari prime minister and foreign minister, said.
"We support the no-fly zone.
We also support contact with the National Council in Libya. It is time to discuss the
situation with them and the [UN] Security Council should shoulder its
responsibility." [3]
Saudi
Arabia
put its money where its mouth is, offering to provide substitutes for Libyan
petroleum products to Colonel Gaddafi’s customers in Europe.
The next
week, the GCC hardline played an important role in driving the deliberations of
the Arab League on the Libyan no-fly zone.
The Arab
League’s position on Libya
has not been a model of consistency.
Prior to
the meeting, Libya’s
membership in the Arab League had been suspended for its brutal crackdown on
demonstrators.
With the
Libyan situation in flux—and Libya’s
ambassador to the Arab League resigning in protest—it was certainly reasonable
to place Libya
on probation, as it were, until things sorted themselves out.
When
Gaddafi sent a replacement delegate to participate in the Arab League meeting
on March 12, a Reuters report indicated that the League still intended to
engage with Gaddafi:
"I don't think that they will
be allowed to attend because the decision of the council of ministers was to
suspend the participation of the Libyan delegation," Hesham Youssef, the
League official, told Reuters.
He added that the Arab League had
not severed all ties to the Tripoli
government and there was a need to discuss the crisis with Gaddafi's
administration, including the humanitarian situation and how to stop violence.
"We may meet them. But not in
the context of the meeting of the council of ministers," Youssef said.
"Nothing has been scheduled as of yet," he said.
"There is a need to discuss
all kind of details with Libyan officials," he said. "All these steps
require communication with those who control the situation in Libya," he said.
Ahmed Ben Helli, deputy secretary
general of the Arab League, told Reuters that "talks and consultations
exist".
Youssef said the Arab League had
also been in touch with the rebel National Libyan Council in Benghazi. [4]
However,
Gaddafi & Son managed to overtax the patience of the Arab League.
In
addition to its problems with Saudi Arabia,
Libya has also perversely
managed to get on the wrong side of most of the Shi’a confession in the Middle East.
As James
Denselow of The Guardian reported Gaddafi has been able to unite both Hezbollah
and the Hariri government of Lebanon—which
is now drafting the UN Security Council no-fly-zone resolution—against him for
his suspected role in the murder of a Lebanese Shi’ite cleric. Iran, Hezbollah’s patron (and not a
member of the Arab League) has been equally vociferous in condemning Gaddafi.
[5]
A
statement by Gaddafi during the assassination spat with Saudi Arabia speaks volumes concerning Libya’s
talent for burning bridges beyond nations all the way up to the regional level:
The Libyan leader continued his
criticism to the Arab League and the lack of its member states of what he
described the unity of ranks in the Middle East.
He said that the relations between Libya
and Italy are better in
thousand of times that Libya's
relations with her sister Egypt."
He added that the relations between Tunis and Germany is much better from its relations ( Tunisia) with Libya.
After
Gaddafi’s humanitarian outrages and insults against the Arab League, Amr
Moussa, the Egyptian Secretary General of the league—who had endured Gaddafi’s
high-handed dismissal of AL mediation during the crisis in Saudi-Libyan
relations--clearly saw no need to shelter Gaddafi in the name of Arab unity.
Before the
Arab League meeting, Moussa told Der Spiegel he believed that Gaddafi was
delusional:
SPIEGEL: Are you trying to
influence him? When was the last time you spoke with the Libyan leader?
Moussa: The way he is now behaving
means a personal telephone call makes no sense. Gadhafi lacks the insight that Tunisia's
(former) President Ben Ali and (former) Egyptian President (Hosni) Mubarak
showed by stepping down. Gadhafi truly believes that the unrest is controlled
from abroad and that the Libyan people still adores him. [6]
In the
run-up to the Arab League meeting, Saif Gaddafi demonstrated that the acorn did
not fall far from the tree:
Saif al-Islam, one of Gaddafi's
sons, told supporters in Tripoli
this week the Arabs were "nothing." "Screw Arabs and the Arab
League," he said.[7]
The Arab
League apparently decided to return the favor.
To use an
overworked metaphor, Gaddafi faced a perfect storm of negative factors in the
week that the Arab League met in its offices just off Tahrir Square in Cairo.
Beyond the
malice of the Gulf monarchs, the hatred of Lebanon, and the disdain of Abu
Moussa, there is a genuine and widespread desire in the Arab world to support
the Libyan rebels, and to prevent a Gaddafi victory that might serve as a
repudiation of the democratic and
revolutionary tide sweeping the region.
This
desire was reflected in the deliberations in the mixture of old-school
autocrats and newly-minted bourgeois democrats in the councils of the Arab League
in the form of good, old-fashioned panic.
There
appears to have been a generalized fear that any signs of going easy on Gaddafi
would be regarded as treason against Arab democracy and dignity by the aroused
demonstrators and activists besetting Arab governments across Africa and the Middle East.
As the
Voice of America reported:
"Obviously things are changing
around the Arab world, and indeed in the Arab League as well,"
acknowledged Hesham Youssef, chief of cabinet to the Arab League secretary
general.
Youssef qualified the Arab League
resolution, which was adopted Saturday evening, while demonstrators outside the
Cairo
headquarters were crying "Action, action! We want action not words!"
as "a clear indicator that the Arab world is entering a new phase".
"Clearly some of the practices that could have passed before cannot pass
now," Youssef added.
The Arab League official
acknowledged that calls around the Arab world for democracy is imposing "a
more forthcoming and a more effective approach" by the league towards all
issues, including those related to human rights. "The influence of (Arab)
public opinion is now becoming very marked in the positions and policies
adopted by the Arab League," Youssef said. [8]
If the
name Hesham Youssef sounds familiar, he was the same official who complaisantly
told Reuters before the meeting that there “is
a need to discuss all kind of details with Libyan officials”.
What a
difference a week makes, at least in the Middle East
in 2011.
The fact
that the Middle East’s ultimate autocracy, Saudi
Arabia, had the opportunity to turn the Arab regime’s
freedom-and-democracy anxiety to account against Libya is, perhaps, somewhat ironic.
The
general fug of fear, opportunism, anger, and disarray may account for the fog
of misleading rhetoric surrounding the Arab League’s decision.
The call
for the Libyan no-fly zone was reported to be a unanimous resolution.
Perhaps it
was, but with an asterisk.
It
subsequently emerged that Algeria
and Syria
were strongly opposed to the measure.
The Syrian state media subsequently came out with a solidly traditional
statement opposing Western intervention in Arab affairs, one that Beijing no doubt found
welcome and appropriate.
Syria’s ambassador to the Arab League
stated to the gathering:
"Any such intervention is a
violation of Libya's
sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, and is inconsistent with
the Charter of the League of Arab States and the principles of the
international law…
…
Ambassador Ahmed warned that any
decision by the Council to impose a no-fly zone on Libya could become a mere
legal tool and a legitimate cover in the near future to target Libya militarily
by a resolution of the NATO or the UN Security Council in order to legitimize
the military intervention.
"Syria affirms that any
decision by the AL Council, in order to get unanimous approval, must take into
account clear and unequivocal guarantees of the absolute rejection of all forms
of foreign intervention in Libya, and the commitment to the national unity and
territorial integrity of Libya and its people, along with the need of
protecting the Libyan citizens against the air strikes they are subjected
to," indicating that the AL must not accept any foreign intervention in
Libya or give cover for such intervention or be part of it.
After putting the resolution to the
vote, Ambassador Ahmad stated that Syria
is not part of this resolution, as it rejects all forms of foreign intervention
in Libya's affairs out of
its keenness on Libya's
territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence.
Following the announcement of the
Syrian stance, Algeria's Foreign Minister and head of the Mauritanian
delegation asked for their countries' stances to be registered against the
content of the resolution because it has not addressed the remarks and sources
of concern expressed by the delegations of Algeria and Mauritania at the first
session.
It
transpires that there was a second resolution condemning foreign intervention
in the Libya
crisis; when bookended with the contradictory first resolution calling for
imposition of a no-fly zone, the League appears somewhat ridiculous.
It is
unclear whether Syria and Algeria
voted traded the passage of the second resolution for their votes on the first,
but the non-intervention call was clearly overshadowed by the virtually
unprecedented, widely reported demand of the first resolution that the UN
Security Council establish a no-fly zone.
While
generating a show of unity on intervention, the League was also extremely
uncomfortable with calling a spade a spade i.e. acknowledging to the
unpredictable but reliably nationalist citizens of the Arab world that any
no-fly zone would be enforced by NATO and the United States; instead the
problem was kicked upstairs as the “responsibility” of the UN.
Perhaps
members of the Arab League—other than Syria
and Algeria--were
subsequently chastened by realization of the consequences of stripping the
Libyan government of its sovereignty and legitimacy but abdicating the
leadership role to the Security Council.
Once it is
open season on Libya,
events are in the hands of the military powers eager to act, not the
notoriously toothless and divided League:
French Ambassador Gerard Araud
urged other members in the Council to refer an earlier UN resolution authorizing
the No-Fly Zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1993, pointing out that it "did
not say who was imposing the No-Fly Zone, how it was going to be imposed."
"This Council is not a
military headquarter; this Council is supposed to give a political authorization,
and, after that, the countries can work together to impose it." [9]
Perhaps
the members of the Arab League found the Libya debate a traumatic
muddle. Beijing undoubtedly found it appalling and
inappropriate.
China, after all, is no stranger to the
practice of using live ammunition on its own population. The possibility that a regional grouping,
like ASEAN, for instance, could take it upon itself to unilaterally declare
China’s sovereignty revoked and call for Western military intervention, which
would then come at the pleasure of the Western military powers, is not a pretty
one—or, to the Chinese, particularly legitimate.
China has little scope to advance its
views on the issue. Without any
impressive pro-democracy or military cards to play in the Middle East, Beijing is marginalized to
a somewhat embarrassing degree in the Libyan crisis.
It
dispatched a junior functionary, Vice Foreign Minister Zhai Jun to tour Egypt,
Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, and Algeria
and declare China’s
support for the idea of noninterference.
It is a
nostrum that has limited resonance in the Arab world as revolution sweeps
across national borders and local elites scramble to confront and/or
accommodate the new forces.
The best
the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs could come up with was that the four
countries “had approved of China’s
position” without, of course, any indication that they would imitate it. [10]
As a
practical matter, China may
be forced to abandon its principle now that its most important interlocutor in
the Middle East, Saudi Arabia,
has committed itself to intervention in Libya
in principle and also in the neighboring nation of Bahrain in practice.
China cannot cavalierly ignore Saudi
priorities.
As Andrew
Critchlow pointed out in the Wall Street Journal, China has a high degree of
dependence on Saudi Arabian oil—and little leverage:
The newly crowned world's
second-largest economy surpassed the U.S.
as the biggest importer of oil from Saudi Arabia in 2009, and the
kingdom's crude is an increasingly important factor in powering the nation's
growth. Considering the economic importance of the Middle East for Asia as a
whole, Beijing
and its neighbors remain unable to influence the course of events in the Arab
world, while being arguably the most exposed to the changes under way.
Despite China's best efforts to
diversify, most of the imported crude it needs to fuel growth comes from Saudi
Arabia, according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, and the
kingdom's energy-rich Shiite Eastern province plays a key role in the nation's
production. The Middle East provides 2.9 million barrels of oil a day to China, more than half its total imports, and Saudi Arabia
alone accounts for about 1.1 million barrels a day.
Faced with
ostracization by Europe as well as the detestation of most of the Arab states,
Gaddafi tried to gain some geopolitical traction by offering
petro-opportunities to China,
Russia, and India.
Despite
Colonel Gaddafi’s inducements, his oil and gas will continue to flow to Europe,
and not to China. This makes shielding Libya much less important and attractive than China’s determined dalliance with Saudi Arabia’s other sworn enemy, Iran.
Despite
expectations that it will express its fundamental hostility to endorsing US and
NATO intervention in the Middle East, China may decide it is in its interests
to burnish its global leadership credentials by orchestrating passage of a no
fly resolution in some form—such as one that pays lip service to the
“humanitarian assistance” justification.
China also happens to hold the
presidency of the UN Security Council this month. As France, Britain, and the United States
pushed for a quick vote, Ambassador Li Baodong, did not appear to be
slow-walking the process, telling reporters: "We hope we will have real
progress tomorrow." [11]
In
justifying his decision to convert to Catholicism in order to gain the French
crown, Henry IV is said to have declared, “Paris is worth a mass”.
To China,
Saudi oil might be worth a vote.
China may well decide to cast a vote on
the Security Council in favor of an Libya
no-fly zone process in order to mollify Saudi
Arabia--while providing much appreciated political cover
to the United States
and other non-intervention minded Western powers, and getting the Arab League
off the hook.
Beijing may
well be hoping that the rebellion will collapse and fail and Gaddafi’s forces
will enter Benghazi
before the no-fly zone “gets off the ground”.
Notes:
Peter
Lee writes
on East and South Asian affairs and their intersection with US foreign policy.
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