The Guardian published an adulatory feature on “The Women Fighting on the Frontline in Ukraine”.
One of the women profiled was “Anaconda”, fighting in the Aidar
Battalion bankrolled by Igor Kolomoisky:
Anaconda was given her nickname by a unit commander, in a
joking reference to her stature and power. The baby-faced 19-year-old says that
her mother is very worried about her and phones several times a day, sometimes
even during combat. She says it is better to always answer, as her mother will
not stop calling until she picks up.
“In the very
beginning my mother kept saying that the war is not for girls,” Anaconda says.
“But now she has to put up with my choice. My dad would have come to the front
himself, but his health does not allow him to move. He is proud of me now.”
…
Anaconda was
photographed in combat dress resolutely holding an assault rifle in front of a
rather decrepit van.
The caption read:
“Anaconda says she is
being treated well by the men in her battalion, but is hoping that the war will
end soon.”
As reported by the gadfly site OffGuardian, several readers posted critical observations
on the van’s insignia in the comments section of the piece. One, “bananasandsocks”, wrote:
“We learn from Wikipedia that the image on the door is the
“semi-official” insignia of the 36th Waffen Grenadier Division of
the SS…” and also pointed out the neo-Nazi significance of the number “1488”.
“bananasandsocks” seemingly temperate comment was removed by
the Guardian for violating its community standards, as were several others,
apparently as examples of “persistent misrepresentation of the Guardian and our
journalists”.
But then the Guardian thought better of it. While not reinstating the critical comments, it quietly deleted the original caption
to the photo of Anaconda and replaced it with:
Anaconda alongside a van displaying the neo-Nazi symbol 1488. The
volunteer brigade is known for its far-right links.
Problem solved? Maybe
not. Maybe it’s more like “Problem
dodged”. Specifically, the problem of
the pervasive participation of “ultra-right” paramilitary elements in Kyiv military
operations, which even intrudes upon the Guardian's efforts to put a liberal-friendly feminist sheen on the debacle of the recent ATO in eastern Ukraine.
As to “1488”, I’ll reproduce the Wikipedia entry:
Both slogans were coined by David Lane, convicted terrorist and member of the white separatist organization The Order. The first slogan was inspired by a statement, 88 words in length, from Volume 1, Chapter 8 of Adolf Hitler's Mein Kampf:
…
Neo-Nazis often combine the number 14 with 88, as in "14/88" or "1488". The 8s stand for the eighth letter of the alphabet (H), with "HH" standing for "Heil Hitler".
Lane died in prison in 2007 while serving a 190 year
sentence for, among other things, the murder of Denver radio talk show host
Alan Berg. David Lane has considerable
stature within global white nationalist/neo-Nazi/fascist circles as one of the American
Aryan movement’s premier badasses (in addition involvement in to the Berg
murder—in which he denied involvement—and a string of bank robberies to finance
the movement—also denied, Lane achieved a certain martyr’s stature for enduring
almost two decades in Federal detention, frequently in the notorious
Communications Management Units).
And David Lane was a big deal for the “ultra-right” & fascists
in Ukraine, according to the Southern Poverty Law Center:
Lane's death touched
off paeans from racists around the country and abroad. June 30 was designated a
"Global Day of Remembrance," with demonstrations held in at least
five U.S. cities as well as England, Germany, Russia and the Ukraine.
Judging by this video, the march/memorial on the first
anniversary of his death, in 2008, organized by the Ukrainian National
Socialist Party in Kyiv, was well enough attended to merit a police presence of
several dozen officers. The sountrack to the clip, by the way, is an elegy to David Lane performed by Ukraine's premier white nationalist metal band at the time, Sokyra Peruna.
There is a photograph of a shield inscribed “1488” at
Maidan.
More significantly, perhaps, the name of the armed wing of the Svoboda Party, C14,
apparently invokes Lane’s “14 words” .
It should be said that Lane’s views,
including those that inspired the 1488 tag, are esoteric even within the
fascist/Neo-Nazi/white supremacist world he inhabited.
In a letter from prison, Lane wrote:
You know that the three greatest
movements of the last 2,000 years have been Islam, Christianity and Judaism.
Judaism allowed Jews to conquer and rule the world. I believe only a religious
fervor can save our kind now. The 14 Words must be a divine command of Nature's
God whom we call Wotan Allfather.
…
…
As the 666 man, and the Joseph Smith
of Wotanism my rewards will be zero. Death in prison, scorn from those with no
vision, and hate from the stupid goyim and their kosher masters. But sometimes
a man is condemned to a higher cause. And cheerfulness in adversity is still a
virtue. Take care. 14 - 88
Lane composed his “88 Precepts” to instruct
believers in the ways of white nationalism.
While apparently riffing off the 88 word Mein Kampf passage and “88=HH=Heil Hitler”, it also refers to
Lane’s numerological/messianic preoccupations.
Ukrainian fascists’ admiration for Lane is a
reflection of the pervasiveness of indigenous Ukrainian fascism,
which looks for models and partners internationally while drawing plenty of strength and inspiration from its own profoundly deep
historical and ideological local roots.
As I wrote in a piece for CounterPunch, Ukrainian fascism
seems almost inevitable:
Ukrainian nationalism was under ferocious attack between the two world wars. The USSR occupied the eastern half of Ukraine, subjected it to collectivization under Stalin, and committed repression and enabled a famine that killed millions. At first, the Soviets sought to co-opt Ukrainian nationalism by supporting Ukrainian cultural expression while repressing Ukrainian political aspirations; USSR nationalities policies were “nationalist in expression and socialist in essence”. Then, in 1937 Stalin obliterated the native Ukrainian cultural and communist apparatus in a thoroughgoing purge and implemented Russified central control through his bespoke instrument, Nikita Khrushchev.
Meanwhile, the western part of the Ukraine was under the thumb of the Polish Republic, which was trying to entrench its rule before either the Germans or the Russians got around to destroying it again. This translated into a concerted Polish political, security, cultural, and demographic push into Ukrainian Galicia. The Polish government displaced Ukrainian intellectuals and farmers, attacked their culture and religion (including seizure of Orthodox churches and conversion into Roman Catholic edifices), marginalized the Ukrainians in their own homeland, and suppressed Ukrainian independence activists (like Bandera, who spent the years 1933 to 1939 in Poland’s Wronki Prison after trying to assassinate Poland’s Minister of the Interior).
Ukrainian nationalists, therefore, were unable to ride communism or bourgeois democracy into power. Communism was a tool of Soviet expansionism, not class empowerment, and Polish democracy offered no protection for Ukrainian minority rights or political expression, let alone a Ukrainian state.
Ukrainian nationalists turned largely toward fascism, specifically toward a concept of “integral nationalism” that, in the absence of an acceptable national government, manifested itself in a national will residing in the spirit of its adherents, not expressed by the state or restrained by its laws, but embodied by a charismatic leader and exercised through his organization, whose legitimacy supersedes that of the state and whose commitment to violence makes it a law unto itself.
It’s not just a matter of historical sentiment or
inclination. Ukraine’s contemporary
fascists share a direct bloodline with the fascists of the Soviet era,
especially in the matter of Roman Shukhevych, the commander of Ukrainian
nationalist forces fighting with the Nazis during World War II and also responsible
for horrific atrocities while attempting to cleanse Galicia of Poles in the
service of Ukrainian independence. From
my CounterPunch article:
In February 2014, the New York
Times’ Andrew Higgins penned a rather embarrassing passage that valorized the
occupation of Lviv—the Galician city at the heart of Ukrainian fascism, the old
stomping grounds of Roman Shukhevych and the Nachtigall battlaion, and also
Simon Wiesnthal’s home town—by anti-Yanyukovich forces in January 2014:
Some of the president’s longtime opponents here have taken an increasingly radical line.
Offering inspiration and advice has been Yuriy Shukhevych, a blind veteran nationalist who spent 31 years in Soviet prisons and labor camps and whose father, Roman, led the Ukrainian Insurgent Army against Polish and then Soviet rule.
Mr. Shukhevych, 80, who lost his sight during his time in the Soviet gulag, helped guide the formation of Right Sector, an unruly organization whose fighters now man barricades around Independence Square, the epicenter of the protest movement in Kiev.
Yuriy Shukhevych’s role in modern
Ukrainian fascism is not simply that of an inspirational figurehead and
reminder of his father’s anti-Soviet heroics for proud Ukrainian
nationalists. He is a core figure in the emergence of the key Ukrainian
fascist formation, Pravy Sektor and its paramilitary.
And Pravy Sektor’s paramilitary, the
UNA-UNSO, is not an “unruly” collection of weekend-warrior-wannabes, as Mr.
Higgins might believe.
UNA-UNSO was formed during the
turmoil of the early 1990s, largely by ethnic Ukrainian veterans of the Soviet
Union’s bitter war in Afghanistan. From the first, the UNA-UNSO has shown
a taste for foreign adventures, sending detachments to Moscow in 1990 to oppose
the Communist coup against Yeltsin, and to Lithuania in 1991. With
apparently very good reason, the Russians have also accused UNA-UNSO fighters
of participating on the anti-Russian side in Georgia and Chechnya.
After formal Ukrainian independence,
the militia elected Yuriy Shukhevych—the son of OUN-B commander Roman
Shukhevych– as its leader and set up a political arm, which later became Pravy
Sektor.
There’s plenty of indigenous fascism to go around. Interviews
with Ukrainian ultra-rights reveal a welter of views befitting the country’s
fraught and contested status in central Europe, ranging from “autonomous
nationalists” (whose demeanour and tactics mirror on the right mirror those of
European anarchists on the left); ultras who emerged from the football club
wars; and determinedly theoretical scientific fascists. The common thread of the diverse and syncretic
Ukrainian fascist movement is the conviction that the survival of the Ukrainian
people is under threat from a multitude of forces and mechanisms (Russians,
Jews, the EU, democracy, capitalism, communism etc.), and can only be assured
by autonomous armed force under charismatic leadership; and yes, apparently a
shared belief that Adolf Hitler showed how it could and should be done.
Rooting fascism out of Ukraine’s cultural, social, and
political matrix is going to take a lot of work. Unfortunately, the opposite is going on right
now.
The leading Ukrainian observer of Ukrainian ultrarights,
Anton Shekhovstov, did not deny the presence of ultraright formations at
Maidan, but tried to square the circle philosophically by characterizing the
Ukrainian conflict as an anti-imperialist/anti-colonial struggle that might
elicit and safely incorporate fascist activism.
Then, when the Russian threat had been dealt with, Ukrainian civil
society could neutralize the fascist factor.
In January 2014, when Maidan was white-hot, Shekhovstov wrote:
Thus, a fight against
fascism in Ukraine should always be synonymous with the fight against the
attempts to colonise the country. Those who separate these two issues or crack
down on the Ukrainian far right without recognising the urgent need for
national independence will never be successful in their attempts to neutralise
the far right. Moreover, they can make the situation worse.
However, Ukrainian fascists have not been disempowered and
marginalized by the circus of defeat and dysfunction that is the current Kyiv
government. In fact, “ultra-right” is
trending upward in Ukraine governance, as Shekhovtsov glumly observed in a
recent post discussing the emergence of yet another powerful ultra-right
formation:
[T]he electoral
failure of Svoboda and the Right Sector [in the recent parliamentary as well as
presidential elections] did not mark “the end of history” of the Ukrainian far
right…
… The recent
developments in Ukraine marked by the rise of the previously obscure neo-Nazi
organisation “The Patriot of Ukraine” (PU) led by Andriy Bilets’ky…
… the PU formed a core
of the Azov battalion, a volunteer detachment governed by the Ministry of
Interior headed by Arsen Avakov. From the very beginning, the Azov battalion
employed imagery such as Wolfsangel and Schwarze Sonne that in post-war Europe
is associated with neo-Nazi movements…
The political perspective raises troubling questions: Why did Ukrainians elect a neo-Nazi into the parliament? Why did the Ukrainian Ministry of Interior promote the leaders of the neo-Nazi organisation?...
Shekhovtstov finds an explanation for Avakov’s footsie with
the PU in the cronyism (and demand for extra-legal street muscle) that
permeates Ukraine business and politics.
His conclusion is not a particularly happy one:
Conclusion
Avakov may consider the PU-led Azov battalion as his “private army”, but not everybody in the PU and Azov see the current cooperation with the Ministry of Interior as a goal in and of itself. The PU may benefit from this cooperation, but it still has its own political agenda that goes beyond this cooperation. The PU has also started advertising employment in the Security Service of Ukraine on their webpages. [emphasis added]
Further infiltration of the far right into the Ukrainian law enforcement and other institutions of the state will most likely lead to the following developments. First, the coalescence of the police and the far right who were engaged, inter alia, in the illegal activities will necessarily increase the corruption risks. Second, the growth of the far right within the law enforcement will lead to the gradual liberation of the PU from the personal patronage of Avakov that will likely result in the PU’s independent action.
While Svoboda and the Right Sector have failed in the 2014 parliamentary elections, the infiltration of some other far right organisations in the law enforcement is possibly a more advanced long-term strategy in their fight against not particularly well established liberal democracy in Ukraine.
Avakov may consider the PU-led Azov battalion as his “private army”, but not everybody in the PU and Azov see the current cooperation with the Ministry of Interior as a goal in and of itself. The PU may benefit from this cooperation, but it still has its own political agenda that goes beyond this cooperation. The PU has also started advertising employment in the Security Service of Ukraine on their webpages. [emphasis added]
Further infiltration of the far right into the Ukrainian law enforcement and other institutions of the state will most likely lead to the following developments. First, the coalescence of the police and the far right who were engaged, inter alia, in the illegal activities will necessarily increase the corruption risks. Second, the growth of the far right within the law enforcement will lead to the gradual liberation of the PU from the personal patronage of Avakov that will likely result in the PU’s independent action.
While Svoboda and the Right Sector have failed in the 2014 parliamentary elections, the infiltration of some other far right organisations in the law enforcement is possibly a more advanced long-term strategy in their fight against not particularly well established liberal democracy in Ukraine.
One of the awkward facts of Ukrainian politics is that
Ukraine’s fascists have the ambition if not yet the demonstrated capability of
opportunistically using the current regime’s need—and factions’ desires--for
effective armed formations to catapult the extreme-right into power.
And it seems that the West has zero strategy for dealing
with this problem. In fact, if disorder
and discontent escalate in western Ukraine as a result of the US insistence on
confronting Russia and the ethnic Russian opposition in the West, I expect the
fascist problem will get worse before it gets better.
And it isn’t going to be solved by ignoring, downplaying,
wishing away, or dismissing Ukrianian fascism as an irrelevant
historical and political anachronism...or by discretely recaptioning
some of its embarrassingly blatant manifestations.
It’s not just amusing or disturbing that the Guardian
appears determined to graft a misleading liberal, Europe-loving image onto the fascist
friendly Ukraine adventure; it’s downright dangerous.
I'm trying to avoid the TL;DR trap so I abridged my original piece to supply the excerpt posted above. But I try to err on the side of inclusiveness and context whenever I can--especially since sources vanish off the web and the Google algorithm sometimes gets dodgy--so I've included the complete original piece below the fold for readers who wish to go deeper.
