Deeper and Darker in the Uyghur-Turkish Passport Mystery

I’ve written about the Turkish passport mystery—in which suspected Uyghur refugees somehow came into possession of Turkish passports, presumably high-tech, smart chip passports encrypted by a Turkish government agency that are so flawless that Asian governments have been unable to confirm their suspicions that their detainees are indeed Uyghurs fleeing the PRC—in a couple posts: Curtain Coming Down on Erdogan’s Excellent Uyghur Adventure?  And Passport-Gate: Turkey’s Brewing Uyghur Passport Scandal .

Here are a couple more news items torn from the headlines that provide some interesting perspectives.

The first piece comes from the Benar News, April 9, 2015, and addresses the most sensitive case, that of four individuals detained in Indonesia and suspected of being a) Uyghurs b) terrorist-tourists c) fugitives involved in the 2014 Kunming railroad station massacre that claimed 33 lives.  (I discussed the developing case in my February Passport-Gate piece): 

Note the interesting tapdancing by the suspects’ lawyer & the Turkish consulate.  Seems to me Turkey wants to encourage the inference that the four are genuine Turkish citizen so they can go to Turkey and the whole embarrassing story disappears.  But the consulate can’t bring itself either to confirm…or deny.  Since the PRC suspects that these are not just Uyghur refugees, but are Uyghur fugitives implicated in the Kunming attack that have to go back to China—and Indonesia seems to agree—the odds of Turkey getting the four don’t look good. 

A lawyer defending four Uyghurs in a terrorism trial in Jakarta says they are Turkish citizens, although Indonesia has indicated that it might send them to China afterward.

The four, arrested in Central Sulawesi province last September, stand accused of travelling there to visit Indonesia’s most wanted terrorist, Santoso, and of using fake Turkish passports and visas to enter the country.

China has not intervened in the case of the four men, attorney Asludin Hatjani told BenarNews this week, when asked about Beijing’s involvement. Indonesian officials believe that these Uyghurs come from China’s northwestern Xinjiang region.

“China has nothing to do with it, because the documents they have state that they are Turkish citizens. And they are recognized by the Turkish government. The proof is that the Turkish government has provided translators,” said Asludin, who had defended Bali bomber Umar Patek at his trial in 2012.

“In Indonesia, terrorism is handled through law enforcement. If they are not guilty, they must be released. If they are guilty, it has to be proven,” he said.

“Regarding the immigration violation, in my view, they have full documentation. It remains to be proven whether it is false or not.”

Turkey responds
Officials at the Turkish embassy in Jakarta did not deny Asludin’s claim about his clients beingTurkish citizens.

“You should take into account what the lawyer says. On the other hand, [the Indonesian] Attorney General officially asked the Turkish embassy to provide the translator for the court. So this is what procedure says, and we follow that,” Ambassador Zekeriya Akcam said in a statement sent to BenarNews on Thursday.

“Since the court process is going on, we are not allowed to make any statement except what the court says,” he added. “We trust [the] judiciairy system of [the] Indonesian Republic and cannot make any comment beyond that.”

In mid-March, before the trial got under way, Indonesia’s National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT) said the four would be deported to China after the trial.

“They will be prosecuted. Once the indictment is completed, they will be returned to China. After that, it’s up to the Chinese government whether they want to detain them, sentence them to death, or free them. It depends on the laws in force there,” BNPT spokesman Irfan Idris told BenarNews then.

China wants the four repatriated, and the BNPT has been working with the Chinese government on the matter, Irfan said.

“We have gone there several times to coordinate with them. They have also visited here. We have agreed to find a good solution,” he said.

IS link?
According to Indonesian officials, the four suspects were arrested, along with three Indonesians, in Poso regency, a hotbed of militant activity.

The Uyghurs claim they were tourists.

“We just asked someone to take us around. The accusation of wanting to meet with Santoso is false. 

 We don’t speak Indonesian, so there seems to have been a misunderstanding,” defendant Ahmet Bozoglan told the North Jakarta District Court through a translator on March 31st.

...Chinese officials claim that about 300 Uyghurs from Xinjiang have joined the Islamic State (IS) jihadist group. Earlier on, BNPT officials had said that the four Uyghurs picked up in Poso were suspected of financing travel for Indonesians to join IS.

The four have been charged under anti-terrorism and immigration laws, public prosecutor Dicky Octavian said.

“The four defendants were involved in dangerous activities linked to terrorism in Poso and the Santoso group,” Dicky told BenarNews.

The trial opened March 23 and continued Thursday with testimony from witnesses for the prosecution.

The second piece appeared in Today’s Zaman, April 9, 2015 and is a pretty hot potato concerning an alleged IS passport agency operating out of Turkey:

It’s rather striking for Todays Zaman to print--albeit via citing another outlet—a story that talks about Turkey’s ISIS hanky-panky.  But it did so with two pieces today: this one, and another that discusses the MIT [Turkish intelligence] arms-to-IS smuggling accusations that Iranian-American journalist Serena Shim was looking into when she died under suspicious circumstances.  Interesting to speculate why TZ is becoming bolder, and how that will play out.  

Anyway, some of this Uyghur story looks absurd: there are only 11 million Uyghurs worldwide, of whom 50,000 reportedly reside in Turkey.  So I’m not going to take very seriously the statement that the Turkish government has funneled 50,000 Uyghurs into IS.  But the idea that the Turkish government has charged some local outfit with recruiting militants, part of this operation involves providing burner passports for the militants to make it into Turkey and go on to Syria, and the recruiting network might be collecting Uyghurs, has a strong whiff of plausability.

By “burner” I mean the passports may be flawless passports suitable for international travel but the intention is to provide single use travel documents that are flagged for Turkish immigration and confiscated when the militants show up at the border.  That way the danger of said militants scampering into Europe—which accepts Turkish documents and safeguards in its passport regime—is theoretically eliminated, and the Turkish government can more easily control the militants, who are without international travel documents and basically trapped in Syria and Turkey.

I also will speculate that Turkey is taking a page from Saudi Arabia’s exploitation of Al Qaeda and other Islamist Arab militants, and is seeking to create a murderous proxy force of Turkic-speaking militants in order for Erdogan, a prickly and recklessly egotistical supremo, to be able to boast he has his own gang of bespoke murderers to do mischief and project power in the region.

With all due respect to Turkish intelligence, I would not be at all surprised if this system broke down when a candidate militant—or Uyghur fugitives perhaps implicated in the Kunming railroad massacre, as the Indonesian bunch is—might agree to enter into the militant program, but renege after getting the passport and scamper off to Malaysia/Indonesia or some other jurisidiction where they can plot the liberation of Xinjiang instead participating in the carnival of massacre that IS has organized in Syria and Iraq (and which operates under the aegis of Turkish intelligence officers who don't speak Uyghur).

According to a story in the Meydan daily, A.G., an aide of Nurali T., a Uyghur Turk working for ISIL to provide militants with passports worldwide, Nurali T.'s office in İstanbul's Zeytinburnu district functions as an ISIL passport office. Each passport was sold for $200, A.G. told Meydan.

More than 50,000 Uyghur Turks came to Turkey with these fake passports from China via Thailand and Malaysia and entered Syria after staying a day in İstanbul, Meydan reported. A.G. claimed that most of the Uyghurs with fake passports were caught by police in Turkish airports but they were released in Turkey after their passports were seized. “The Uyghurs' release in Turkey is due to a secret [little-known] Turkish law on Uyghur Turks. More than 50,000 Uyghurs joined ISIL through this method,” A.G. added.

A.G. further said that Nurali T. organizes recruits from around the world from his İstanbul office. Militants who entered Turkey with these fake passports are hosted either in hotels or guesthouses for a day before they join ISIL in Syria, A.G. said.

One thing that does surprise me is that the intoxicating mix of Uyghurs/China/IS/Turkey/Syria/burner passports/the specter of militants galloping around the EU with perfect Turkish passports/TERRORISTS AT THE GATES OF EUROPE!!!  has not attracted the interest of Western journos.  Guess it’s just me.

Saudi Arabia Switches to Plan B for IS and Syria

From my ever interesting and amusing twitter feed @chinahand, with some minor edits:

China Matters crystal ball tells me: 

1) Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is switching from jihadi strategy to great power negotiations in response to IS fiasco

2) KSA is saying, "OK, we'll help clean up our IS mess, but Assad's gotta go. Syria's a natural pickup for the Sunni side and belongs in KSA's sphere of influence.” 

3) KSA's half-assed jihadi anarchy strategy for Syrian regime change has failed. Time for Plan B.

4) As long as Assad getting billions in financial support, military assistance from Iran, he's not going anywhere. If Iran cuts off aid to Assad, he'll be out on the first plane to Moscow or wherever.

 5) So I believe KSA is offering Iran peaceful coexistence in ME in return for dumping Assad

6) and US agreed to put Assad on table as part of Iran nuke deal. So after IS contained, US wants Iran to support "political transition".

7) and US/KSA/Iran all sing "kumbaya". Especially since KSA believes it will be able to shoulder aside whatever hapless transitional govt is installed in Syria and get their own people in. 

8) If this scenario plays out, would expect Israel to get nervous as KSA/Isr/US anti-Iran bloc crumbles. Will certainly demand any new government in Syria be acceptable to Israel (probably why it's now backing JAN). Wonder if it will try to upset applecart w/ quick JAN regime change dash to Damascus to pre-empt deal w/ Iran for transition.

Comment from Moon of Alabama:

Interesting idea - but don't think that's the way supreme leader does business -too dirty a deal

Back to chinahand

@MoonofA agree. Iran the only grownups in the room. But might consider modulating support for Assad in return for rapprochement w/ US, coexistence w/ KSA, commitment to Syria reconstruction. 

But I wonder if Israel would move first to queer the deal in any case.

Then KSA could just shrug its shoulders and say, Hey too bad our deal with Iran didn’t work out. Conspiratorial onion can be peeled:

KSA playing nice, Israel doing the dirty, Assad gone, Iran angry and re-isolated, US left holding its d*ck as seems to be usual case in ME.

If, as I’ve previously speculated, Saudi Arabia formed a protective alliance with Israel to shield KSA from America’s righteous post-9/11 wrath (and keep the notorious 28 pages bottled up), letting Israel take the more conspicuous role in the anti-Assad tag team would be expected.

At the same time, it’s not an Arab Spring, but there might a Theocratic Autumn and a change in Saudi-Iranian relations, supporting the idea that the Kingdom has decided to put its Wahabbi-Troskyite permanent global revolution against the Shi’a on hold in order to pursue some regional power horse-trading with Iran--especially since the US attempt at rapprochement with Iran seems to be gaining some momentum, in part thanks to the accurate perception that Iran is serious about doing something about IS, while Saudi Arabia is not.

Now, therefore, is not the time to bluster about the Iranian menace to Washington.  Time for some united-front happy talk instead, and demonstrate to the United States that Saudi Arabia is capable of anti-IS vigor equivalent to what's coming out of Tehran.

In addition to a rather unprecedented meeting of the Saudi and Iranian foreign ministers, Saudi Arabia was distinctly passive in its response to a takeover of the capital of Yemen by a Shi’a force, the Houthis.

But coexisting with Iran apparently does not mean tolerating Iran’s key ally/client Bashar al-Assad.  It looks like Saudi Arabia has not changed its objectives, merely the means of pursuing them.

As to the issue of what does Saudi Arabia care more about, getting rid of Assad or reining in IS, the jury seems to be in.  A Wall Street Journal backgrounder tells us that KSA and its minions in the Gulf decided to promise the United States the moon with regard to anti-IS support…as long as the US promised not to abandon the anti-Assad crusade.

It "took months of behind-the-scenes work by the U.S. and Arab leaders, who agreed on the need to cooperate against Islamic State, but not how or when. The process gave the Saudis leverage to extract a fresh U.S. commitment to beef up training for rebels fighting Mr. Assad, whose demise the Saudis still see as a top priority."

The Saudis also agreed to foot most of the bill for the “Third Force” of 5000 fighters that is supposed to be trained and led, I imagine, at rather close quarters by the United States, and offer the prospect of a capable, controlled force that will further US objectives in Syria, especially if/when the US follows through and coordinates its operations inside Syria with close US air support.

Hat tip, by the way, to Zero Hedge for stumping up for a WSJ subscription and summarizing the key points for the beleaguered anti-imperialist forces.

Prince Bandar was in on the meeting with Secretary Kerry, another indication that Saudi Arabia has not abandoned its indefatigable campaign to evict Assad from Damascus even as the proxies for its previous anti-Assad gambit wreak so much havoc in the Middle East that the US feels compelled to step in and step up.

One might speculate that IS was a devilishly clever scheme by Prince Bandar to force the United States to return to Riyadh and bargain for KSA support in return for trying to put a leash on IS.

But I am of the school that Prince Bandar performed his usual reverse Midas touch of turning chicken salad into chicken sh*t, and the Kingdom is scrambling to make the best of his murderous incompetence.

With IS, US Getting Ready for Its “Suez Crisis” Post-Imperial Close-Up

Though an anti-war type I am not on the same page with many anti-war types when it comes to poo-pooing President Obama’s call for military action against the IS caliphate.  

The caliphate is a big deal, in my opinion, a big bad transnational deal with significant consequences throughout Asia, and something should be done.  “Something”, unfortunately, would be a big, disruptive military campaign coordinated through the UN Security Council and Arab League, spearheaded by Saudi Arabia and Turkey, and involving lots of Saudi and Turkish casualties, both military and civilian, and a prolonged, agonizing, and expensive effort to reassert the control of the Iraqi and Syrian governments over the territory they had lost.

Understandably, nobody, including the United States, is willing or able to make sure that something actually gets done and it looks like what we are getting is a collection of ineffectual half-measures justified by hyped-up “threat to the homeland” agitation whose main purpose is to exploit the crISis in order to enhance US clout in the region.

IS took root in Iraq and Syria, in large part because of the Obama administration’s willingness to enable a jihadi solution to its dump-Assad problem and the very, very bad decision of Turkey and Saudi Arabia to support the operation.  I don’t think President Obama and his foreign policy team should be judged generously for their casual “let ‘er drift” casual approach to the dangerous and unpredictable mechanics of regime collapse through jihadi insurgency, with the details handled by two rather incompetent local allies who claim to be regional powers but are actually risk averse opportunists who look to the United States to do all the heavy lifting.

The depressing part of the US strategy is that, as far as I can tell, it views the anti-IS campaign as a Trojan Horse, a chance to favor, strengthen, and advance anti-Assad forces.  So instead of cooperating with literally the only Middle Eastern state willing to field an army against IS—Syria—the US is refusing to work with Syria and instead will train and equip an anti-Assad and anti-IS force, reportedly in Saudi Arabia, that is less of a US-backed militia of venal “insurgents” and more of a controlled and disciplined military strike force created, controlled, and deployed by the CIA and, unlike our most famous previous experiment in this vein, the Bay of Pigs invasion, this force will have lots and lots of airpower. 

The idea, presumably, is that as IS is pummeled by drones and air strikes (and its fleet of tanker trucks ferrying crude oil to Turkey is destroyed) and retreats, the US-backed force will advance and occupy the vacated territories before Assad can.  And hopefully, the force will attract the fairweather allies of IS who prefer a US paycheck and immunity from air strikes to getting plastered.  And then the US can orchestrate demands from a finally viable Syrian opposition for Assad to step down in the name of national unity, full US support, and an all-out war against IS.  Victory!

My admittedly imperfect knowledge of US government decision making implies to me that somebody had to bring President Obama a proposal like this for an American win in Syria—or at least a borderline plausible case for a chance for an American win in Syria--before he made the politically unpalatable decision to re-enter the Middle East quagmire.   

Assad, Russia, and IS are, of course, not going to stand idly by as this clever plan is implemented.  My prediction is that the US will experience its usual success in the counterinsurgency nuts and bolts of “clearing” territory, and its usual difficulty in the complicated political task of “holding” territory.  So my expectation is for several more years of inconclusive and expensive bloodshed as the people of Syria and Iraq suffer through (and the US security/military/think tank complex profit from) another overoptimistic US geostrategic experiment.

I think the spectacle of the US dilemma in the Middle East will also spur the PRC to adopt a massively-preemptive hard line against Islamist militancy in Xinjiang.  China, after all, considers itself an empire on the rise and with the will and resources to go toe to toe with its political enemies, not waiting, US-style, for disaster to pound at the door before thinking about doing something.

If things heat up in west China with blame being attached to jihadi havens in Pakistan, Afghanistan, or wherever, don't be too surprised if the PRC embarks on its own regional military adventure, probably through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization of Asian states (the PRC recently hosted a big anti-terrorist military drill for SCO forces) but unilaterally if need be.  And if the PRC chooses the military option, don't expect half-measures.  If a region in Xinjiang shows promise of becoming a stronghold of anti-PRC sentiment, the regime will pave it over before it allows a IS-style force to establish itself.

And now, since I am somewhat pressed for time, I will outsource the rest of my points to my cut-and-pasted Twitter feed with edits for clarity and one extended observation:

Westerners mock pretensions of IS Caliphate but it seems to strike chord among quite a few Muslims: effort to reestablish theocratic rule in heartland of Umayyad/Abbasid caliphates, turn page on disastrous century of colonial/postcolonial rule, replace fragmented/corrupt states w/ united Islamic power. The West’s passivity validates the caliphate & its transnational strategy. May be it will be PRC/Russia that try to draw the line.

Ending IS & restoring control of its territories to functioning Syrian/Iraqi governments would require a military/political upheaval beyond will/capability of US/"allies". IMO this is the real "British @ Suez crisis" limits-of-empire event. Expect US experts already talking about how to degrade/coerce/manage/moderate/engage IS regime we can’t destroy. Good ol' Saudi Arabia waiting to offer its good offices I'm sure.  In PRC, Chinese government will adopt extremely harsh & intensive methods in Xinjiang to pre-empt similar crisis of control IMO

If as I believe PRC determined not to repeat us mistake in letting IS take root, its first order of business may be alliance w/ Mullah Omar in Afghanistan.  

[The Afghan Taliban, as opposed to the Pakistan Taliban, has maintained a modus vivendi with the PRC and not seriously threatened PRC interests in Pakistan and Xinjiang.  Proclamation of the IS Caliphate is a direct challenge to Mullah Omar’s emirship in Afghanistan and various Islamist militant organizations in South Asia are fracturing as a result.  In this case, I think Mullah Omar and the PRC will look at each other as “friends in need” when it comes to countering the IS push into Pakistan (ongoing) and Afghanistan (only a matter of time)].

Should look at Sri Lanka anti-Tamil campaign for example of what happens when PRC gets serious abt counterinsurgency.  Everybody wanted Tamils crushed but quailed at humanitarian cost. So PRC helped Sri Lankan gvt do the dirty work & let West handle post-hoc human rights handwringing. An ugly affair, & one of the few successful CI ops post-WWII.

See my article at Asia Times Online on the Sri Lanka campaign.