“Irritating Japan” Well On Its Way to Replacing “Rising
China” Meme
There is a delicious—well, delicious to me, anyway—flavor of
Western bewilderment about the neverending parade of Japanese nationalist shenanigans.
The most recent entry was Osaka Mayor Toru Hashimoto’s
endorsement of the World War II Japanese military brothel system a.k.a. “comfort
women”:
"If you want them to have a rest in such a situation, a comfort women system is necessary. Anyone can understand that."
Hashimoto—who seems to have way too much of his mental space
occupied by visions of sexually rampaging soldiers-- made his remarks in the context of promoting the Okinawan sex worker industry as a legal
source of relief for the hard-working American military men based on the
island.
Toru Hashimoto…told reporters
Monday that he visited with Marine Corps Air Station Futenma’s commander last
month and told him that servicemembers should make more use of Japan’s
legalized sex industry.
“There are places where
people can legally release their sexual energy in Japan,” Hashimoto said during
a video press conference Monday in Osaka. “Unless they make use of these
facilities, it will be difficult to control the sexual energies of the wild
Marines.”
Hashimoto said that the
commander responded with a bitter smile and told him that brothels are
off-limits to U.S. servicemembers.
Bitter smile, indeed.
Perhaps the US government took little comfort from Hashimoto
conflating the sexual needs of the US military today with those of the Imperial
Japanese Army.
For those who have been following the Okinawan issue—and China's
rather malicious and successful highlighting of particularist
sentiments among the Okinawan population as part of its campaign to undermine
Japan’s claim to eternal and uncontested sovereignty over the Senkakus—it was noteworthy
that there were also Okinawan protests against Hashimoto’s comfort-women
remarks.
Since most comfort women on Okinawa during World War II were
Korean, Okinawan objections are apparently more along the lines of resentment
against the sexual impositions involved in contemporary Tokyo-imposed US
basing, rather than the historical revisionism on the comfort women issue that
inflamed opinion in China and South Korea.
As China continues to push the Okinawan hot button with its
questioning of Japanese sovereignty over the Ryukyu Island chain, expect more
media focus on the most loaded question in Okinawa/Japanese history: the Battle
of Okinawa in 1945.
Japanese nationalists have worked assiduously to shape the
official narrative—down to the wording of memorial plaques—to depict Okinawa as
the frontline of Japanese resistance.
However, many Okinawans consider the battle—which resulted in the death
of over 100,000 Okinawan civilians in the Japanese military’s Gotterdammerung
defense—as an atrocity in which Okinawa and Okinawans were sacrificed to buy
time for the Japanese home islands. (In
the event, fear that the bloody action on Okinawa would be replicated across
the four “home islands” reportedly convinced President Truman to cancel the invasion and short-circuit
the war by dropping atomic bombs on Nagasaki and Hiroshima.)
A vocal sector of Okinawan public opinion regards Japanese
nationalist revisionism as an effort to deny Okinawan suffering and submerge it
beneath an untrue narrative of Japanese heroism.
Asia-Japan Focus reported in
2012 on the fracas over a plaque commemorating the Japanese army headquarters
on Okinawa (which, interestingly and tragically, was sited at Shuri Castle, the
“pre-eminent symbol of the Ryukyu Kingdom” according to the translators):
A controversy has arisen over Okinawa governor Nakaima’s deletion of
the word “suteishi" (sacrificial stone) [this doesn’t mean “sacrificial stone” in the
exalted sense of a “consecrated altar”; it refers to a disposable position and
losable game piece in the board game of go--PL] from the draft that was
prepared for the translation of the description for the explanation panel about
the 32nd Army HQ Shelter. Hitherto, the word “suteishi” has been used as
a key term that directly captures the essence of the Battle of Okinawa. This
word also symbolises “postwar” Japan-Okinawa relations, in which Japan regained
its sovereignty with the San Francisco Peace Treaty, while abandoning Okiwawa
to US military domination, and forcing it to bear the burden of the US bases,
even after Japan regained administrative rights over Okinawa.
There is nothing new about Japanese nationalism with a World
War II denialist tinge.
Despite efforts to keep it buttoned up (members of the
ruling LDP distanced themselves from Hashimoto’s remarks), nationalism keeps
bubbling up and its emergence into the Japanese political mainstream is an
unpleasant surprise for American pundits.
After all, “peaceful, progressive, and democratic Japan” is
more than a useful cliche in the compare-and-contrast framing opposite “assertive,
oppressive, and communist China”.
A cooperative, helpful Japan is the linchpin of US efforts
to orchestrate a soft containment of China based on US-friendly liberal norms
and justified by the idea that the unruly Chinese dragon needs to be kept in
its cage by an alliance of the US and Asian democracies.
Japan “going off the res” and behaving like a war-loving
dingbat creates obvious problems for the optics of the “pivot to Asia”.
Japanese nationalism also complicates the US narrative with
its healthy dose of anti-Americanism (including a sub voce tendency to blame
the US-imposed constitution, US-demanded yen appreciation, the US-inflicted
global financial crisis, and US blind infatuation with the strategic and
economic importance of China for Japan’s long term woes), and a remarkable and
embarrassing hostility toward critical US ally South Korea as Japan’s zero-sum
rival for economic and diplomatic leadership among the Asian democracies.
The fact that a bona-fide Asian democracy can act so “assertively”
also calls into question the lazy liberal assumption that democratization
is a panacea which automatically translates into tolerance, transnational amity, de-escalation of tensions,
and regional stability.
A less obvious but, I expect, to US diplomatic strategists,
more pressing problem is that nationalist ideals are serving as a justification
for an independent-minded Japanese foreign policy that plays lip service to US
objectives but actually exploits US backing in order to advance Japanese
interests at the expense of US goals.
In the US, we call it “The tail wagging the dog”.
In China (and Japan), the relevant proverb is “The fox
pretending to the tiger’s might”. (In the
Chinese proverb, the fox claims that people respect him more than the
tiger. “Just walk behind me, and you’ll
see how people fear me.” The gullible
tiger follows the fox and is chagrined to see all the other animals fleeing, apparently, before the fox.)
My personal shorthand for the situation is “Japan as the
Israel of East Asia”.
I think this is a metaphor that troubles the US government
as well.
After all, one of the attractions of pivoting to Asia and
away from the Middle East was that the United States would be leaving a region
in which its freedom of movement was constrained at enormous financial,
military, and diplomatic cost by Israel’s ability to substitute its own
security narrative (existential threat of Iran’s nuclear weapons) for the US
priority, at least for the Obama administration (normalizing relations with
Iran and resolution of the Palestinian issue).
Instead, I have a feeling that Japan under nationalist rule
will be more interested in encouraging polarization between pro-China and
pro-US blocs in Asia—thereby providing Japan with a favored and decisive role—than
it will be in behaving like the good, obedient ally assisting the United States
as it manages its relationship with China-- soon going to be the world’s
largest economy--at the expense of the interests and anxieties of an
increasingly marginalized Japan.
By this reading, the Senkaku crisis—which forces the United
States to line up with Japan against China over some Taiwanese rocks the Obama
administration cares nothing about—is like money in the bank for the Abe
government.
Therefore I’m not expecting that crisis to go anywhere soon.