I note with interest that Thomas Friedman, the premier moral imbecile of American
journalism, is spitballing the idea of using ISIS to roll back Iran.
Friedman is still an outlier. The moderate voice in hawkish Middle East
policy today, on the other hand, belongs to analysts calling for supporting al
Qaeda as the preferred US asset against Iran and, for that matter, ISIS.
This marks a sea change in American Middle East public punditry
and a sign that the United States has moved beyond the 9/11 era, in which our
national policy and indeed our national identity was largely defined by getting
those AQ bad guys who had knocked down the World Trade Center, blown a hole in
the Pentagon, and killed over 3000 Americans on a single day in 2001.
Now, the oppose-Iran obsession has resumed center stage, at
least for the Beltway-friendly commentariat, and al Qaeda is seen as a suitable
and acceptable partner, especially since the current Sunni extremist champion,
ISIS, is enduring an ass-kicking at the hands and boots of the Iraq government,
Shi’ite militias, and Iranian Revolutionary Guard units.
It is sobering to consider that the United States has done
less to un-f*ck-up the Middle East in 14 years than Iran has been able to
accomplish in a few months of campaigning in eastern Iraq. Another sign, if anybody is paying attention,
that Iran is the least dysfunctional polity and partial democracy in the Middle
East, while Uncle Sam is trapped driving in circles in a clown car fighting for
the wheel with Saudi Arabian autocrats and Israeli apartheidists.
No wonder President Obama wants rapprochement with Iran and
a quick pivot outta here to the peaceful and prosperous precincts of Asia. Good luck with that!
As to the odious al Qaeda alliance, the bad news is that it
is more than the fever dream of frustrated Beltway analysts.
The de facto US-AQ alliance has been going on in Syria for
almost three years.
In fact, I think I can put a date on its formal unveiling:
July 17, 2012, the day the US, Europe, Turkey, and the GCC optimistically
thought they could wrap up the Syria crisis in a few weeks with a well-timed
campaign of terror and insurrection starting in Damascus.
Recently, a Beirut based newspaper, As-Safir, published a
report on the July 2012 bombing (not aerial bombing, a C4 boobytrap) that wiped
out Bashar al-Assad’s “security cell” a.k.a. his national security team during
their daily strategy session in Damascus.
As translated by an outfit called Mideastwire, As-Safir claims the bombing was a decapitation
strike as part of an elaborately choreographed scheme by the U.S. to collapse
the Syrian government and military and smooth the way for a drive on Damascus
by the Free Syrian Army and the elevation of defecting general Manaf Tlass (who
possessed limited capacities beyond a firm jaw well suited to Churchillian
cigar-clenching but was adored by the French, perhaps because his socialite sister
had allegedly been the mistress of a French foreign minister) to the
presidency.
Why should we care?
With the cataract of blood and rubble and anguish that has hurtled into
the Syrian abyss since then, why should we care that three of Assad’s henchman
got blown up in July 2012?
Because a) the aftermath of the attack revealed the essential
robustness of the Syrian regime and command structure and apparently convinced
President Obama that strategies predicated on quick regime collapse either by
covert action or indignant rhetoric were unlikely to remove Assad from his
perch; b) Assad’s view of Western/GCC negotiating sincerity was probably
tempered by the awareness that they had tried to murder him ; and c) the
helter-skelter scheme revealed for the first time the presence of armed
extremists under the Al Qaeda banner as US auxiliaries.
I am inclined to believe As-Safir, apparently a lefty,
Syria-friendly outfit with a large circulation, because shortly after the
bombing I drew the same conclusion, immortalized in my July 28,
2012 piece for Asia Times Online:
[A] funny thing
happened last week. The Assad regime didn't collapse, despite an orchestrated,
nation-wide assault (coordinated, we can assume, by the crack strategists of
the international anti-Assad coalition): a decapitating terrorist bombing in
the national security directorate, near-simultaneous armed uprisings in the
main regime strongholds of Damascus and Aleppo, and the seizure of many of
Syria's official border crossings with Iraq and Turkey.
Points 1 and 2 are covered in the As-Safir article, which
apparently draws on tittle-tattle from a French diplomat. As to the third point, seizure of the border
crossings, in July 2012 I wrote (refer to my ATOl article for the links):
Juan Cole of the University of Michigan laid out the big picture strategic thinking behind some of the border seizures on his blog, Informed Comment:
If the FSA can take the third crossing from Iraq, at Walid, they can control truck traffic into Syria from Iraq, starving the regime. The border is long and porous, but big trucks need metalled roads, which are few and go through the checkpoints. Some 70% of goods coming into Syria were coming from Iraq, because Europe cut off trade with the Baath regime of Bashar al-Assad. The rebels are increasingly in a position to block that trade or direct it to their strongholds.According to an Iraqi deputy minister of the interior, the units that seized the border were perhaps not the goodwill ambassadors that the Syrian opposition or Dr Cole might have hoped for:The top official said Iraqi border guards had witnessed the Free Syrian Army take control of a border outpost, detain a Syrian army lieutenant colonel, and then cut off his arms and legs.
"Then they executed 22 Syrian soldiers in front of the eyes of Iraqi soldiers."They reportedly also raised the al-Qaeda flag.
The forces participating in the operation at the Turkish border crossings were also an interesting bunch - and certainly not all local Syrian insurgents, as AFP reported:By Saturday evening, a group of some 150 foreign fighters describing themselves as Islamists had taken control of the post.
These fighters were not at the site on Friday, when rebel fighters captured the post.
Some of the fighters said they belonged to Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), while others claimed allegiance to the Shura Taliban. They were armed with Kalashnikov assault rifles, rocket launchers and improvised mines.
The fighters identified themselves as coming from a number of countries: Algeria, France, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia and the United Arab Emirates - and the Russian republic of Chechnya…
Nice to remember that Juan Cole, who embarrassed himself
mightily by cheerleading the Libyan debacle, also applied his mad analytic and
tactical skillz to the Syrian fiasco.
Anyway, the appearance of armed Islamist extremists as part
of a meticulously if not particularly intelligently planned regime change
gambit in 2012: that’s what matters today.
Because even after the decapitation & collapse strategy
failed, the extremists stayed, presumably as executors of an open-ended “success
is not an option” “bleed Syria (and Iran)” strategy funded by Gulf interests,
supported by Turkish infrastructure, and condoned by the United States.
And bleed Syria did.
The result is a butcher’s bill of nearly one
quarter of a million dead and 3.5 million refugees, over 90% incurred after the
domestic insurrection failed in February 2012 and the combined genius of the
Western, Arab, and Turkish worlds was turned to engineering regime change via
external means.
As the sage said, success has a thousand fathers and failure
is an orphan. So it is reprehensible but
not too surprising that the Syrian horror is now described in the ultimate
hands-off passive voice fashion as “a tragedy” and not “the knowing murder of
hundreds of thousands and the immiserating of millions by the funding, supply,
facilitation, and diplomatic support of thousands of paramilitaries by the
United States, European states, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and now Israel
(which is now providing medical facilities to wounded AQ fighters at the Syrian
border)”.
It is also darkly amusing that the worse IS does, the more pre-emptive
squealing one hears from the West about the as yet unmaterialized threat of
massive human rights violations against Sunnis by Shi’a forces in areas
recovered from IS.
And, to cap it, you get chin-stroking in the press about
common cause with AQ and/or ISIS to stop the Iranian menace.
Which reminds me of the final indispensable element in
regime-change choreography: credulous, vociferous, enabling media.
According to as-Safir, it was clear at the early July 2012
Friends of Syria conference in Paris that something was afoot:
When a French diplomat stopped two journalists, a French and an Arab, in early July 2012, near a café adjacent to the French foreign ministry, the lights of the Friends of Syria conference had grown dim at the conference center following two exhausting days of debate that provided the impression to the meeting participants that the toppling of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad is now a fait accompli.…[T]he diplomat revealed what he had in mind and advised the journalists to slow down with their packing because a major event was going to take place in July. The bets to topple Al-Assad in Paris and between the “Friends of Syria” had turned into a mere matter of time.
I will be charitable and say, despite these manifest signs
(and, for that matter, the fact that an externally choreographed regime change
jamboree was under way was apparent even to an outside observer like me), it
was not clear to the legion of Western journos covering Syria that they were
getting played as part of some PR charade whose primary purpose was to stampede
Russian into abandoning Assad and supporting a UNSC resolution condemning him,
preferably with an Article 7 stinger approving the use of force, thereby
enabling transition to the West/GCC-backed opposition.
At the New York Times, Neil McFarquar (with considerable
assistance: “Reporting was contributed by Dalal Mawad and Hwaida Saad from
Beirut, Rick Gladstone from New York, Ellen Barry from Moscow, Isabel Kershner
from Jerusalem, Elisabeth Bumiller and Eric Schmitt from Washington, and an
employee of The New York Times from Damascus, Syria.”) asked if the death knell
was being sounded for Assad’s regime:
The impact of
the day’s events reverberated on multiple levels, piercing the psychological
advantage that Mr. Assad’s superior military strength has provided in
preserving the loyalty of his forces and frightening much of the public into
staying home. With the opposition energized and the government demoralized,
analysts wondered if other military units and trusted lieutenants would be more
inclined to switch sides — and if the government would retaliate with an
escalation of violence.
The
idea that a poorly organized, lightly armed opposition force could somehow get
so close to the seat of power raised questions about the viability of a once
unassailable police state.
In its final form, the title of the piece is “Syrian Rebels
Land Deadly Blow to Assad’s Inner Circle”.
I suspect the original, more optimistic drift of the piece is embodied
in the URL:
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/19/world/middleeast/suicide-attack-reported-in-damascus-as-more-generals-flee.html
Despite the telephoned and optimistically spun blandishments
of President Obama, Putin didn’t bite (I expect he was still feeling the “Libya
no-fly-zone burn”), and the anti-Assad coalition had, in addition to botching
the putsch, failed to strip the Assad regime of Russian support. In fact, the Russian Federation doubled down
on its support of Assad instead. Which,
I imagine, feeds the “Bad Vlad” resentment that permeates Western capitals and
editorial offices…
…exacerbated, certainly, by Putin’s sabotaging of another
brilliant Western scheme, this time in Ukraine…
…which, come to think of it, explains my extremely jaundiced
opinion of the reportorial and analytic capacities of the pro-Kyiv journos, who
exhibit a similar paired obliviousness to incompetent, catastrophic, and
morally bankrupt Western strategic gambits with credulous retailing of
anti-Russian novelties as their outlets and colleagues previously displayed in
the matter of Syria.
4 comments:
nice turn of phrase
I can't tell if you're being deliberately disingenuous by conflating the broader Syrian opposition with al Qaeda, or are letting a kneejerk anti-Americanism blind you to nuance. Either way, your piece fails to meaningfully link US and AQ but by odd insinuation based off innocuous quotations that you feel have some nigh-conspiratorial hidden implications.
Perhaps Sean, the writer is a "self-loathing American"? I don't share your uncertainty however about who is being disingenuous; the connection between the US and AQ goes back to OBL's earliest moments, and before if you make allowances for the frequency of which these groups rebrand. If you are suggesting it is "conflation," or worse "conspiratial" to connect the two, you've missed the last generation or so of US foreign policy in the region.
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