"It cost us 20 million lives to win the rivers and mountains of China. Do the students believe they can take them from us without payment?"
Remark attributed to Wang Zhen after declaration of martial law in May 1989
Remark attributed to Wang Zhen after declaration of martial law in May 1989
"We love the students"
Message scribbled in my notes by a citizen of Beijing in May 1989
As will be apparent from the material I've archived in this post, I was on the scene at Tian An Men Square in Beijing for a good number of significant events in 1989, including June 4th and also May 19, which might have turned out to be even more significant.
A few weeks after I returned to the U.S., I wrote an account
of my experiences, submitted it to a national magazine, and received a nice
rejection letter stating that “at this stage it does feel a little out of date,
considering the volume of testimonies that have been published’.
Considering the saturation coverage the democracy movement
had received in the Western press, I couldn’t argue with that assessment, so I
tucked my account and my notes into an envelope, where they resided untouched
for thirty years.
However, I revisited my old
typewritten/handwritten/faxed/photocopied archive yesterday and decided to
convert them into digital form and post them here to provide a documentary alternative to the June
4th fetishism (now supercharged by the hope that the CCP will be swept into the dustbin of history as a challenger to US pre-eminence) that infects the Western press and intelligentsia...
...or as Nicholas Kristof put it in one of the endless series of June 4th 30th anniversary commemoratives run by the New York Times in its crusade to embarrass and delegitimize the CCP:
[T]hose of us who witnessed Beijing Spring are confident that eventually, unpredictably, the tide of freedom will roll in again.
...or as Nicholas Kristof put it in one of the endless series of June 4th 30th anniversary commemoratives run by the New York Times in its crusade to embarrass and delegitimize the CCP:
[T]hose of us who witnessed Beijing Spring are confident that eventually, unpredictably, the tide of freedom will roll in again.
.
Well, some of us who witnessed Beijing Spring harbor certain suspicions that 1989 witnessed a new birth of authoritarianism.
Western nostalgia for 1989 is understandable, because it was the apogee of pro-American sentiment in Beijing. When I was in the square, locals were inviting the United States to send aid in the form of B 52 bombers, missiles, and even the Mafia (to assassinate Li Peng and Yang Shangkun).
Western nostalgia for 1989 is understandable, because it was the apogee of pro-American sentiment in Beijing. When I was in the square, locals were inviting the United States to send aid in the form of B 52 bombers, missiles, and even the Mafia (to assassinate Li Peng and Yang Shangkun).
But in my opinion the simplistic narrative of a democratic movement temporarily balked by authoritarian power simplifies the forces at work, ignores the post-1989 evolution of Chinese sentiment, and encourages the false hope that those (pro-American, regime-shaking) conditions
can be conveniently replicated in the 21st century.
The CCP has spent decades studying, developing
countermeasures, and evolving to make sure 1989 (and for that matter Tian An
Men) don’t happen again. And the U.S. has spent decades screwing up: stuff like bombing the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, cratering the prestige of liberal democracy through the Iraq War, Great Financial Crisis, Trumpismo, so on and so forth.
As preface to my 1989 material, I offer these observations concerning 1989 (and welcome
correction since I have not immersed myself in the history of the movement):
Before the troops entered the city on the evening of June 3,
the democracy movement had already been pretty much defeated. The immense crowds had deserted Tian An Men
Square, leaving it to a relatively bedraggled and disorganized group of dead
enders.
When Zhao Ziyang visited the square on May 19 and told the
students he had “come too late” he was probably expressing his regret that he
had been completely outmaneuvered in the factional infighting in the Politburo
and terminally botched his attempt, whether motivated by reasons of principle
or ambition, to leverage the energies of the popular protests on behalf of his
agenda.
I have not followed the minutiae of June 4th
historiography, but I would be interested to learn who was the young man in
military fatigues who hurried to the square on May 19 (but had his face
shielded from cameras) to urgently announce Zhao Ziyang’s removal from the Politburo
Standing Committee, thereby rallying the students who were poised to abandon
the square that night.
If Zhao dispatched the messenger, perhaps Deng Xiaoping was
generous in simply putting Zhao in cold storage in Sichuan for the rest of his
life. And maybe history is generous in
not condemning Zhao for encouraging the students to cling to the square and
become a piñata for the PLA.
In my opinion, the 1989 movement was less of a “democracy
movement” than a “populist movement” in keeping with the base meaning of the Chinese characters 民主 a.k.a. "rule by the people". In
its rhetoric it largely eschewed direct challenge to the CCP’s right to rule,
and instead agitated for accountable rule, to be achieved through increased
freedom of expression and association, not multi-party democracy and free
elections.
Undoubtedly for many activists the ultimate goal was to rot
the CCP into oblivion through free speech, protest, and agitation and
transition to a parliamentary system, but the formal mechanism was “petition”
i.e. appealing to the better nature of the CCP’s better leaders to come up with
solutions to the Party’s dysfunctional rule.
And Party rule in 1989 was pretty corrupt and pretty inept.
This approach produced a designation of "bad" CCP leaders (Li Peng, Yang Shangkun, Wang Zhen etc.) and the declared hope that "better" CCP leaders (Zhao Ziyang, Wan Li, Xu Xiangqian, Nie Rongzhen) would step up to champion Hu Yaobang's legacy and the student agenda.
Fatally, the ultimate "bad" CCP leader turned out to be Deng Xiaoping & he scotched any hopes of a favorable factional dynamic inside the CCP that would sideline the hardliners.
Tian An Men is very much Deng Xiaoping's bloody baby.
This approach produced a designation of "bad" CCP leaders (Li Peng, Yang Shangkun, Wang Zhen etc.) and the declared hope that "better" CCP leaders (Zhao Ziyang, Wan Li, Xu Xiangqian, Nie Rongzhen) would step up to champion Hu Yaobang's legacy and the student agenda.
Fatally, the ultimate "bad" CCP leader turned out to be Deng Xiaoping & he scotched any hopes of a favorable factional dynamic inside the CCP that would sideline the hardliners.
Tian An Men is very much Deng Xiaoping's bloody baby.
Student hopes of an elite-fracturing factional struggle within the CCP leadership elicited Deng Xiaoping’s otherwise inexplicable fear of a return
to the Cultural Revolution and its mobilization of the entirety of Chinese
society in political, social, and armed conflict.
Perhaps for Deng, scuttling around in the caverns beneath Zhong Nan Hai and dreading confrontation with a factional mob reawakened unpleasant memories of his own experiences at the hands of Mao and the Gang of Four…and explained his anger and contempt at Zhao Ziyang for pandering to the students.
Perhaps for Deng, scuttling around in the caverns beneath Zhong Nan Hai and dreading confrontation with a factional mob reawakened unpleasant memories of his own experiences at the hands of Mao and the Gang of Four…and explained his anger and contempt at Zhao Ziyang for pandering to the students.
The message that Deng imposed on Zhao and the Party was the
familiar one of unity of the elite core: hang together or hang separately. It’s a lesson that the CCP has pretty much
taken to heart after the near-death experience of 1989 and the calamity that
afflicted post-Soviet Russia.
And I believe Deng’s outlook determined the endgame of the
protests: the bloody assault of June 3-4 and beyond. The assault was massive and disproportionate
so that every Party member was required to stand up, commit to the Party line
with positive/extreme action, and share the responsibility…and the guilt.
The posted materials include the rejected magazine piece, Massacre of the Innocents, which I wrote
in July 1989.
For historical interest I’ve also directly and completely transcribed
the record I compiled immediately after the protests in my hotel from my
scribbled notes made while out and about (sample of my field notes below with the statement in
Chinese “We love the students” that a Beijing citizen emphatically wrote for
me).
The record is reproduced without addition or correction
(except for my tongue in cheek references of the protesters’ motorcycle auxiliary
as “Deng’s Angels”; I provide the correction to “Flying Tigers”, the name they
became commonly known by). [Bracketed
material] was written as part of the record in my hotel in 1989 immediately
after the events to supplement and clarify my field notes.
Raw material of history, historians!
The timestamped
material is stuff I directly witnessed.
The other stuff either summarizes conversations with local interlocutors
or presents my commentary at that time.
Final note: I am confident of the accuracy of most of my
observations, except hearing the crowd sing “The Internationale” at 3:00
AM on June 4. When you’re tired and freaked out, your mind
can play tricks on you. I might have
dreamed that one.
Massacre of the Innocents
I was on Chang An Avenue west of Tian An Men on the night of
the massacre. Shortly after midnight I
walked beyond the XiDan Street barricade—two accordion buses pulled across the
intersection. Down the avenue toward the
west I could hear the continuous popping of automatic weapons, and see muzzle
flashes and the distant orange glow of a burning bus. The broad avenue was dotted with anxious
knots of people smashing paving stones and pulling apart traffic lights in a
desperate search for weapons. Suddenly,
a young man fell in the middle of the street.
A crowd hurriedly gathered around him, picked him up amid shouted
instructions, and rushed to a nearby hospital.
The gunfire grew in volume and intensity, and the scattered groups of
people were swept off the avenue in a wave of panic. Tear gas began to fill the air.
I turned and found myself looking into the eyes of a young woman. She was in her best summer dress and
awkwardly gripping two lumps of rubble torn from the sidewalk. She was struggling to keep control of herself,
but her eyes were filling with tears and her voice was cracking. “Do you see what they’re doing?” she
sobbed. Can you imagine they would do
such a thing? Please, you must go back
and tell what you saw. Please.” As a chorus of voices echoed her, I was led
to the center of the avenue where the young man had fallen and saw the splash
of fresh, crimson blood near the median.
Shortly thereafter, the authorities blacked out the western district and
the military column began its assault on the intersection.
I had been in and out of Beijing on business several times
in the month prior to June 4. Every time
I came back to the capital, I would follow the thousands of people who would
stream into Tian An Men Square to visit the students there, read the banners,
and gather under the streetlights for excited discussions of politics and
strategy. Every night the city shared a
mood dictated by conditions in the square—exhilaration, exhaustion, indignation,
or anxiety. The citizens glowed with
pride and self-respect, and the democracy movement acquired an aura of
predestined success.
In its earliest stages, the student demonstrations were
characterized by a high degree of discipline and organization. During the hunger strike, direction of
traffic in the center of the city was for all intents and purposes surrendered
by the police to the students’ Marshals’ Committee, headquartered on the steps
of the History Museum east of the square.
Roadways were demarcated by lengths of white cord and reserved for the
ambulances carrying a continual stream of hunger strikers to the hospitals.
Captains were identified with white headbands and dispatched to the
intersections to clear the way and maintain order.
As the scope of the demonstrations grew, the students were
joined by workers marching under the banners of their factories , and
“independent business men” on their motorcycles forming the famous “Flying
Tiger” squad. With the students
receiving open and sub rosa support
from the media, government bureaucracy, and even the CCP, it seemed the square
was becoming the fulcrum for a truly national political movement. The enthusiasm probably reached its apogee on
May 19, the night martial law was declared.
On that night, it appeared the students were prepared to
abandon both the square and their hunger strike. Around midnight the marshals formed a human
chain leading out of the southeast quadrant of the square and began directing
the withdrawal of hundreds of students.
One after the other, various university delegations dissolved their
distinct, tightly knit encampments, and streamed out of Tian An Men Square.
In the middle of this process a three-wheeled pedicab,
several young men balanced precariously on its bed, jounced into the square near
the Monument to the Martyrs of the Revolution.
One of their number, dressed in military green, pulled out a
battery-powered megaphone and announced to the crowd what he identified as
“most correct news”. His face shielded
from TV cameras by the arm of a colleague, he proceeded to details the events
of that afternoon’s meeting of the Politburo Standing Committee—the rejection
of Zhao Ziyang’s conciliatory approach, his removal, and the ascendancy of Li
Peng’s hardline clique. Moments later,
as if to confirm this extremely accurate and timely announcement, the
government loudspeakers crackled to life and began booming out the government’s
declaration of martial law.
A buzz of indignation ran through the crowd and the squads,
which had been leaving, hesitated and returned.
The square became a hive of activity, with a stream of speeches over the
students’ PA at the Monument, and spontaneous parades around the perimeter of
the square on foot, under banners, or on bicycles with arms linked Meanwhile, factory trucks filled with defiant
workers flashing the V sign began rumbling and down the avenue.
Within the hour, reports were received that the army was
attempting to enter the city from the west.
Student teams began to rush off in trucks and bicycles, and the Flying
Tigers raced along the avenues unrestricted by the traffic police. The streets filled with excited people
exchanging news and rumors, and hitching rides on trucks headed west. Sometime trucks pulled away with stragglers
trapped in the grasp of passengers on the flatbed, forcing them to do a frantic
quickstep to get on board.
Their objective was twenty four army vehicles stopped about
6 miles west of Beijing, around a floodlit traffic circle called Gong Zhu
Fen. I arrived to find the glum and hapless
soldiers surrounded by crowds of hectoring students reading statement for their
benefit, and for the TV cameras. The
surrounding crowds surged with excitement and energy. Truckloads of students and Flying Tigers
performed ecstatic victory donuts around the circle and roared back into the
city. As dawn filled the east, the
residents of Beijing began to appear, walking, jogging, doing Tai Qi, or airing
their thrushes in cloth-hooded cages.
The first morning bus lumbered down Chang An Avenue was stopped by a
crowd of students imploring the driver to join the general strike—and he did.
Walking homeward, I reached the official party
residence—Zhong Nan Hai, west of the square—as the soldiers trooped out to the
great flagpole in the cool, pale morning for the daily raising of the
colors. The doorway was hung with
tattered student banners and a press of haggard young people surrounded the
squad. An expressionless captain fixed
the PRC flag to the lanyard and hoisted it.
He stiffly snapped a salute, and the students joined in a ragged
rendition of the Chinese national anthem.
It seemed as if a great and fundamental change had occurred.
The first week of martial law began with a flush of
optimism. Citizens gathered in the
square every night to protect the student demonstrators, and the streets were
filled with the thunder of the Flying Tigers, which had grown into an immense squadron
of nearly 250 Hondas, Suzukis, and mopeds.
So long as the army didn’t enter the city, every sunrise was a victory,
and the downfall of Li Peng was predicted daily.
However, it is easy to see in retrospect that the students’
cause was lost on May 20, at the declaration of martial law. The hunger strike was abandoned and the
students were left without a concrete program or strategy to oppose a
government which refused to engage in any sort of dialogue.
Meanwhile, the government consolidated direction of the army
during meetings in Wuhan with the commanders of the military districts. PLA forces were stationed in TV and newspaper
offices to reestablish control over the media.
It was common knowledge that troops were infiltrating into the center of
the city through a honeycomb of tunnels which connect the Forbidden City, Great
Hall of the People, and History Museum to secure locations outside the
city. Enormous military forces—estimated
at well over 200,000 strong—were rushed to Beijing and massed in the suburbs.
In the city, work units began to tighten control over their
personnel and their vehicles, and compiled detailed records of pro-democracy
activities. The Flying Tigers were
crippled by arrests (informants had joined their nightly processions and noted
their license numbers) and thus the students lost their reassuring thunder—and
mobility. A temporary tax of 200% on
inward remittances cut off most of the demonstrators’ funds from Hong Kong, and
petty harassments such as interruption of water supplies to the square further
drained their strength and resolve.
Finally, the government made its first overt move against the movement,
arresting three members of the workers’ independent union on June 3.
The tragedy of June 4 was rehearsed the night before—as
farce. At 2:00 AM I was awakened by
somebody bicycling under my window shouting “Comrades! Get up! Get up!” Moments later I heard the synchronized slap
of thousands of tennis shoes as an immense column of soldiers trotted down
Chang An Avenue. They were without
rifles or military jackets, and extraordinarily young-looking. In fact, I first mistook them for a
contingent of Young Pioneers, the communist party youth corps. I ran ahead toward the Beijing Hotel and saw
that an excited crowd had gathered at the Dong Dan intersection.
As the column approached the people frantically began to
pull the median dividers across the street to block the troops’ advance. At first they tried to erect their barricades
across the road too close to the head of the column, and the troops brushed
them aside. The citizens ran down the
road and repeated the process fifty yards onward—with the same result. Finally, in front of the Beijing Hotel, two
municipal vehicles drove up to block the road to the accompaniment of excited cheers
from the crowd. At the same time the
vanguard of the troops allowed themselves to be herded into the bicycle lane
and sandwiched between its divider and the sidewalk fence. They were enveloped by a crowd of shouting,
grasping people and their discipline quickly cracked. Young soldiers broke from the column either
to join the people or escape the harassment, and others, trapped in the center
of the column, began pitching their hats and gear into the air. Some clambered over the fence and began
straggling out of town on the sidewalk. Finally, someone from the square
appeared with a megaphone and began shouting instructions, which were
universally ignored. As the column
dissolved, the crowd roared in unison “Go back! Go back!” A pedicab drove off toward the square with a
meagre pile of trophies—hats, jackets, and so on—for a victory lap.
There was immediate speculation that this fiasco had been
organized by the government in order to discredit the unreliable units of the
Beijing Military Command which had taken part in the march. Less attention was paid to the fact that this
inept thrust had demonstrated the tactical helplessness of the student
movement. After the fall of Zhao Ziyang,
the students were clearly bereft of information concerning government actions
and troop movements. The streets had
been cleared of the Flying Tigers and commandeered trucks, and student messengers
had to traverse the vast distances of Beijing municipality by bicycle. Students from the local colleges had, in
large part, returned to their campuses, leaving the square to arriving students
from outlying cities—who were perhaps more extreme, less organized, and with no
clear strategy other than to cling to the square until a hoped-for meeting of
the Standing Committee of the People’s Congress and a presumed political
solution. Finally, the students and the
people of Beijing were exhausted, worn down by tension, exhilaration, and an
endless succession of sleepless nights.
The next night brought the whirlwind they were totally unprepared for.
On the afternoon of June 3, I walked down Chang An Avenue
and through the square. The main road
was extensively barricaded and virtually impassable to motorized traffic. Near the Zhong Nan Hai party compound there
were unsettling signs of violence from a skirmish an hour before: three smashed
vehicles, a traffic kiosk with its windows knocked out, glass littering the
intersection—and seven anxious police trapped in a van by an angry crowd. One man came up to me and showed a blunt,
grey-brown trophy—a tear gas canister.
It was the first time force had been used in the city center.
In front of the Great Hall of the People, I came across a
hollow rectangle of several hundred determined-looking troops in full battle
dress. A young man wandered through it
with blood streaming copiously over his face and shirt from a scalp wound, his
mouth gaping and hands raised in a universal gesture of lamentation. A murmur ran through the crowd but no one
spoke or stepped forward.
That night around midnight, having heard a report on CNN of
new troop movements, I made my way past the barricades to the square once
more. There was a swirl of disassociated
activity going on, with the main student PA at the monument competing with
another, in the northern quarter, which was ineffectually attempting to
interest the crowd in the dedication of “Democracy University”. I paid my final respects to the Goddess of
Democracy and followed a stream of angry young people striding westward on Chang
An Avenue toward the Zhong Nan Hai compound.
For the first time I saw people carrying clubs—actually pathetic
switches torn from the sapling by the road—and gathering piles of broken
bricks. The entrance to the compound was ringed by tense and angry people
confronting a line of troops in battle dress.
I was waiting for a shout, a push, or a slogan which would
send the crowd surging against the troops, but it never came. Instead, we watched two young men engage in a
painstaking and farcical attempt to drape a ripped sheet over the security
camera mounted on a lamp pole across from the compound entrance. Shortly after midnight they succeeded in
clambering up the pole and stuffing a plastic pail over the lens, and were
rewarded with a half-derisory, half congratulatory cheer.
In the next moment we hear a distant wave of rumbling and
popping which might have been summer thunder, but turned out to be the first
sounds of the army assault from the west at Mu Xi Di. Twenty minutes later I found myself outside
the barricade at Xi Dan Street as the armed column began sweeping down the
avenue to crush the democracy movement in the center of the capital.
June 4 was not the triumph of age over youth, or the past
over the future. It was the victory of
the party elders led by Deng Xiaoping—creators and masters of the party-state
juggernaut, with decades of revolutionary experience—over naïve students and
untested second generation party bureaucrats.
Declaration of martial law hamstrung the students’ movement
while concentrating authority and effective control in the hands of the
hardline Martial Law Command. But
bringing the army to Beijing served a broader purpose. It created an atmosphere of intense political
crisis which enabled Deng Xiaoping to initiate an extensive and draconian purge
of Chinese society which is still going on today.
This opportunity brought with it a historical conundrum—how
to mobilize the army and still maintain control of it. Addressing this problem, Deng Xiaoping also
showed that the innocent patriotic optimism of the students was no match for
the old men who had created and manipulated the PLA for half a century. As the democracy movement learned to its
bitter cost, in China, the Party—despite its ideological impotence and the
bankruptcy of its political and economic leadership—is the only organization
capable of exacting obedience from China’s fractious military.
The traditional approach—splitting the PLA into competing
armies isolated in garrisons far from Beijing—would not serve, since units had
to be brought into the capital. Instead,
Deng Xiaoping allowed the Martial Law Army to become a vehicle for the ambitions
of President Yang Shangkun and his family, while bringing in dozens of neutral
or hostile armies and creating a welter of competing loyalties and ambitions to
be manipulated by Deng’s Central Military Commission.
The massive mobilization effectively neutralized the threat
of unilateral PLA action but in the process virtually assured a violent and
costly military solution to the unarmed civilian occupation of Tian An Men
Square. It was rumored that the 27th
Army—commanded by Yang Shangkun’s son-was designated to lead the assault and
threatened with 2 years’ imprisonment as a unit if it did not carry out its
orders and reach the square on the morning of June 4. In the event, it took something more than six
hours and well over 2000 lives.
The column advancing into Tian An Men Square from the west
was a lethal motorcade of armored personnel carriers and transports filled with
troops. It rammed through the barricades
at Xi Dan and established a strong point at the intersection, continually
spraying the approaches with automatic rifle fire in the air, at the feet, and
at chest height.
I took cover in an alley parallel to Chang An Street. It was filled with people sheltering from the
continual hail of gunfire outside. A
pedicab creaked by on the way to the hospital, with a man lying on the bed in the
back. He was naked from the waist up,
and very still. A white towel pressed
against the center of his chest showed a brilliant red dot.
I spent the next two hours huddled in a tiny courtyard near
the intersection with a group of grim young Chinese. Some embraced silently, others murmured in an
undertone beneath the continual crackle of rifle fire about casualties,
tactics, and the future. Two were
wounded, and the group tried to turn its concentration to treating them. We watched under flashlight as a foot with an
arterial wound pulsed and bled slowly through its bandages into a porcelain
basin. An old couple brought out a
minute bottle of iodine, which was diligently inspected for its expiration date
and conscientiously applied. Finally,
one of the residents took a door off its hinges to serve as a stretcher and the
wounded young man was sent off with bearers and guide on the perilous journey
to the local hospital.
About 3:00 AM, a powerful chorus filled the air—a mass of
people on Chang An Street were singing the “Internationale”. The gunfire rose in a crescendo to meet it
and after a few minutes the voices fell silent.
I thought, this is what the end of the world must sound like: choirs and
machine guns.
Shortly thereafter, the two-hour barrage of gunfire ceased
and quiet filled the intersection. There
was a gentle ‘whump’ and the sky over the rooftop in front of us filled with
orange fire and black smoke. We ventured
outside and found the intersection deserted except for three burning buses and a
few onlookers. I struck out on the
two-hour walk back to the hotel.
As I crossed the Bei Hai bridge to the northwest of the
Forbidden City, I could faintly hear the government loudspeakers from Tian An
Men echoing across the lake, ordering the students to obey the martial law
army. Hardfaced old men and women had
appeared on the sidewalks on the back streets, perched on miniature bamboo
stools. Passersby warned me in anxious whispers
to “Be careful!” since I was being followed, and directed me down alleys and
side streets.
Dawn broke over a fearful and subdued city. A pedestrian told me 3000 were dead. I ducked into my hotel through the garage
entrance at 5:00 AM, just as dozens of tanks and armored personnel carriers
rumbled past its door. The democracy movement
was crushed and the massacre of the innocents, for that night, at least, was
over.
It is eerily appropriate that very few students died inside
Tian An Men Square. The real targets
were outside—not only the thousands who died on the roads leading into and
surrounding the square, but the hundreds of thousands of students, workers, and
small-time businessmen, the bureaucrats, intelligentsia, and reporters who
dared to challenge the party’s hegemony.
As the depth and extent of the purges becomes clearer, the
suspicion grows that the bloodshed of June 4 was not born of accident, panic,
or military necessity. Through gross
provocations, whether by incompetence or design, the authorities preserved a
nucleus of defiant young people in the center of the city, which could justify
the assault and the cynical post-facto discovery of a counter-revolutionary
conspiracy.
Certainly, Deng Xiaoping had to avoid the hollow triumph of
peacefully occupying an empty square; very possibly he had to move up the
timetable for the final assault to prevent his army’s advance from being
outpaced by the retreat of the rapidly ebbing democracy movement. The unpopular and isolated hard-line junta
needed martial law in order to consolidate its control over the party and state
organs. It needed victims, and found
them, young and eager, on the streets of Beijing on the morning of June 4,
1989.
Little more than a month has passed, and the Chinese
government is trying to bury the memory of the tragedy in Tian An Men Square
beneath a mountain of words.
Nevertheless, it is doubtful that the tautological perfection of
Communist propaganda will make the people forget that their government failed
them so completely—and so needlessly. If
the students were the soul of China, that soul is now scarred and
embittered.
During that final night, as we watched the laden stretcher
wind away down the alley, an old woman turned to me and said bitterly, “Without
the students, China has nothing. Come
back in two years and you will see. No
civilization, no nation. There will be
nothing left. Nothing.”
Below my notes from mid-May to early June 1989