Showing posts with label Abenomics. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Abenomics. Show all posts

Tuesday, June 04, 2013

LDP Pro-China Wing Fires Back at Abe



LDP’s Pro-China Wing Fires Back at Abe; More Yeast for the Nikkei; and More Confusion About the Ryukyus

It always seemed likely that, back in the Deng Xiaoping days, the PRC and Japan were eager to cut a deal for normalization of relations and, therefore, both sides would agree to put the Senkaku issue on the backburner.

The “set aside the Senkakus” sentiment was certainly the governing spirit at a press conference during Deng’s 1978 visit to Japan, as Ezra Vogel’s biography of Deng records (pg. 304 of the ebook):

When a reporter asked about the ownership of the Senkaku Islands, the audience became tense, but Deng replied that the Chinese and Japanese held different views, had different names for the islands, and should put the issue aside so that later generations, who would be wiser than those present, could solve the problem.  The audience was visibly impressed…

In the amicable context of 1978, “putting the issue aside” would appear to mean “let’s discuss it later” which puts the issue well down the slippery slope of “an issue that can be discussed/an issue for discussion/an issue that is open to negotiation”.

Apparently, there wasn’t any public confirmation that this spirit informed the actual Sino-Japanese discussions behind closed doors.

Until now.

In an interesting development, a China-friendly LDP elder decided to go public with his recollections of the Japanese attitude toward the Senkakus during the period of normalization under Tanaka and Deng, in an apparent effort to restore the islands’ status as a topic of engagement rather than an excuse for self-righteous belligerence.

This creates some awkwardness for the Abe government, which has hung its hat on the position that the Senkakus have always and indubitably (at least since 1895 and disregarding the 1945-1952 hiatus of US occupation) belonged to Japan,  the sovereignty of the sacred rocks has never been debased by inclusion in the greasy diplomatic dealings between Japan and China, we can do anything we want with them, if you want to talk about the Senkakus, talk to the hand, buster.

Reawakening memories of the time when discussions relating to the Senkakus were a matter of mutual amity probably also reflects the fact that the Chinese government is getting anxious about the downward spiral of PRC-Japan relations—and Prime Minister Abe’s success in building anti-China relationships with India, Vietnam, et. al.—and is interested in appearing less confrontational.

The Chinese charm offensive also includes a full-court press of high level cordiality at the Shangri-La defense confab and a rather frantic cozying up to the United States (including a request for the early Xi-Obama Sunnyland  summit and, to sweeten the pot, more than the usual expressions of impatience with North Korea).

This gives President Obama at degree of leverage over the PRC that he has not enjoyed in the past.
The USA will take advantage of this favorable situation by forcibly torqueing Xi’s testicles on the matter of “cyberwarfare” and cyberespionage.

It will be interesting to see if President Obama also exploits China’s accommodating posture to “rebalance” the Pacific situation by tilting a little more toward China and away from Japan, or contents himself with a zero-sum win on cyber stuff.



Contradicting government, Tanaka confidant says two sides cut deal at time of normalization of ties

Senkaku row shelved in ’70s: Nonaka

Kyodo

Jun 5, 2013 BEIJING – In a new ripple to Japan’s assertion of ownership of the disputed Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea, former chief Cabinet Secretary Hiromu Nonaka said leaders from Japan and China had agreed to shelve the territory row when the two countries normalized relations in the early 1970s.

The remark by the former Liberal Democratic heavyweight, a disciple of the late Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka, who cut the normalization deal with Beijing in 1972, contradicts the government’s official stance that there was no such agreement at the time.

Nonaka, who is leading a delegation of current and former Diet members on a visit to China, told reporters Monday, “Just after the normalization of relations, I was told clearly by then-Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka that a decision was made on the normalization by shelving the Senkaku issue.

“As a living witness, I would like to make clear (what I heard),” Nonaka said after meeting in Beijing with Liu Yunshan, the fifth-ranked leader of the Chinese Communist Party.

Liu is said to have told the delegation that Japan is responsible for the current confrontation with China. Apparently aiming to have Japan acknowledge at least the existence of a bilateral territorial dispute, Liu also reportedly said he hopes to see a solution reached through dialogue between the two governments.

In Tokyo, top officials reiterated the government’s view that the Senkakus are not an issue Japan should put on the shelf since no territorial dispute exists.

“There is no truth (to the remark) that (Japan) agreed with China to shelve or maintain the status quo of the Senkaku Islands,” Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga said, reiterating Tokyo’s position that no territorial dispute exists.

Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida also repeated the same line: “It is not the case that to this day, we have agreed to shelve (the dispute), nor has there been a territorial dispute that should be shelved in the first place.”



Bubble Bubble Toil & Trouble

Looks like Prime Minister Abe is preparing additional bubbliciousness for the Nikkei and, perhaps, lucky stock exchanges in emerging markets:

Japan's government is set to urge the nation's public pension funds - a pool of over $2 trillion - to increase their investment in equities and overseas assets as part of a growth strategy being readied by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, according to people with knowledge of the policy shift. 

It seems that the Japanese government is going to make sure the Japanese stock market stays propped up by artificial means, at least until the Japanese economy restructures into that senior-citizen-fueled growth engine we've been told about, or the smart money cashes out, whichever comes first.

Hmmm.  Should I be buying the Nikkei? shorting it?...or both?

Somebody Else Is Badly Confused About the China/Okinawa Issue

But it’s not AFP.

Can anybody tease out the contradiction of this headline from on line news site Japan Today:


And the lede from the accompanying article, sourced from AFP?

A top Chinese general on Sunday sought to distance the country from claims by some of its scholars that the Ryukyu Islands, which include Okinawa, do not belong to Japan.

I hate to admit it, but this qualifies as supporting evidence for the “blogsites have lower standards than traditional news outlets” slam.

Japan Today is also guilty of not policing its Wikipedia entry which is a total rip job by somebody who obviously totally completely hates Japan Today.

Claims of Universal Expertise

Japan Today staff has been known to employ underhanded tactics to prevent criticisms of media incompetence.  Often times they will intentionally ignore new or existing information and state that the only truth is their stance. They claim they are experts in all fields, including law, engineering, psychology, and politics.

…which, comes to think of it, also supports the “Wikipedia content can’t be trusted” slam.

Recently, the founder of Japan Today (no longer involved in operations) showed up on the Talk page to criticize the entry but, as of this writing, it’s still up there in all its glory.

On the other hand, for a good piece of bloginess on the Ryukyu/Okinawa issue, here’s a link to something I wrote on the LDP's Okinawa problem--and China's pleasure in stirring the pot.


Saturday, June 01, 2013

China Has a Medium-Sized Financial Anvil It May Want to Share With Japan



“Abenomics” pumps liquidity into the Japanese financial markets through government bond purchases by the Bank of Japan.  The liquidity creates asset inflation, mainly in the stock market at least for now.  

Theory is, the owners of these bubblicious assets feel rich (or, according to the politically less offensive explanation, feel the raw terror that sustained, government-mandated inflation will erode the value of their savings), buy things, trickle down trickle down trickle down.  

Right now it’s too early to see signs that this process is succeeding.  Instead of buying things, canny investors are taking profits off the bubble (“correction”) and then putting their money back in the market on the calculation that the Japanese government isn’t going to stop the liquidity injections just yet.

The other, voodooish side of Abenomics is the theory is that the  increased demand for government bonds thanks to the Bank of Japan intervention will trigger lower interest rates (in bond-speak, lower yields; since the interest payment is fixed, strengthening or weakening demand is reflected in the price of the bond.  Lower yields means higher bond prices).  

The lower yields promised by Abenomics mean Refi! to reduce the carrying cost of Japan’s truly awesome national debt and cheaper money to provide some conventional Keynsian stimulus to the economy through some infrastructure giveaways.  

Instead, bond prices are falling and yields are increasing—an indication that the bond market is fixating on the inflationary implications of Abenomics and the need to boost yields to keep pace, which is indeed a very traditional view of how bonds are supposed to behave in an inflationary environment, especially one in which the stock market has jumped 79%  year to date—and the opposite of the Bank of Japan’s optimistic prediction.


Higher yields—the more obvious consequence of inflation and a major challenge to Abenomics' liquidity strategy—raises the very, very bad specter of more expensive debt service for a country that can ill afford to add fractions of a percentage point to its cost of borrowing--and the prospect of reduced capital and lending power for the Japanese banks that hold massive amounts of Japanese government debt on their balance sheets.

Here’s what the Economist had to say about Japan’s vulnerability to a yield spike (which would translate into a reduction in value of the bonds held by Japanese banks):

The worst scenario is that bond-market volatility could focus attention on Japan’s public debt, which stands at nearly 250% of GDP. Owning so many government bonds, banks are heavily exposed to any rise in yields: an increase of only one percentage point would mean a loss of ¥10 trillion for Japan’s banks overall, according to J.P. Morgan.


The  Abe government is in determined spin mode to assure the markets that the recent gyrations in asset prices are nothing to get worked up about, while also declaring that the bond market’s queasiness is Good News—a sign that the inflationary-expectations gambit is working.

So far, the financial press, while exhibiting caution,  is not very interested in naysaying Abenomics, which is enriching its well-heeled readers through the upwardly spiraling (well, at least until recently) Nikkei.

Today’s interesting development is that China—which is locked in a zero-sum confrontation with Shinzo Abe-- has taken an overt interest in Japan’s government bond market.

The Global Times article excerpted below lets us know that the PRC holds about $200 billion in Japanese government debt (equivalent to two months plus of Bank of Japan Abenomics-related bond purchases) and is “Japan’s largest creditor”.

I leave it to Interested Reader to speculate as to whether this lengthy discussion of a rather boring subject of China’s Japan debt holdings is meant to convey:

1)      That the Chinese government has decided to maintain a sizable position in Japanese government bonds out of sheer stupidity, even though the value of the Japanese yen is plummeting and the US and EU have already bailed on the Jbond because successful Abenomics will, on top of yen depreciation, put a lid on yields and threaten to wipe out any financial benefit a foreign holder could gain from holding Japanese government debt…

2)      The Chinese government is betting that Abenomics will fail and China will reap a nice return as yields spike or…

3)      That the PRC has in its possession a  $200 billion anvil that it can toss to the Japanese financial markets if it decides it would like to see is Abe grappling with a Chinese selloff on top of the yield-spiking factors already roiling Japanese bond prices...

I’m inclined towards 3.  I have a feeling that China has decided that, in the face of US military superiority, Abe’s success in building strategic ties with India as well as China’s other, smaller regional antagonists, and advances in the anti-China Trans Pacific Partnership alliance of Pacific democracies (plus Vietnam and Myanmar) a key weapon for the PRC as it confronts the pivot is that China is a creditor nation—and the US and Japan are debt superpowers.



By Zhao Qian (Global Times)
13:47, May 29, 2013 http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/img/2011english/images/icon16.gifhttp://english.peopledaily.com.cn/img/2011english/images/icon17.gifhttp://english.peopledaily.com.cn/img/2011english/images/icon18.gif
China maintained its position as Japan's largest creditor by increasing its holdings of Japanese treasury bonds to 20 trillion yen ($196 billion) at the end of 2012, up 14 percent from the previous year, according to data released Tuesday by the Bank of Japan (BOJ).

By contrast, the US reduced its holdings of Japanese treasury bonds last year by 15 percent to 8.6 trillion yen, while the UK, the largest European creditor of Japan, reduced its holdings by 23 percent to 8.87 trillion yen, according to the BOJ data.

"As the total amount of China's foreign reserves has increased quickly, it was reasonable that China increased its holdings (of Japan's treasury bonds) last year amid concerns about the EU debt crisis and the weakening US economy," Zhao Xijun, deputy director of the Finance and Securities Research Institute at Renmin University of China, told the Global Times Tuesday.

"As the largest holder of US treasury bonds, China also needs to diversify its portfolio to balance its foreign exchange reserves investments," Zhao noted.

China's foreign reserves hit $3.31 trillion by the end of 2012, up 4 percent compared with the previous year, according to the People's Bank of China. And the number had risen to $3.44 trillion by the end of the first quarter this year.

Compared with other foreign investment products, "Japanese treasury bonds have always had a relatively stable yield as most of the holders are domestic investors, and the government is unlikely to allow big potential risks," Zhao noted.

The benchmark 10-year yield for Japanese treasury bonds rose to 0.905 percent Tuesday, up 7 basis points from the previous day.

China started to raise its reserves of Japanese treasury bonds substantially in 2011, when its holdings hit a record high of 18 trillion Japanese yen, up 71 percent from the previous year.

Liu Dongliang, a senior analyst at China Merchants Bank, told the Global Times Tuesday that Japanese treasury bonds are still a good investment target due to the lower risk involved, although the recent depreciation of the yen may cause losses for its foreign holders.

Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has released a series of quantitative easing policies since he took office last December, and has promised to promote further yen depreciation to stimulate the world's third largest economy.

Zhao said the fall in the yen has not only hurt China's interests but also those of other countries like the US, which is unlikely to allow the yen to depreciate continuously in the long term.

...

Depreciation in the yen has greatly affected China's exports to Japan, even if the country's quantitative easing measures have been effective in aiding the recovery of its domestic economy, Ministry of Commerce spokesman Shen Danyang said on May 16.


 

Friday, May 31, 2013

India Places Its Asian Bet on Japan...and Asian Neo-Nationalism?

[Correction: I incorrectly identified ex-Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi as Shinzo Abe's father-in-law; he was actually Abe's maternal grandfather.  Thanks to a knowledgeable and sharp-eyed reader for catching the mistake.  PL 6/21/2013]


In a dismaying week for the PRC, India turned its back on China...and thereby drifted further away from the narrative of Japanese criminal aggression in World War II that China and the United States have exploited for the last half century.

Idon’t know if there is a term in the diplomatic lexicon for “deep tongue kiss accompanied by groans of mutual fulfillment”, but if there is, it seems it would be illustrated by the encounter between Indian President Manmohan Singh and Japanese PM Shinzo Abe in Tokyo May 27-29, 2013.

Speaking to an assembly of Japanese government and corporate worthies in Tokyo, Singh said:

Asia’s resurgence began over a century ago on this island of the Rising Sun. Ever since, Japan has shown us the way forward. India and Japan have a shared vision of a rising Asia. Over the past decade, therefore, our two countries have established a new relationship based on shared values and shared interests.
Our relationship with Japan has been at the heart of our Look East Policy. Japan inspired Asia's surge to prosperity and it remains integral to Asia’s future. The world has a huge stake in Japan’s success in restoring the momentum of its growth. Your continued leadership in enterprise, technology and innovation and your ability to remain the locomotive of Asian renaissance are crucial.

India's relations with Japan are important not only for our economic development, but also because we see Japan as a natural and indispensable partner in our quest for stability and peace in the vast region in Asia that is washed by the Pacific and Indian Oceans.

Our relations draw their strength from our spiritual, cultural and civilizational affinities and a shared commitment to the ideals of democracy, peace and freedom. We have increasingly convergent world views and growing stakes in each other’s prosperity. We have shared interests in maritime security and we face similar challenges to our energy security. There are strong synergies between our economies, which need an open, rule-based international trading system to prosper. Together, we seek a new architecture for the United Nations Security Council.

In recent years, our political and security cooperation has gained in salience. Japan is the only partner with whom we have a 2-plus-2 Dialogue between the Foreign and Defence Ministries. We have also begun bilateral exercises with the Japanese Maritime Self Defence Force.

The romance was consecrated by an audience with the Japanese emperor and empress for Singh and his wife, and the announcement that the royal couple, apparently in Japan’s version of panda diplomacy, would be visiting India before the year’s end in only the second overseas trip for the aging emperor since 2009.

It should also be noted that India is studying Japan’s offer to sell an amphibious plane, the US-2, that would be de facto Japan’s first overseas military sale, though it would go out under the flag of “dual use”.

Compare and contrast Singh’s effusions in Tokyo with the proper but distant tone of the communique on Chinese PM Li Keqiang’s recent visit to India:

There is enough space in the world for the development of India and China, and the world needs the common development of both countries. As the two largest developing countries in the world, the relationship between India and China transcends bilateral scope and has acquired regional, global and strategic significance. Both countries view each other as partners for mutual benefit and not as rivals or competitors.

“Nettlesome neighbor” versus “strategic partner”.  I think the picture is clear.

Much of the Indian coverage gave full rein to anti-PRC feelings (The Hindu being the exception, although it perforce titled its skeptical editorial on Singh’s Japan trip as “Love in Tokyo” ), implying that India’s vociferous China bashers were celebrating an overt shift in Indian government attitudes or, at the very least, Japan had been extremely thorough in its spadework with right-wing Indian media to cultivate a Japan-India alliance.

Times of India:


First Post:

It’s true that no other country in the world today feels as threatened by China’s so-called “peaceful rise” as Japan. But then India too feels threatened by China. That is why Shinzo Abe, the Japanese Prime Minister and a known India friend, had said in his address to the joint session of Indian parliament in the Central Hall in the summer of 2007 that the Indo-Japan relations were a “confluence of the two seas”, a phrase that he drew from the title of a book written by the Mughal prince Dara Shikoh in 1655.

Abe is an unabashed China-basher who says he is determined to see that the South China Sea does not become a “Lake Beijing”.  He has proposed an ADSD – Asia Democratic Security Diamond, comprising Japan, India, Australia and the US.

This is what Abe said in a signed article in December 2012: “If Japan were to yield, the South China Sea would become even more fortified. Freedom of navigation, vital for trading countries such as Japan and South Korea, would be seriously hindered. The naval assets of the United States, in addition to those of Japan, would find it difficult to enter the entire area, though the majority of the two China seas is international water.”

Abe has forecast that in about a decade Japan-India relations would overtake Japan-China and even Japan-US relations. “I envisage a strategy whereby Australia, India, Japan, and the US state of Hawaii form a diamond to safeguard the maritime commons stretching from the Indian Ocean region to the western Pacific,” he said in this article.
India and Japan were never as close to each other as they are today. The bonding is to become all the stronger in the near future. All thanks to China.

A brief note: the “Democratic Security Diamond” was originally bruited about in Abe’s first term and independently championed by US Vice President Dick Cheney back in 2007 as an effort to stovepipe freedom into Asia with the help of a conservative regional ally against the wishes of the rest of the Bush administration, which had decided to sideline Cheney's team and was rather desperately trying to engage the PRC on the North Korea nuclear issue.  


Japan occupies a large space in Manmohan Singh's heart, and he has logged enough frequent flyer miles to Tokyo to prove it. When he lands in Tokyo on Monday, Singh is certain to get the kind of reception that will show Japan reciprocates in full measure.
Japan has the kind of technological and innovation heft India needs in spades. Acknowledging this, the PM once famously listed three of India's relationships he described as "transformational" - US, Japan and Germany - that if India used these relationships wisely, they could help transform our nation. …
With Shinzo Abe back in power in Japan with a convincing mandate and a will to resuscitate Japan from its "lost decades", India has a unique opportunity.
It is time India came out of the closet to strengthen the countries in the region: Indonesia, Vietnam and the real power in Asia - Japan. India should not waste its time looking for Japanese endorsement of Kashmir or Arunachal Pradesh, though many officials will tell you this is why we're kind of reticent with them. Instead, India should be more helpful on the Senkaku/Diaoyu issue - because if China gets away with this one, it will be unstoppable everywhere else.

Put China on the list of observers who came away with the impression of an Indo-Japanese lovefest.

For an illustration for the diplomatic equivalent of “green eyed monster that doth mock the meat it feeds on” i.e. jealousy/envy/sour grapes, read this People’s Daily editorial which attempts to put the resolution of a minor border intrusion during Li Keqiang’s visit to India on par with the multi-course love feast between Singh and Abe (while diplomatically putting the blame for Singh’s dalliance on Abe’s shoulders):

Sino-Indian diplomatic miracle embarrasses Japanese politicians

“The clouds in the sky cannot blot out the sunshine of Sino-Indian friendship,” said Premier Li Keqiang when describing the Sino-Indian ties on the last day of his stay in India.

Before Premier Li Keqiang’s visit, the China-India border standoff was hyped up by international media. The divergence and contradictions between the two countries were also exaggerated as if the Sino-Indian ties had been strained suddenly.

But what surprised the media was that China and India properly solved the issue in a short time. During Premier Li Keqiang’s visit, the top leaders of both countries had sincere and candid talks and came to a series of strategic consensus and cooperation. The shift of Sino-Indian ties in such a short time is a miracle.

In the development of Sino-Indian ties there are several divergence and contradictions. Some countries see these differences as an opportunity to provoke dissension.

Not long ago, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe called on Japan, India, Australia and the U.S. to jointly form a “Democratic Security Diamond” to compete with the ascendant China. He also proposed that Japan should promote “Strategic Diplomacy” and “Values Diplomacy” and made visits in countries around China. Some politicians just made themselves petty burglars on China-related issues.

The so-called “Democratic Security Diamond”, “Strategic Diplomacy” and “Values Diplomacy” among other new terms seem very strategic. But in fact they unveiled the narrow-minded diplomatic thoughts of Japanese government. The conspiracy of these petty burglars is doomed to fail…


It is difficult to shed the feeling that Indian commentators who detect an anti-China shift in Indian government policy are on to something.

Certainly, the JapanIndia affair has sound diplomatic and economic bases.

India is not happy about its immense trade deficit with China; Japan sees India as a cheap overseas labor source and Abe needs some big ticket deals with India to keep the economy humming and keep Abenomics out of the ditch, especially with Japan-China relations in the icebox.

Various national quid pro quos are at work—several billion dollars in Japanese loans, Indian support for the Tokyo Olympics in 2020, and a promise to work together to change the structure of the UN Security Council, to date notably China-heavy and Japan- and-India-free.

But an interested reader—and, for that matter the Chinese government—cannot escape the sense that Singh, encouraged by Abe’s vigorous approach to restoring Japan’s national and regional stature, has decided to place an open bet on Japan—a fellow democracy and, until recent years at least, acknowledged master of the global economic and financial game--instead of obstreperous, state socialist China in the Asian sweepstakes.

Therefore, I for once and very gingerly take issue with the esteemed Mr. Bhadrakumar’s conclusion  that China’s assertiveness in Ladakh strengthened the hands of India’s China bashers and queered Li Keqiang’s trip and Sino-Indian relations overall.  Given the apparent desire of Prime Minister Singh to opt for a Japan partnership, maybe somebody thought an Indian provocation in Ladakh would yield a timely and useful piece of anti-Chinese framing to the encounter in Tokyo.

Maybe Mr. Singh’s heart was in Japan from the beginning.

Guided by an admonitory op-ed in Global Times, I looked up “Radhabinod Pal“ on Wikipedia.

In Internet speak, TIL (today I learned) that Pal was an Indian jurist on the Japan war crimes tribunal in 1946.  Pal was enamored of the anti-colonial rhetoric that accompanied the Japanese “advance” into SE Asia.  He believed the United States had provoked Japan into war (the Japanese response was therefore not “aggressive”), was concerned with unpunished Allied wartime atrocities, and declined to endorse the “triumph of civilization” narrative of Japan’s defeat or the creation of “Class A” war criminal category that the Occupation used to prosecute the Japanese military and civilian leadership.    
While acknowledging the commission of atrocities in the field (though a Nanjing Massacre skeptic), Pal voted for acquittal of the “Class A” defendants and prepared a 1235-page dissenting opinion—suppressed by the Occupation until 1952-- stating that the trial was a “victor’s justice” travesty.

So far so good.

After his dissent was published, Pal, unsurprisingly, became a hero to Japanese nationalists.  Given the legal and moral flaws of the tribunal, the standard explanation is that Pal was simply a scrupulous jurist whose dissent got cherrypicked by nasty nationalists for verbiage that supported their claim that the only thing Japan did wrong in World War II was lose it.

Actually, as an article at Japan Focus by Japanese scholar Tekeshi Nakajima points out, in his dissent Pal went beyond challenging the legality and validity of the tribunal to excusing Japanese--activities? Aggression? Advances? Choose your favorite word-- on the grounds that Japan was getting picked on by the West.

This is rather obvious in Pal’s treatment of Japan’s incursion into Manchuria, which Japan did on its own kick without the excuse that the US was forcing it into war.

Pal probably found it extremely awkward that Japan, in his mind the front line of resistance to western colonialism, adopted nakedly colonial policies in its dismemberment of China and subjugation of Manchuria.

He attempted to resolve his difficulties by deploying what might be characterized as the “monkey see monkey do” defense—that Japan, deluded by the precedent, pretexts, and spurious legality of Western colonial intrusions, mistakenly adopted the same methods and, indeed, erroneously adopted the very idea that it needed to occupy Manchuria, from the West.

After dismissing the Manchurian and Marco Polo Bridge incidents as examples of simple overexuberance by officers in the field and not elements of a conspiracy to justify occupation of north and northeast China, Pal deployed the “delusion” defense, as Nakajima writes:

Justice Pal then critically examined Western Imperialism, which, he asserted, Japan had imitated. Quoting the Survey of International Affairs 1932, he turned the target of the criticism toward the colonial policies of Western Powers:

Was it not Western Imperialism that had coined the word ‘protectorate’ as a euphemism for ‘annexation’? And had not this constitutional fiction served its Western inventors in good stead? Was not this the method by which the Government of the French Republic had stepped into the shoes of the Sultan of Morocco, and by which the British Crown had transferred the possession of vast tracts of land in East Africa from native African to adventitious European hands?30

For Justice Pal, Japan’s ‘farce’ was nothing but the result of imitating Western fashions of imperialism. From this point of view, he questioned why only Japan’s establishment of Manchukuo could be assessed as ‘aggression’. Weren’t Western countries morally guilty as well in practicing colonialism? If the acts of aggression by Western countries were not charged as crimes, why was the establishment of Manchukuo by Japan?

Justice Pal further quoted the Survey of International Affairs 1932:

Though the Japanese failed to make the most of these Western precedents in stating their case for performing the farce of ‘Manchukuo’, it may legitimately be conjectured that Western as well as Japanese precedents had in fact suggested, and commended, this line of policy to Japanese minds.31

By saying, ‘[i]t may not be a justifiable policy, justifying one nation’s expansion in another’s territory’,32 he emphasised that both Japan and the Western countries were morally responsible for the colonisation of other nations. Justice Pal explained that Japan was at that time possessed with a ‘delusion’ and believed that the country would face death and destruction if it failed in acquiring Manchuria.33 

Pal regarded this as the reason for Japan’s attempts to establish interests which it saw as necessary for its very existence. Justice Pal said that carrying out a military operation driven by ‘delusion’ was not unique to Japan as it had been repeatedly practised on a large scale by Western countries for many years. Saying, ‘[a]lmost every great power acquired similar interests within the territories of the Eastern Hemisphere and, it seems, every such power considered that interest to be very vital’, Pal argued that Japan had the ‘right’ to argue that the Manchurian Incident was necessary for the sake of ‘self-defense’.34 

Japan claiming national ‘self-defense’ in regard to its territorial expansion in China was in step with international society at the time, Pal said, and thus Japan’s actions stemmed from the ‘imitation’ of an evil practice of Western imperialism. Based on this premise, he concluded: ‘The action of Japan in Manchuria would not, it is certain, be applauded by the world. At the same time it would be difficult to condemn the same as criminal.’35

I, for one, find that Pal’s brief goes beyond the questioning of a dubious legal proceeding by a distinguished and experienced international jurist to rather dishonorable special pleading on behalf of his favorite country, Japan on the grounds of “everybody else was doing it, so it should have been OK, oops, make that that 'necessary'.”

Try that defense next time you’re caught cheating on your taxes.

And there’s this:

In In 1966, the Emperor of Japan conferred upon Pal—who stated his lifelong admiration of Japan as the one Asian country that stood up to the West-- the First Class of the Order of the Sacred Treasure.

The Pal dissent is more than ancient history; it is a cornerstone of the recent nationalist tilt of the Japanese government and the determination of Japanese nationalists to claim an untainted leadership role for Japan as the pre-eminent Asian practitioner of the modern arts of economics, democracy, and warfare (defeated but not discredited in the "great war"), as can be seen from this Telegraph report of the aftermath of the LDP’s victory at the polls in 2012:

"The view of that great war was not formed by the Japanese themselves, but rather by the victorious Allies, and it is by their judgement only that [Japanese] were condemned," Mr Abe told a meeting of the House of Representatives Budget Committee on Tuesday. 

In his previous short-lived spell as prime minister, for 12 months from September 2006, Mr Abe said that the 28 Japanese military and political leaders charged with Class-A war crimes are "not war criminals under the laws of Japan." 

Pal was enshrined at Yasukuni, which gives the lie to the claim that it is simply a war dead memorial and not a revisionist shrine.  The photo illustrating Pal’s entry in Wikipedia is his Yasukuni stele.

Prime Minister Abe made a pilgrimage to Kolkata in 2007 to meet with Pal’s son and receive a couple pictures of Pal with Abe’s father-in-law [correction: Abe's maternal grandfather], ex-Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi, who was detained after the war as a suspected Class A criminal but never indicted or tried.

For those who like their national history convoluted, it should also be pointed out that Pal was an admirer of the Indian National Army, which fought with the Japanese against the British in Malaya and Burma.  When the British attempted to try the leaders of the INA for treason after the war, the combination of outrage in the Indian military and popular revulsion against the British exercise of justice was a crucial factor in Great Britain throwing in the towel and granting Indian independence.

So, by an alternate reading of history, Japan can claim credit for the decolonization of India as well as Malaysia and Burma.

Prime Minister Singh is unlikely to go the final mile in supporting the Japanese liberation narrative as his primary political patrons are the Gandhi family, which demands sole credit for India’s independence on behalf of Mohandas Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru.

Nevertheless, Prime Minister Singh’s attitude to the potent symbolism of the Pal dissent and the Japanese decolonization narrative was displayed in Singh’s toast to Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi in 2005:

The dissenting judgement of Justice Radha Binod Pal is well-known to the Japanese people and will always symbolize the affection and regard our people have for your country. 

On December 14, 2006, Singh upgraded Pal’s judgment to “principled” and an expression of Indian-Japan solidarity in his speech in the Japanese Diet. He stated:

"The principled judgment of Justice Radhabinod Pal after the War is remembered even today in Japan. Ladies and Gentlemen, these events reflect the depth of our friendship and the fact that we have stood by each other at critical moments in our history."


This does not look like a matter of parsing the legal and moral flaws Pal detected in the war crimes tribunal.  It looks like Singh’s heart, like Pal’s was with Japan—and its view that it got jobbed by history as written by the World War II  victors and China benefited excessively from the unfair Japan = monster framing.

As memories fade of the concrete miseries of Japan’s romp through Asia, resurrecting the comforting abstraction of the Japan decolonization narrative is a potent political and diplomatic weapon, despite the fact that Japan has to be discreet in wielding it before the United States, which is completely vested in the Greatest Generation/triumph over evil version.

Anyway, maybe India thinks it’s time to repudiate the idea of war guilt along and give Japan back its rightful place in the sun (and consign its undeserving rival, the PRC, to the moral and geopolitical doghouse).

Singh did not have to endorse that reliable if somewhat misleading anti-Chinese bugbear “freedom of navigation” and claim an overt Indian strategic role in East Asia through the Look East policy.

But he did so in his remarks in Tokyo.

Our Look East engagement began with a strong economic emphasis, but it has become increasingly strategic in its content.
Our relationship with Japan has been at the heart of our Look East Policy. Japan inspired Asia's surge to prosperity and it remains integral to Asia’s future. The world has a huge stake in Japan’s success in restoring the momentum of its growth. Your continued leadership in enterprise, technology and innovation and your ability to remain the locomotive of Asian renaissance are crucial.

India's relations with Japan are important not only for our economic development, but also because we see Japan as a natural and indispensable partner in our quest for stability and peace in the vast region in Asia that is washed by the Pacific and Indian Oceans.

Our relations draw their strength from our spiritual, cultural and civilizational affinities and a shared commitment to the ideals of democracy, peace and freedom. We have increasingly convergent world views and growing stakes in each other’s prosperity. We have shared interests in maritime security and we face similar challenges to our energy security. There are strong synergies between our economies, which need an open, rule-based international trading system to prosper. 

For outside observers, India’s overt buy-in validates the idea of the anti-China alliance and the narrative that the PRC is a rogue actor that needs containment.

It appears that Singh decided to follow his heart and match Abe’s boldness with his own, making a risky move to help Abe's anti-China gambit succeed with some conspicuous Indian support.

My personal feeling is that Singh is going too far by “Looking East” and meddling in the China seas together with Japan, the world’s third-largest economy and committed China-basher, even if it is simply in retaliation for China’s conclusion of a “strategic cooperative partnership” with Sri Lanka and port-related initiatives –the notorious ‘string of pearls’- with India’s troublesome but less than intimidating neighbors Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and Myanmar.

The confrontation between Japan and the PRC over the Senkakus may very possibly not end well, and having India sticking its oar in will probably not make things better.

If Singh’s ambitions go beyond playing the Japan card in order to wring better behavior out of China on South Asia and Himalayan issues  to concluding an overt alliance with Japan against the PRC to alter the balance of power in Asia, I think he’s writing checks that the world—let alone India—can’t afford to cash.

History, as they say, will judge if Singh made the right bet.  If it goes bad, people will be asking why he placed it so early in the game.

Global Times talked tough on the occasion of the Singh visit, putting the onus on Abe once again but presumably also sending a message to India not to end up on the wrong side of (long term) history (as well as reassuring itself that, despite the pretty unfavorable set of current circumstances, the PRC will come out on top in the end):

It will take time for Japan to face the reality that the once only great power in East Asia has to give way to China, whose GDP and marine strength will surpass that of Japan. The process will be tougher for Japan, which will be sincerely convinced some day.

The day will come sooner or later. The little tricks that Japan is playing are nothing but a struggle for self-comfort, which will not affect the development of Asia.

Japan is trying every means to hide its decline against China in order to boost its national morale, but China  does not need to compete with Japan to regain confidence and prove its strength.

The conflict between China and Japan should not be regarded as a "strategic" game. In fact, the overall strategic future of Japan and China has already been determined. Gains and losses incurred by the frictions between China and Japan make no difference to the futures of either country. There is no need for China to exert too much energy on Japan.

As a growing but young giant, Chinese society will unavoidably have to deal with various conflicts with Japan. It will be a long journey for China to become mature enough so that a real great power will emerge with confidence.

This is not a final showdown between China and Japan, neither is it an opportunity for China to mend its broken fences with Japan. All China should do is "take it easy." China should be aware that Japan tricks can never impact China strategy. China should take the initiative to decide when and how seriously we respond to it.

But maybe Singh sees a once-in-a-career opportunity for rollback against the PRC with Abe in Japan, the US in Myanmar, and China’s problems with ASEAN on a prolonged, ugly boil.

It is already clear that India is slow-walking its negotiations with the PRC over a free trade agreement.  If India and Japan both insist that China’s proposed regional trade zone regime, the RCEP, needs to look more like the TPP, negotiating initiative for all of the region’s trade pacts may switch over to Japan and India.

The PRC might decide it is a good idea to draw closer to the United States (which Abe is discreetly shouldering aside as he pursues his Japan-centric initiatives and promotes his vision of Japan as a victim of “victor’s justice”).  

The PRC premier, Le Keqiang, found himself in the unlikely position of trying to reawaken nostalgia for the Potsdam declaration—which mandated the return to their owners of territories like Taiwan, the Pescadores, and Manchuria that Japan had stolen—during his trip to Germany.  Beyond giving the PRC some kind of claim to the Senkakus, invoking the Potsdam declaration is probably meant to remind the United States of a happier time when the West’s writ was respectfully acknowledged and not covertly defied by the subjugated and defeated nations of Asia.

It will be interesting to see if the PRC decides that, given the Japan-India partnership, maybe the time has finally come to throw North Korea under the bus for the sake of Sino-US rapprochement.  

On the other hand, if the weakened yen and Abe’s frenetic regional dealmaking fail to keep the Nikkei afloat and the long-expected revulsion against Japanese bonds (and the 240% of GDP national debt they fund) materializes and spikes Japan’s borrowing costs, Japan will be licking its wounds a few months from now and Singh will face some awkward moments in dealing with Beijing.

But for the time being, the vision (or to the PRC, the specter) of an active Japan-India alliance inciting and recruiting opposition to Chinese strategic and economic penetration in Asia offers the prospect of an interesting rejuggling of Pacific relationships.