As US-Iran rapprochement inches toward at least partial consummation
in Geneva, I wish to offer a few observations:
1)
The Iran
nuclear weapons threat has always been a McGuffin, an excuse for various powers
to advance an anti-Iran agenda.
2)
Chief among the usual suspects is, of course,
Israel under PM Netanyahu. If the
Israeli government is able to spin Iran as a nuclear (almost) capable
existential threat to Israel, then Israel can make an absolute claim on US
sympathy, support, and protection. If
Iran returns to good relations with the United States, the US will arguably
become less willing to bear the sizable political, diplomatic, and economic
cost of deferring to Israel’s priorities—on the Palestinian question, on
regional security, and its obstinate refusal to acknowledge its nuclear arsenal
and integrate it into the international arms control regime.
3)
The other regional power most interested in
thumping the Iran-threat drum is Saudi Arabia.
However, I would argue that the high-profile anti-Iran stance of the
Kingdom (probably symbolized but not necessarily created by the notorious Prince
Bandar) has little to do with the threat of “Iran hegemonism” (a canard frequently
retailed in the big-name press) and a lot to do with Saudi Arabia’s decision to
go pro-active against the popular democratic agitation expressed by the Arab
Spring uprisings by supporting conservative Sunni theology and governance, not
just in Shi’ite inflected countries like Bahrain, Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria, but
also in nations like Libya (where Saudi Arabia and its creature, the Gulf
Co-Operation Council were the primary motive force in demanding intervention against
Gaddafi) and Egypt. It’s easy for Saudi
Arabia to piggyback on the anti-Iran campaign promoted by the US and Israel and
cite Iranian subversion as a pretext for the campaign of conservative Sunni
rollback; if Iran is removed from the league table of existential enemies subverting
the Sunni heartland, Saudi Arabia is left in the exposed position of protecting
Wahhabi obscurantism against liberal democracy.
That’s not a happy place to be.
4)
Western observers have been rather surprised by
France’s unapologetic sabotage of the Iran nuclear
negotiations in Geneva at Israel's behest. I saw some
left-of-center complaining that France’s motivation was the greedy desire to muscle
in on the lucrative Saudi arms business.
Perhaps, but I think the strategic nature of French involvement should
be emphasized. Recall that France’s
traditional sphere of influence in the Middle East has been the Levant—that chunk
of coastline that includes southern Turkey, Syria, and Lebanon. France claims a paternal interest in the
bloody, fascistic and pro-Israeli antics of the Lebanese Maronite community, a
Catholic grouping whose origins date back to the Crusades and is perhaps the
most conspicuous legacy of the French enthusiasm for meddling in the Middle
East. Before Syria blew up, France was
at the center of an initiative to install Bashar al-Assad in the affections of
the West. Also, recall that the Libyan
adventure was a creature of French enthusiasm; that France was also easily the
most eager advocate of a US military strike on Syria after somebody crossed
President Obama’s gas warfare red line.
With the United States displaying a desire to tilt toward Iran, if only
a little bit, the Middle East jigsaw puzzle has been shaken up and France has
the best potential of any Western power to shape and profit from the new
alignment. We can justifiably bitch
about France carrying Israel’s water, but if the US pivots toward Asia, as it
has promised, there is a strong case for redefining the Arab Middle East as a
Mediterranean construct, with France playing the role of keystone (and Iran
scolder-in-chief). If Iran wants a
European ally, well, Germany is probably there for the asking.
For the edification of China Matters readers, I offer two pieces from the archives below the fold.
First, a piece on the longstanding Saudi eagerness to push dissent into the sectarian pigeonhole, not only in Bahrain but in the entire Persian Gulf region. Hopefully, this provides a corrective to the rather ludicrous assertions of Iranian subversion, typified by allegations that the minority Assad regime is suicidally promoting sectarianism in Syria. The truth is, the Sunni affiliation of the Syrian majority is considered to be a dragon to be awakened in the service of conservative Saudi rollback against non-sectarian democracy, both in the kingdom and in the region.
Second, a discussion of the perennial question of whether Israel can pose a credible unilateral threat to Iran’s nuclear program with a military strike. When I originally wrote the post, it was considered unlikely that Saudi Arabia would provide refueling facilities to Israeli fighter bombers, and plausible that the US occupying forces in Iraq might provide the service. How things have changed. Under the current circumstances, I would say that Saudi Arabia’s enthusiasm for fighting to the last American has simply been transferred to Israel. I think that neither Israel nor Saudi Arabia have the stomach to bomb Iran and, perhaps, start a regional war without strong US backing of the sort that the Obama administration appears loathe to provide; hope I’m right. In any case, the real game is in Syria and western Iraq, regions that if not for that exasperating problem of al Qaeda blowback, would be viewed with unalloyed joy as fertile fields for conservative Sunni rollback and continued bloodshed, no matter what happens with Iran.
