Saudi Arabia Edges Closer to Open Syria Regime Collapse Policy

Over the last year or so, I’ve taken the bet  that Saudi Arabia is pursuing a strategy of regime collapse in Syria.

In practical terms, this means that the KSA won’t support a Syria peace process that achieves a measure of accommodation between the Ba’athist ruling party (with or without Assad) and the opposition, popular, overseas, or otherwise.

Saudi Arabia, in my view, is not interested in the humanitarian satisfactions of helping end the brutal civil war.  Nor has it come around to the Obama administration’s increased wariness about the virtues of insurrection (especially when practiced by overmatched rebels who might be able to overthrow the regime with outside help but might not be able to run the country), given the post-intervention collapse of Libya into a failed state despite (or I guess maybe because of) the existence of sufficient oil reserves to fund a live-and-let-live pro-Western lifestyle.

No, I think Saudi Arabia has decided to play the long game, preferring the triumph of a largely Sunni insurrection that would drive the Ba’athists from power and install a new regime that is largely beholden to the GCC, fundamentally hostile to Iran, and would serve as a counterweight/threat/practitioner of destabilization against the Shi’ite-led and Iran-friendly government of Iraq, and Hezbollah in Lebanon.

The most recent harbinger of Saudi radicalism on the Syria issue may be its high-profile decision to reject the non-permanent UN Security Council seat that it had presumably yearned and lobbied for over a period of years.  The Saudi snub was couched in terms of the UNSC’s inability to take meaningful action on the Palestinian, Middle East nuclear free zone, and Syrian issues.

The coordinated nature of the Saudi move—it followed Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal’s cancellation of Saudi Arabia’s scheduled speech to the General Assembly in early October—indicates that a Saudi hardline policy is not just the personal hobbyhorse of the Machiavellian Prince Bandar, whose determination to dethrone Assad is rather unambiguous if perhaps underreported in the press.

Today, Egypt and the GCC weighed in to praise Saudi Arabia’s “courage” in ditching the UNSC seat, a sign that bigger game is afoot than simple pique at UNSC veto-holders Russia, China, and the US.

I think the target of the Saudi snub is the faltering Syrian peace conference scheduled for Geneva in late November under the auspices of the UN and the special envoy for Syria, Lakhdar Brahimi.  The KSA, it seems, would rather be outside the tent pissing in, than inside the tent pissing out.

It looks like the Saudis are digging in for a posture of intransigence on Syria—basically, stalling the peace process so that the jihadi groups can escalate their campaign of car bombs, assassination, and armed resistance to the point where the Assad regime might actually collapse or, failing that, remain a basket case.

As to why this is happening, I think a few forces are at work:

First, the United States has marginalized itself in the eyes of Saudi Arabia thanks to its new-found moderation on Syria, its pursuit of engagement with Iran, and its Egypt policy.   This has encouraged Saudi Arabia to cobble together its own security strategy.

Second, absent an aggressive US policy on Iran and the likelihood that Israel’s unilateral attack-Iran rhetoric is mostly bluster, Syria offers Saudi Arabia the best venue to counter Iran’s regional influence.  

 It might be pointed out that Iran is a populous democracy, albeit of the mixed theocratic type, with a diversified economic base.  In peacetime conditions, it has a good chance of outcompeting a sclerotic Wahabbist autocracy.  So, for that matter, does Qatar, whose strategy of using the civil war to catapult Syria’s Muslim Brotherhood into power is anathema to Saudi Arabia.  

Peaceful competition in the marketplace of ideas, in other words, is not a recipe for Saudi success.  Keeping the bloody Syrian pot boiling—and raising the specter of the collapse of Shi’ite-led Iraq into civil war as collateral damage—is perhaps the Kingdom’s best option.

Third, maybe Saudi Arabia is riding the jihadi tiger and can’t get off—even if official government support for extremist factions (as opposed to genuine private Saudi enthusiasm) has been as anxious and equivocal as some think.  If it supported a peace process in Syria, there are a lot of jihadis who would take it as a betrayal.  The US apparently has grand plans for a purge of jihadis similar to the “Anbar Awakening” that expelled Al Qaeda from western Iraq.  But the Anbar operation probably succeeded because of the efficiency of the US JSOC assassination squads, not just the righteous indignation of the local sheiks.  If a similar stunt were tried in Syria—but using proxies, the factionalized Free Syrian Army, and/or the Syrian army as a substitute for US military muscle to put paid to the jihadis—a lot would probably slip through the net and survive with a thought of anti-Saudi mayhem on their minds.

If and when the Geneva peace conference goes ahead, it will be interesting to see if a) what Saudi-backed opposition groups participate b) if the outcome is rejected as a useless exercise in UN-peace-mongering neutered by Russia and China (and the US) and c) if Saudi Arabia decides to throw gasoline on the fire in terms of open provision of arms and money to the insurrectionists, instead of just letting Syria burn.

China Defends Its Approval of Iran UN Sanctions Draft

...And then does some walkback

My last word, at least for the time being, on China and the Iran UN sanctions resolution process, is in an article at Asia Times entitled, China plays lapdog in sanctions ploy.


I link to the article in a blog post that also summarizes its conclusions: China Plays Skillful Hand on Iran Sanctions.

CH 5/24/10

Rolling updates:

I'm dumping updates at the top in roughly chronological order with local timestamps.

19 May 2010 20.00 BST From the Guardian, another sign that the resolution draft was rushed in an atmosphere of incipient panic:

Various annexes of the draft resolution relating to travel bans and asset freezes for individuals, groups and banks have yet to be agreed.

The article, reporting that the NPT conference is nearing deadlock, goes far to confirm my pet theory that Iran sanctions are being pushed in order to obtain Israel's participation in NPT Revcon.

The Asahi Shimbun, May 19 (posted on English language website on 5/20) weighs in with an editorial calling for the Brazil/Turkey deal to be pursued--with demands for more LEU and an enrichment freeze.

Continuing the enrichment program, meanwhile, will inevitably cause the stockpile to grow again. Any guarantee of peaceful use requires that all the uranium be routed outside of Iranian territory, while halting the enrichment work. Terms toward that end must be hammered out through diplomatic channels.

Both Brazil and Turkey are currently nonpermanent members of the Security Council. We hope that permanent council members and Germany, which have principally handled the negotiations with Iran to date, will bolster their cooperation with Brazil and Turkey in a serious push to win over Tehran.

Japan is increasingly used by the U.S. for wet work it doesn't want to be associated with officially. Also, Amano, a Japanese bureaucrat, is head of the IAEA. Maybe we're looking at a contingency plan: if the ITB swap deal gains too much traction (as appears to be happening; President Obama made a call to Erdogan to express what I think was rather insincere appreciation for the Turkey/Brazil initiative), unimpeachable third parties try to sink it by demanding new and difficult-to-fulfill concessions from Iran.

May 19,2010 New York Times reports that Russia is making positive noises about the ITB swap deal and giving Secretary Clinton a fine headache in the bargain. Details on the negotiations reveal that the final agreement on the draft was only reached in the last few days as the swap deal was imminent. The US certainly wasn't in its strongest negotiating position as the U.S. was desperate for a draft, any draft, so it could regain the initiative on sanctions.

If politics is like making sausage, this is the part when the dead rats are shoveled into the meatgrinder.

An official in the Russian Foreign Ministry, speaking on condition of anonymity under ministry rules, said Mr. Lavrov placed a call to Mrs. Clinton after learning of her announcement on Tuesday night. The official said Russia views Tehran’s proposal to enrich uranium in Turkey as very similar to a deal brokered in October by the International Atomic Energy Agency, but acknowledged that Washington is skeptical.

“Our position is, give them another chance,” the Russian official said. “We should take into account this demonstration of readiness by Iran.”
...

The agreement came months later than the administration had hoped, and after a hectic week of diplomacy, capped by a last-minute phone call by Mrs. Clinton to Mr. Lavrov, to confirm whether Moscow was on board, a senior American official said.

The United States believed that it was close to a deal last week, said the official, who did not want to be identified by name while discussing internal negotiations. But it could not resolve the final points with Russia over conventional, nonnuclear arms sales to Iran, and with China over its energy investments there.



12:16 19/05/2010 Back in Brazil, President Lula declines to comment on the apparent switch of Russia and China to the sanctions track after they had expressed support for the swap agreement. Per Agencia Brasil via Babelfish:

When answering the journalists on the change of position of Russia and China on the sanctions - the two countries had given support to the agreement and later they had been of the North American side - Lula limited himself to say it that “they are great friends (são grandes amigos)”.

As a sign of its dissatisfaction with the continued sanctions process despite the announcement of the fuel swap agreement, Brazil's ambassador did not attend the UNSC's closed-door discussions on the resolution draft on Tuesday.

20:01 18.05.10 As for China's line of "we kept Iran informed", a passage from Reuters via Haaretz implies this is not the case:

On Wednesday, Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki expressed surprise when asked about the draft sanctions resolution.

When asked by a Reuters reporter what Iran's reaction would be to the resolution, Mottaki said in English: "Are you sure?"

After an assurance that major powers had agreed the draft, Mottaki said: "Don't take it serious". He then walked away.

Mottaki was attending a meeting in the Tajik capital Dushanbe of foreign ministers from the Organization of the Islamic Conference.

02:20 19/05/2010 The English-language text from Novosti makes it clear that Lavrov's qualms referenced below relate to part but not all of the anticipated national sanctions--possibly relating to America's love for the Proliferation Security Initiative which, if ever completely implemented would permit foreign flag vessels to stopped and searched on the high seas:

...unilateral sanctions would include measures "of an extraterritorial nature, beyond the agreed decisions of the international community and contradicting the principle of the rule of the international law, enshrined in the UN Charter."

No excuse for China to disregard the national sanctions threat here.

Per a lengthy article in Xinhua, as of 2010年05月19日 17:36:51 the theme is 以压促和: Using pressure to promote peace i.e. The pressure of the sanctions process is presented as a legitimate means to promote efforts by Iran to restore international trust.

The piece takes another step toward incorporating the ITB deal into the UN sanctions process (and getting China out from behind the eightball) by reporting that Brazil and Turkey are opposed to a sanctions process that ignores their agreement with Iran and their no votes would be an embarrassment to the United States. Article quotes German wonk as saying the choice is up to Iran. If it uses the excuse of the circulation of the sanctions draft to drop the swap, it will have lost an opportunity (thereby implying that executing the agreement will affect the sanctions process). America will not be pleased, but maybe China will find some wiggle room by saying the swap has to be taken into account at least tactically in order to respect the feelings (and win the votes) of Brazil and Turkey.

2010年05月19日 21:29:44 Xinhua reports on a conversation between Lavrov and Clinton, with the Russians emphasizing that unilateral sanctions beyond UN sanctions would exceed the framework of the resolution agreed upon unanimously by international society and would go against the principle in the UN Constitution concerning the primacy of international law".

对伊朗实施单方面制裁的行为将超出国际社会协商一致的决议框架，违背联合国宪章强调的国际法至上原则

Standing up for the UN and international law is a political non-starter in the USA, so this argument would presumably do little more than provide political cover to Russia and China.

According to IRNA: Tehran, May 19 Iran chides the P5+1 for the sanctions draft, implicitly acknowledging China's involvement but not calling it out by name

Global Times interviews a previous Chinese ambassador to Iran, Hua Liming, who says "Iran certainly will be unhappy" but claims that since all the other members of the P5+1 were calling for sanctions, China had to respond accordingly. He says that Iran should appreciate China's efforts from the "complexity" of the draft.

Bottom line: China protects its key interests and gives Iran the assurance that it absolutely will not agree to the use of force to resolve the Iran issue. Message: Iran will certainly indicate displeasure but the overall Iran/China relationship will not be affected.

Awkward question of squelching the ITB agreement not directly addressed
but indirectly acknowledged by observation that it looks like UNSC non-permanent members Turkey and Brazil won't agree to sanctions.

Judging from the comments, Chinese netizens--at least the subset that gets to comment on articles in Global Times--are, for the most part, not happy.

Sample:
It's no use. There are too many people in the party with a tilt toward the United States.
没有办法，党内倾美决策人太多。

既要做婊子又要立牌坊！别以为民众看不懂！
So you want to lead the life of a whore and have a ceremonial arch erected to commemorate your chastity! Don't think the Chinese people don't see and understand what's going on!

Any country that befriends China will end up the loser.
任何国家跟中国交朋友都会吃亏的。

We've lost a friend and gained an enemy.
我们有少个朋友了，多个敌人

When you drop stones on somebody who's fallen in a well, you're worse than a pig or a dog.
落井下石猪狗不如

Once Iran is sanctioned, America will start to classify China as a currency-manipulating country. When the bird is shot, the fine bow is put away; when the rabbit is caught, the hunting dog goes into the cooking pot. Wake up, comrades!

等制裁完伊朗，美国就开始把中国列为“汇率操纵国”了，飞鸟尽良弓藏、狡兔死走狗烹啊！该醒醒了，同志们！



In a slightly more representative sample, Global Times' on-line poll asked "Do you think Iran will retaliate for China's support of sanctions", 4000 respondents--72%--said yes.

In the same issue, one Tang Zhichao, Deputy Director of the Asia and Africa Institute of the Academy of Contemporary International Relations 中国现代国际关系研究院亚非所副所长 hopefully opines that President Obama isn't really serious about sanctions.

Original post:

Global Times Chinese Edition ran a lengthy Xinhua article defending China's decision to approve the draft resolution on Iran sanctions "as revealed by a knowledgeable party at the Chinese Embassy to the UN".

From the title onward, there is no ambiguity about China's position: "China agrees to draft resolution to sanction Iran".

While leading with the defensive statement, "Although the draft was circulated, the door to diplomatic efforts is still open", the Xinhua article offers no pushback to the U.S. position on sanctions or the timing of the resolution; it simply endorses the draft, stating "We have no objection (literally, "we hold no divergent opinion") to this UNSC draft resolution"我们对这安理会散发决议草案不持异议。, and confirming that it will be voted on within three weeks,

The document also hopefully referenced a "strategic partnership" between Russia and China and asserted that China had kept in touch in a timely manner with all parties and enjoyed universal approbation.

The article's position is questionable in light of Turkey's assertion that sanctions were no longer necessary because of the agreement that Lula and Erdogan had visited Tehran to conclude.

Brazil also not pleased, as the Washington Post tells us:

But Brazilian and Turkish officials were outraged at Clinton's announcement just one day after they had secured a pledge from Iran to ship some of its stockpile of low-enriched uranium to Turkey. Maria Luiza Ribeiro Viotti, the Brazilian ambassador to the United Nations, denounced the U.S. move, saying that Brazil "will not engage on any draft resolution" and that there "is still room for negotiations."

It appears that China got in deep in negotiations with the United States, had already abandoned its position opposing sanctions--in fact had already agreed to the draft--and was caught flatfooted by the Iran/Turkey/Brazil agreement and by Washington's dash to pre-empt the news of the deal with the accelerated sanctions push.

The United States rushed out an announcement of the resolution agreement faster than Russia (and one would imagine Beijing) wanted it, according to the Wall Street Journal:

The agreement on a draft U.N. resolution was reached within the last several days. Senior administration officials said its unveiling was timed as a direct response to the Turkish-Brazilian pact, in which Tehran renewed an offer to swap much of its nuclear fuel outside its borders for enrichment.

...

Russian ambassador to the U.N. Vitaly Churkin told reporters that Russia would have preferred to wait a day or two after the Brazil-Iranian deal, but the U.S. wanted to put it on the table right away.

Western officials feared that the deal reached in Tehran could throw up new hurdles to the already-delayed sanctions regime.

In testimony before Congress, Secretary Clinton provided the money quote, explicitly linking the draft resolution (and China) to the repudiation of Iran's diplomatic initiatives:

"This announcement is as convincing an answer to the efforts undertaken in Tehran over the last few days as any we could provide."

I have a feeling that the United States has no regrets about humiliating China with the rushed announcement, perhaps as revenge for China's embarrassing the U.S. at the Copenhagen climate conference or as a conscious effort to undercut China's pretensions to leadership in the developing world and as Iran's protector.

If so, Secretary Clinton's action will be long remembered in Beijing.

But, if the U.S. hurry to circulate the draft is understandable, China's apparent haste in endorsing the action so publicly and categorically is rather inexplicable.

It is surprising that China, which cares so much for its prestige and public image--its bella figura, as the Italians call it--allow itself to appear to such a disadvantage.

Tehran's English-language media reported on the circulation of the sanctions draft--but not China's role.

Certainly, Tehran will be interested to hear why China could not--or did not--keep the draft from circulating for a few days and give the Iran/Turkey/Brazil deal a chance to accummulate some public-relations momentum.

Beyond the issue of the TRR fuel deal, virtually every article in the US media emphasizes that watered-down UNSC sanctions are needed simply to enable harsher national and EU sanctions.

One wonders if Tehran will appreciate China's celebration of its negotiating heroics at the UNSC--which were probably more to China's benefit than Iran's--or regard Beijing's sign-off on the sanctions draft resolution as a prelude to Western sanctions and a betrayal.

Perhaps developments in the next few days will yield some answers.

In any case, it will take some effort and explaining if China is to regain the catbird seat on Iran--a position that I thought it was comfortably occupying as recently as last week.

If only for the sake of appearances, some post-facto Chinese hedging is apparently called for.

Two hours after the first Xinhua article appeared, judging by the timestamp, Li Baozhong, China's ambassador to the UN, attempted to rescue the situation by offering fulsome praise for the Turkish/Brazilian initiative and expressing deep concern for the wellbeing of the Iranian people:

We attach great importance to, and welcome the agreement signed by Brazil and Turkey with Iran on the supply of fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor. This is a positive step taken in the proper direction. We hope the various parties will grasp this opportunity, find a suitable method of resolution, and prevent the intensification of contradictions...On the question of Iran sanctions, we talk on the basis of principles: sanctions cannot affect energy supply, cannot affect routine trade and economic relations, and cannot affect the normal lives of the Iranian people..."

李保东说：“我们重视并欢迎巴西、土耳其同伊朗就德黑兰研究堆燃料供应签署的协议，这是朝正确的方向迈出的一个积极步骤。我们希望各方能够抓住这一机遇，找到妥善的解决办法，避免激化矛盾。维护海湾地区的和平与稳定是我们最关心的问题，和平与稳定符合各方的利益。为此，中国在这方面发挥了非常积极和建设性作用。我们会与各方继续努力，争取通过外交手段找到妥善解决伊核问题的办法。”


　　他说：“在对伊制裁问题上，我们是讲原则的，制裁不能影响能源供应，不能影响正常的贸易和经济往来，也不能影响伊朗人民的正常生活。应对有关制裁进行严格的限定。”

By midday Beijing time, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Chinese-language website was carrying a statement that Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi had spoken with the foreign ministers of Brazil and Turkey to express China's appreciation for their mediation--while reaffirming China's continued support for the "two track" process.

People's Daily ran a report in English on Yang's calls.

Interestingly, as of midday May 19 in Beijing, the MOFA website carried no news or statement about the circulation of the draft or the Chinese role. As far as I could tell, People's Daily English and Chinese editions didn't either.

By the time the Xinhua article made it into English in truncated form, it had a new title: Draft sanctions resolution on Iran does not mean end of diplomatic efforts: diplomatic source and did not explicitly mention China's approval of the contents of the draft resolution.

Returning to the original Xinhua article, one question is why the Chinese official media charged into print and went a long way toward publicly locking in China's support for UN sanctions at a time when it might have been more politic to keep silent and see how the chips fell.

Perhaps it contains in large part the standard diplomatic jibber-jabber prepared some time ago to set out China's position on sanctions, but looks rather unpersuasive when viewed in the context of quashing the Iran/Brazil/Turkey initiative.

The article took considerable pains to assert it got a good deal "over 20 rounds of two-party discussions" between the US and Chinese representatives, and also make public the "red lines' that will keep sanctions within limits.

But the upside of the situation for China is difficult to see.

The article identified four major points and provided explanations/justifications for each.

Point 1:

China acts on principle. It is opposed to nuclear proliferation and the possession of nuclear weapons by Iran.

"At the same time" China affirmed the dual track strategy and "the discussion of the draft of the six nations concerning sanctions should not affect the peace and stability or influence the recovery of the international economy.

与此同时，中方也认为，坚持“双轨”战略，六国关于制裁决议草案的讨论不应影响地区的和平与稳定，也不应影响正常的贸易和国际经济复苏的势头。这是中方从谈判一开始就强调的几点原则。中方认为，上述原则已经在决议案文中有所体现并得到满足，在安理会散发决议草案的有关条件已经成熟。

Point 2:

China's important interests are maintained. China's important interests are...in the matters of Iran's energy, trade, and financial sectors. China believes that normal economics and trade should not be punished because of the Iran question nor should those countries that maintain normal, legal economic relations with Iran be punished...Through negotiations, this point was satisfied, doing a relatively good job of upholding China's...important interests.

二、维护中国的重大利益。中国的重大利益主要体现在伊朗能源、经贸和金融等领域的合法利益。中方认为，不能因为伊朗核问题就惩罚正常的经济贸易，惩罚那些与伊朗保持正常、合法的经济贸易关系的国家。因此，这也是中方一直坚持的原则，经过谈判，这一点也得到了满足，比较好地维护了中国在能源、金融和经贸等领域的重大利益。

Point 3:

Maintaining China's image as a responsible great power...China has repeatedly emphasized although the six nations are discussing sanctions in New York, diplomatic efforts should becompletely unaffected. The door to diplomatic efforts has not been closed...China's consistently positive and constructive attitude has gained the favorable comment of the concerned nations.

三、维护中国作为一个负责任大国的形象。他说，中国作为一个负责任的大国，主张要坚定地维护国际核不扩散体系，在伊朗核问题上坚持“双轨”战略，积极支持外交努力。中方反复强调，即使六国在纽约启动了关于制裁伊朗问题的磋商，但外交努力不应受到任何影响，外交努力的大门并没有关闭。与此同时，中方在磋商过程中一直保持积极的、建设性的姿态，得到了有关国家的好评，认为中国在谈判过程中展示了一个建设性的形象，一个负责任大国的形象。

Point 4:

China has energetically tended to good relations with the various parties...During the course of discussions we have maintained good communications with the various parties, including Iran. We have reported relevant circumstances to the concerned party Iran in a timely manner. We have encouraged and supported Iran's expansion of cooperation with international society. The most recent conclusion of an agreement of Brazil and Turkey with Iran for the swap of nuclear fuel was also the result of China supporting diplomatic efforts and creating the space and time for diplomatic efforts. This also includes obtaining precious time for the Brazilian and Turkish leaders to go to iran to engage in diplomatic efforts and achieve a positive result. Therefore, the representatives of both Brazil and Turkey have in various venues and through different channels expressed thanks to China. At the same time, Iran has also indicated that this is also the result of the work done by China's leadership on the Iran side, actively urging and promoting discussions.

我们在磋商过程中，与包括伊朗在内的各方保持良好的沟通。其中，我们向作为当事方的伊朗及时通报有关情况，鼓励和支持伊朗与国际社会开展合作。最近巴西和土耳其与伊朗就核燃料交换达成协议，这也是中国支持外交努力、为外交努力留出空间和时间的结果，这也包括为巴西和土耳其领导人到伊朗进行外交努力并取得积极成果争取了宝贵的时间。因此，巴西和土耳其的代表通过不同场合与渠道先后对中国表示感谢。同时，伊朗也表示，这也是中国领导人对伊朗方面做工作，积极劝和促谈的结果。


Furthermore, it was stressed that China would ensure that non-permanent members of the UNSC would have enough time to study the draft resolution after it was circulated; a vote in about three weeks.

"Thanks to the joint efforts of China and Russia", the draft also includes references to "do not approve of use of force or threat of force", maintain international economic rights and responsibilities" and reflects the "dual track" approach of having sanctions content while also supporting and encouraging diplomatic efforts".

据了解，经过中国和俄罗斯的共同努力，在提交安理会讨论的决议草案中写入了“不赞成使用武力或威胁使用武力”以及“维护国际经济贸易的权利与义务”等内容。决议草案本身体现了坚持“双轨”战略的立场，既有制裁方面的内容，也包含支持和鼓励外交努力方面的措辞。

　

The Not So Great Game: Japan's Hunt for a Security Council Seat

It must be a great relief to the impoverished nations of Inner Asia and the South Pacific to know that, in addition to the profitable competition between the PRC and Taiwan for diplomatic recognition, there is another cash cow dangling its teat over the region—Japan.

Winning one of the non-permanent two-year elected seats on the Security Council allocated to Asia in 2008 is important enough to Japan that it has made winning regional support for its bid a focus of its financial diplomacy.

A Korean news outlet reported on January 26, 2007:

Prime Minister Abe had just received a long-awaited present from the Mongolian president: during the telephone conversation, President Enkhbayar said his nation would withdraw its candidacy for a non-permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council. He had reportedly urged Japan to run for the spot instead...

Junichiro Koizumi, then Japanese prime minister, visited Mongolia last summer to pledge assistance of US$350 million. Japan's last term on the council was made possible when Papua New Guinea withdrew its candidacy in 2004 due to financial problems.

This $350 million was on top of a big chunk of change handed out in May 2006 to the South Pacific, albeit as part of an initiative to support Australia and New Zealand’s ham-handed efforts in the region to counter Chinese influence.

As reported by the AP :

Japan lavished Yen 45 billion (US$410 million) in fresh aid to Pacific Island nations at a leaders' summit yesterday and walked away with unified support for Tokyo's bid to join the UN Security Council [as a permanent member-ed.]. (Japan Lavishes Aid on Pacific Islands, Taipei Times, May 28, 2006)

The beneficiaries of this largess were Scrabble powerhouses Fiji, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Republic of the Marshall Islands, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga and Vanuatu, Cook Islands ,the Federated States of Micronesia, Kiribati, and Tuvalu.

Japan, of course, yearns for a permanent Security Council seat, together with the rest of the G-4 group of aspirants—Germany, India, and Brazil—to which it has linked its candidacy.

It views occupying a non-permanent seat as an important part of this effort, allowing it to demonstrate a deep involvement in Security Council affairs that, together with its significant financial support of UN operations, justifies a permanent position on the council.

As the withdrawal of Papua New Guinea in 2004 implies, wading through mountains of Security Council paper work requires a commitment of personnel, time, and money that smaller nations are not necessarily eager to make.

Holding a non-veto wielding seat does have some practical advantages that are not immediately apparent. All 15 members of the Security Council serve on the various sanctions committees set up in support of UN resolutions against Iran and North Korea, which are tasked both with monitoring the sanctions regime and permitting exemptions.

Not unexpectedly, Iran is trying to get elected to a non-permanent seat, presumably so it can have a say in the sanctions regime imposed upon it, but its chances of success are considered slim.

By serving on the council as a non-permanent member and participating in the sanctions committees, Japan has an additional leverage over Teheran, an important but troublesome energy partner, and Pyongyang, the bugbear of North Asia.

Traditionally, campaigning for an elected seat has been a biennial circus of pleading, bribery, threats, and cajoling starring the various national representatives stationed in New York.

David Malone’s Eyes on the Prize in Global Governance, provides a brisk overview and a witty insider’s perspective on the frenetic campaigning circa 2000.

Malone reports that at that time upward of 25% of U.N. New York representatives either received no instructions from their capitals or received instructions but chose to ignore them. Aegean cruises, tickets to Circ du Soleil, and dinners too numerous to count were deployed in order to sway these discriminating voters.

The line between diplomacy and deception was a fine one, and was easily crossed.

Many others - fearing to indispose often more powerful states or simply hoping to get credit for a vote they will not cast - actively mislead others on their voting intentions. This factor seems to have badly tripped up Australia in 1996. In a press conference after that vote, Richard Butler referred to "rotten lying bastards" as the explanation for Canberra's loss. The recognized master of the electoral game at the UN, Italy's Permanent Representative Paolo Fulci, has developed a formula many believe foolproof: 10 percent of those commitments received in writing and 20 percent of those conveyed orally must be discounted. Failure to factor this formula into projections can lead to disaster.

The abrasiveness of Australia’s representative to the U.N. was a byword, according to Malone, and Australia’s defeat was attributed to “the Butler factor”.

Judging from Malone’s account, a pre-9/11 campaign for an elected seat on the UN would require, in addition to a fine understanding of human cupidity and duplicity, a budget of a perhaps a million dollars for staffing up and funding an intensive vote-winning effort.

Today, on the other hand, it appears to be a much bigger deal, involving not only national ego but national interests and, in the case of Iran, perhaps even national survival.

The 2006 election saw an epic contest between the United States’ champion, Guatemala, and Hector Chavez’s Venezuela, which had promoted its candidacy throughout the developing world with oil aid incentives, for the Latin American and Caribbean seat.

The vote went through 47 ballots before everybody threw in the towel and gave the nod to Panama as a compromise candidate.

Japan should be master of the game by now, having served as 9 terms as an elected member.

But however successfully it fairs in the 2008 elections for a two-year seat, Tokyo’s ambitions for a permanent seat may be doomed.

China, of course, wants no part of Japan as a permanent member of the Security Council and, given Japan’s close adherence to the U.S. line in international affairs, there doesn’t seem to be very strong support for a) offending China and b) giving the U.S. a second veto.

So it appears prudent of Mongolia’s Enkhbayar to support Japan’s election to two-year membership on the council and skirting support for a permanent seat that would have antagonized the dragon on his southern border.

One would think that Washington would encourage Japan’s use of yen diplomacy to buy influence in Asia at China’s expense, ostensibly for support of its UN ambitions.

However, in another example of the bewildering disconnect between the United States and its closest ally in the region, the U.S. is allowing UN reform—and expansion of the Security Council—to languish.

On February 18, 2007 the Daily Yomiuri reported Japan still far from permanent UNSC seat:

While pressing for Security Council reform as part of the G-4, Japan has been seeking strong U.S. support for its own plan for council reform, but the United States has shown little interest in the topic. The United States was the only permanent member of the Security Council that did not make a speech in the OEWG [Open Ended Working Group—as its name implies, a UN group founded in 1993 whose discussions on UN reform will apparently last for the rest of eternity—ed] meeting.

With South Korea, Italy, and Pakistan formally opposed to expansion, China hostile, and the U.S. disengaged, prospects for Japan successfully driving the process to obtain a permanent Security Council seat are grim.

And that makes the price of $350 million for Mongolia’s support of a non-permanent seat—and Abe’s reported joy and relief at Enhkbayars’s nod—almost inexplicable.