Showing posts with label copper. Show all posts
Showing posts with label copper. Show all posts

Monday, June 20, 2011

Congo Copper, the Three Gorges Dam, and America's $6.6 billion Imperial Rounding Error in Iraq

My piece in Asia Times this week is China plays long game on Congo copper.

For students of the IMF vs. Chinese theories of economic development, I think the details of the Chinese struggle to keep this project going in the teeth of Western disapproval strikingly illustrates some conspicuous and interesting differences.

For people who like a good anti-imperialist horse-laugh, there's this excerpt:

United States Secretary of State Hillary Clinton took a swipe at China in a June 11 press conference in Zambia, urging African nations to resist "new colonialism" and for foreign investors to practice "good governance".

    "We saw that during colonial times, it is easy to come in, take out natural resources, pay off leaders and leave," Clinton said in Lusaka, the Zambian capital, before flying off to Tanzania. "And when you leave, you don't leave much behind for the people who are there. We don't want to see a new colonialism in Africa."

    Although she didn't mention China by name, officials traveling with Clinton said she wanted to stress that African countries should hold Chinese investors to the same standards that they apply to Americans and Europeans. Clinton said the United States didn't want any foreign governments or investors to fail in Africa, but wanted to make sure that they give back to local communities. "We want them to do well, but also we want them to do good," she said. [1]

This declaration appeared at the same time that America's most conspicuous post-colonial initiative in Africa - the bombing of Libya - was entering its third month with a cost approaching US$1 billion and no end in sight.

It was the same week that the world got another look at the US exercise of good governance in Iraq, courtesy of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. The George W Bush administration had airlifted $12 billion in cash into post-conquest Iraq. $6.6 billion - more than half - cannot be accounted for. It is now assumed that it was stolen, perhaps "the largest theft of funds in [US] national history".

The LA Times reported:


    U.S. officials often didn't have time or staff to keep strict financial controls. Millions of dollars were stuffed in gunnysacks and hauled on pickups to Iraqi agencies or contractors, officials have testified.

    House Government Reform Committee investigators charged in 2005 that U.S. officials "used virtually no financial controls to account for these enormous cash withdrawals once they arrived in Iraq, and there is evidence of substantial waste, fraud and abuse in the actual spending and disbursement of the Iraqi funds."

    Pentagon officials have contended for the last six years that they could account for the money if given enough time to track down the records. But repeated attempts to find the documentation, or better yet the cash, were fruitless. [2]

In the requisite ironic coda, it turns out that the billions weren't even American taxpayers' money. The US government pulled the cash from the Development Fund for Iraq administered by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. The fund accumulated the proceeds from Iraq's energy exports during the Saddam Hussein oil-for-food sanctions years for eventual disbursement for the benefit of its true owners: the citizens of Iraq.

Tough luck, Iraqi citizens.

If China decides to take the US fiduciary meltdown in Iraq as precedent for its overseas activities, the bar for "doing good" and "giving back" to the local community is going to be extremely low.
For those keeping score, $6.6 billion is 66 million $100 bills. It is 72 tons of shrink-wrapped cash. It is the payload of three C-130 Hercules transports.

It is also the stated value of the Sino-Congolese infrastructure-for-copper agreement, trumpeted as the "deal of the century".

The much-touted neo-colonialist Chinese penetration of the Democratic Republic of Congo , in other words, is roughly equivalent to an American imperialist rounding error.

My article of the week before, Three gorges dam crisis in slow motion, looks at some of the TGD's highly publicized problems.

The dam is something of an overpriced fiasco.  The reservoir is starting to demonstrate a lot of the unattractive characteristics of a stopped-up toilet.  Billions of dollars will have to be spent in Sichuan dealing with the consequences of the dam: building more dams upstream to trap silt; constructing pollution-treatment facilities; stabilizing the reservoir banks to prevent landslides and dangerous, tsunami-esque wave surges; and maybe finding a new home for the port of Chongqing if China's hydrologists are outmaneuvered by the masses of silt marching upriver to the city's port.

The TGD is also a metaphor for big, bad China.  The PRC forged ahead and built the dam in the teeth of post-Tiananmen criticism of the regime, its leadership style, and its economic policies as symbolized by the TGD. 

So, international critics tend to pile on whenever some problem crops up in the vicinity, even when the link to the dam is tenuous at best.

In my piece, I take issue with accusations that the TGD was cause of the prolonged drought in the Yangtze River basin.  Long story short, holding water behind the dam was probably a factor in the dramatic but temporary drying-up of the shallow floodplain lakes Dongting and Poyang.  However, the dam did not cause the droughts.  More importantly, with an apparent trend toward longer droughts broken by brief, severe rainstorms, the big dams will play a big role in alleviating rather than exacerbating droughts.

As I complained in my piece on the misreporting of the Dalai Lama's statements on the death of Bin Laden , there seems to be a tendency toward laziness blogginess in the major news outlets.  Please, MSM, leave lazy blogginess to lazy bloggers!

...some outlets decided to use the Yangtze basin drought as a news hook for the story. As the Washington Post reported, "Amid severe drought, Chinese government admits mistakes with Three Gorges Dam." [1] CNN pitched in with "Has the Three Gorges Dam created Chinese drought zone?" [2] Associated Press: "China drought renews debate over Three Gorges Dam." [3]

In example of the bloggy "it would be irresponsible not to speculate" writing that news outlets increasingly turn to in order to fill their pages and attract readers, Elaine Kurtenbach of AP reported the allegation that "many villagers and some scientists suspect the dam ... could also be altering weather patterns, contributing to the lowest rainfall some areas have seen in a half century or more."

A modicum of research - ie recollecting that the Yangtze experienced one of the biggest floods in its history in the not-too-distant past, that is to say 10 months ago - casts doubt on this particular exercise in empirical inquiry.

The Yangtze River basin historically has a surplus of water, not a dearth, and this situation is likely to persist. Research on the effects of climate change on the Yangtze River basin predicts that global warming - not the TGD - will bring more rainfall in brief, more intense episodes from the summer monsoon. It was therefore undoubtedly a matter of considerable but not unexpected relief to the government as Xinhua reported that the drought broke under torrential rains - as much as 10 inches in some localities.

Thursday, June 11, 2009

Article Up on Asia Times: China, Copper, the Democratic Republic of Congo--and the IMF

As an illustration of how the IMF and China really don’t get along—despite Beijing’s interest in the IMF in a source of gold and SDRs—I've written a piece for ATol entitled China’s copper deal back in the melt, on a high-profile tussle in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

The IMF is openly lobbying the Congolese government to renegotiate a $9 billion copper and cobalt deal with China, for the stated reason that the project encumbers the DRC government with sovereign debt (an allegation that the Chinese dispute) at the same time the IMF is mediating with the Paris Club to forgive a chunk of the $10 billion tab run and embezzled in the name of the predecessor state of Zaire by kleptocrat-in-chief Mbuto Sese Seko.

In a classic example of the witless stenography that passes for Western reporting on Asian and African issues, the actual story - IMF threatens to withhold debt relief unless the Chinese deal is renegotiated - got a bit of a twist - as in Voice of America's "Chinese Mineral Deal Blocking Congo's IMF Debt Relief."

To get the real story, one perhaps has to dig even deeper—to the case of the Freeman MacMoRan-operated Tenke Fungurume copper mine.

The website operated by whistleblowing ex-Freeport MacMoRan employees with the buzzkilling name “FCXsucks.com” (“FCX” is Freeport’s NYSE ticker symbol) provides some interesting details and analysis.

The TF project is similar in scale to the Chinese project, and will take somewhere between $2.7 billion to $3 billion in copper out of Congo annually when it gets up to speed.

By a remarkable coincidence, at the same time the IMF is complaining about the Chinese deal, the DRC government is trying to renegotiate the sweetheart deal that the TF project got from the Sese Seko regime—a deal that capped the Congolese share in the project at 17.5%.

To compare and contrast, the DRC share in the Chinese project is already at 32%.

The FCXsucks people think the Chinese deal turns out worse than the TF deal despite the higher percentage because the Congolese partner, Gecamines, walks away with less money per year.

But that’s because the Chinese loan disbursement is bigger than the Freeport investment and covers a range of do-gooder infrastructure items not directly related to the deal. From the overall perspective of the DRC, adding the infrastructure improvements to Gecamine’s own ROI, the Chinese deal doesn’t look too bad.

President Kabila reportedly wants to see the DRC’s share in the TF project boosted to 45%, over the vigorous opposition of the project’s investors in the United States and Canada, and the U.S. government.

At the same time, the President is no doubt all ears to the IMF’s insistence that the interest rate on the Chinese project be dialed back from more expensive commercial terms to government-to-government concessional rates, like those China gave Angola.

Perhaps the DRC is less interested in the IMF’s proposal that the Chinese project get scaled back to $6 billion, as that would decrease the quantity of nice things the Chinese would build there in the next few years.

The Democratic Republic of Congo is flat on its back in terms of economic and social infrastructure. China coming in with a fast-track project to help rebuild the country (as the PRC did for Angola, in return for crude oil) is probably more welcome than a lecture from the IMF on Mbuto Sese Seko’s debt.

However, it will not be surprising if President Kabila—eager not to alienate either China or the West—finds a way for both deals—and debt relief--to go ahead.

The war in the Democratic Republic of Congo (previously Zaire) since 1998 has killed an estimated 5.4 million people, making it the bloodiest conflict since World War II.

Although the conflict has attracted intensive meddling from outsiders fixated on the country’s vast mineral reserves, the immense human suffering has inspired little in the way of the high profile attention and assistance.

The website Friends of the Congo provided this chilling perspective on how things are in the eastern end of the republic (the main copper deposits are in the south, in Katanga, which also saw fighting during the wars):

The International Center for Transitional Justice, the Human Rights Center at the University of California, Berkeley and the Payson Center for International Development at Tulane University conducted a survey of 2,620 Congolese between September and December 2007. The study focused North and South Kivu, Ituri, Kinshasa, and Kisangani. The results of the survey were predictable but shocking nonetheless. A summary of the survey revealed:

• 80 percent of respondents said they had been displaced at least three times in the last 15 years
• 75 percent said their cattle or livestock had been stolen
• 66 percent said their home had been destroyed or confiscated
• 61 percent of those polled in the east said they witnessed the violent death of a family member or friend
• 60 percent said one more of their household members had disappeared
• 34 percent said they themselves had been abducted for more than a week
• 53 percent reported being forced to work or being enslaved by armed groups
• 31 percent said they had been wounded in fighting
• 35 percent said they had been tortured
• 46 percent had been threatened with death
• 23 percent had witnessed sexual violence
• 16 percent had been sexually violated and 12 percent multiple times
• 85 percent of people polled believe "those responsible for the violence should be held accountable"

In North Kivu, at the epicenter of the violence, responses to the question "who protects you" were quite revealing. Respondents answered God (44 percent), the army (25 percent), the police (8 percent), nobody (7 percent), U.N. peacekeepers (6 percent).


Emphasis added.