[Updated Jan. 17 & Jan. 20, 2015--CH]
A couple days ago I was interviewed by The Real News on
the current round of sanctions against North Korea. Link here.
I talked about a few things that I’ve covered in China
Matters and on my twitter feed, not all of which made it into the report: the whiff of bogosity in the North Korean attribution in the Sony
case, and the apparent need for a rapid-response, evidence be damned
attribution process in the case of cybercrimes.
I speculate that a more immediate explanation for the quick sanctions slapdown was
that Kim Jung Un had compounded his diplomatic crime of trying to split and
circumvent the Six Party Talks united front through unilateral outreach by
dealing with the Monster of the Century (actually monster of three weeks ago
& I expect soon to resume the crown) Vladimir Putin. Kim’s first overseas trip as head of state
will be Russia, not the PRC, and I unpack the historically fraught and
unfriendly relationship between the DPRK & PRC and the shift of the center of PRC--Korea economic and strategic gravity to the southern half of the Peninsula. The PRC and the US, in fact, have a joint interest using the Six Party Talks to neutralize independent North Korean diplomacy and keep the initiative out of the hands of the DPRK and, for that matter, South Korea, Japan, and the Russian Federation.
The PRC, I think, wants to maintain North Korea as an impotent buffer state under its thumb and the United States wants to quarantine North Korea as a nettlesome nuclear power (and, perhaps, an important non-Chinese justification for the enormous U.S. North Asia military presence). Neither superpower, in other words, places a high priority on seeing North Korean diplomacy evolve beyond the current futility.
The PRC, I think, wants to maintain North Korea as an impotent buffer state under its thumb and the United States wants to quarantine North Korea as a nettlesome nuclear power (and, perhaps, an important non-Chinese justification for the enormous U.S. North Asia military presence). Neither superpower, in other words, places a high priority on seeing North Korean diplomacy evolve beyond the current futility.
I also made the point that US-DPRK diplomacy is, for the
time being, hopeless--the term of art is "strategic patience"--since Obama is the “gotta get rid of your nukes” Nobel
Peace Prize winner, and also “the guy who greenlit the overthrow and murder of
Muammar Gaddafi, the guy who got rid of his nukes at US insistence.”
Just to recapitulate for readers who may have forgotten,
after Desert Storm Gaddafi worried that he was next. In one of the few victories for George W.
Bush coercive diplomacy, Gaddafi revealed and decommissioned his nuclear and
chemical WMD programs under international inspection, acceded to the Chemical
Weapons Convention, re-opened Libya’s oil industry to foreign investment, and
ponied up over US$1 billion in compensation for the Lockerbie bombing (if, as
some suspect, Iran engineered Lockerbie as retaliation for the U.S. shootdown
of Iran Air 655, the mullahs of Tehran must be grateful indeed). In return, Libya got normalized relations, a
U.S. shield from terrorism lawsuits, visits from Condoleezza Rice and Tony
Blair, and the pleasure of receiving, incarcerating, and abusing repatriated
anti-Gaddafi dissidents. The “Libya
model” was actually touted as a precedent for bringing North Korea in from the
cold.
All that evaporated, together with Gaddafi and for that
matter much of civilized Libya, as President Obama yielded to the urgings of the “we
must not be on the wrong side of Arab Spring history” crowd and agreed to drop
the hammer on the Gaddafi regime.
That definitely put the USA on the wrong side of the DPRK, which understandably cited the Libyan precedent as justification for why it could never, ever surrender its nuclear weapons.
That definitely put the USA on the wrong side of the DPRK, which understandably cited the Libyan precedent as justification for why it could never, ever surrender its nuclear weapons.
And as for why President Obama is dealing with a publicly-demonstrated, full-fledged North Korean nuclear deterrent--instead of dealing with the discrete and selective displays of their nuclear capabilities at Yongbyon and elsewhere that the North Koreans used to put on for Siegfried Hecker--a trip in the Wayback Machine is in order.
For me, the anti-North Korea financial sanctions announced this week--and the concurrent hearing conducted by the House Foreign Relations Committee--were an exercise in nostalgia in the matter of policies, rhetoric, and even actors, and also a bitter reminder of two lost years of US DPRK policy, and the bomb they helped birth.
For me, the anti-North Korea financial sanctions announced this week--and the concurrent hearing conducted by the House Foreign Relations Committee--were an exercise in nostalgia in the matter of policies, rhetoric, and even actors, and also a bitter reminder of two lost years of US DPRK policy, and the bomb they helped birth.
North Korean financial sanctions is truly a matter of Same
Sh*t Different Decade, recapitulating and hopefully improving on one of the
biggest and at the same time unreported fiascos of American foreign policy: the
2005 attempt to achieve regime change on the cheap against North Korea through
covert financial sanctions. The 2005
circus also featured a pair of principals in the January 13, 2015 congressional
testimony: Congressman Ed Royce, a leader of the “something must be done about
North Korea” caucus and Treasury’s Daniel Glaser, Assistant Secretary for Terrorist Financing, who is in charge of OTFI, the
Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence a.k.a. sanctions central.
Since the miraculous efficacy of financial sanctions is now an article
of faith thanks to the apparent success of Iran sanctions, I think it's a
good time to lift up the curtain and look at what happened, what didn't
happen, and what was misreported the first time America took a financial swing at North Korea.
I made my rattly bones blogging the sanctions story non-stop
in 2007. Long story short, the Bush
administration, which had lost its multi-lateral mojo thanks to the Iraq f*ck
up, decided it would further beef up America’s unilateral muscles by “weaponizing”
financial enforcement.
The U.S. Treasury Department’s FinCEN (Financial Crimes Enforcement Network) operation had done a
bang-up job on its original, apolitical mission: tracking and blocking drug
cartels’ ongoing struggle to launder the immense ocean of cash sloshing out of
their operations. Come 2001, FinCEN was,
of course, recruited into the GWOT with the creation of the OTFI operation, but
was of limited utility: the amount of money that actually needed to change
hands through the international financial system to execute a terrorist attack is
vanishingly small. Under Bush, Section
311 of the Patriot Act was generously reinterpreted to exploit its coercive potential by employing FinCEN money laundering investigations against disliked state actors like North Korea. Somebody coined the term "financial waterboarding" to describe the borderline legality and extremity of the tactic.
In 2005, after Bush’s re-election, Colin Powell was gone and
the Cheney gang of f*ck-you unilateralists were enjoying a brief ascendancy in
the foreign policy apparatus. Aggressive
North Korea regime change policies moved to the top of the agenda
and somebody, a.k.a. probably John Bolton, got the brainwave that the resources
and legislation enabling FinCEN, coupled with the central U.S. position in the
world financial system—which meant that U.S. unilateral actions against any
foreign bank would cut it off from the world financial system--could be used to
destabilize North Korea.
Ground Zero for the initiative was a small Macau bank, Banco
Delta Asia, which had allowed North Korean entities to open some 50 accounts. I suspect the proximate impetus for going
medieval on BDA was that in 2000 South Korea under the engagement-minded Kim
Dae Jung had funneled $500 million to North Korea in return for a summit (and,
subsequently, a Nobel Peace Prize) through some Macanese banking channel,
thereby making a mockery of US attempts to isolate, defund, and pressure North
Korea.
The U.S. Treasury Department, under OTFI jefe Stuart Levey,
designated BDA as an institution “of primary money-laundering concern” under
Section 311, averring that it was suspected of laundering the infamous North
Korean “supernotes”—a miraculous counterfeit of the US hundred-dollar note that
was virtually indistinguishable from the real thing. To “protect the U.S. financial system”, U.S.
financial institutions were instructed not to have dealings with BDA. Result: a run on the bank, and BDA went into
receivership in the hands of the Macau financial authorities.
Mission accomplished, one might think. Without any due process (the designation was
merely the beginning point of an 18-month investigatory process, not a
conclusion), the US government had successfully torpedoed a foreign bank. And about $25 million in North Korea-related accounts was frozen and out of Pyongyang's reach! Pow! Power!!
By the lights of the Bush administration, the fact that this
power could be exercised unilaterally, pre-emptively, without any checks and
balances (the case, when investigated, is a completely internal US government star-chamberesque
proceeding, without any opportunity for the targeted institution to confront
its accusers, demand discovery, etc.) no doubt added to its intoxicating
allure.
In order to further accentuate the measure’s unilateral dark
and mighty awesomeness a la Cheney (and shield the actions from any trace of
international accountability or consultation), at first the Bush administration
even peddled the myth that the BDA designation was just a plain vanilla
Treasury enforcement action against a Macau bank with shoddy controls and had nothing to do with North Korea (even as Treasury
conducted a secret global campaign of harassment
against any bank that dared to do business with the DPRK and also dished out the
same treatment to Cuba).
As a matter of evidentiary rigor, the Bush administration
f*ked up royally. It turned out that BDA
routinely sent all its cash deposits over to Hong Kong & Shanghai Bank in Hong Kong for
vetting, and the single time counterfeit currency had been detected—one decade
before!-- the U.S. Treasury had been promptly informed. But that did not deter the Treasury
Department, which ground on with the apparently bogus case. I assume that the flimsiness of the case was
perhaps considered as not a bug, but a feature, a sign that U.S. financial
might, diplomatic determination, and unilateralist ambitions would prevail
under the most adverse circumstances.
The U.S. government’s determination to prevail had a lot to
do, I suspect, with the fact that the real target of the BDA procedure was not
BDA or even North Korea; it was the People’s Republic of China.
The PRC is the 800-pound gorilla in the room when it comes
to Iran as well as North Korea sanctions.
If the PRC is unenthusiastic, the sanctions simply don’t work. When Treasury officials talk about “cutting
of North Korea from the world financial system” they’re really talking about
the PRC.
The architect of the 2005 campaign, David Asher, came out and said it in congressional testimony in 2007.
“Banco Delta was a symbolic
target. We were trying to kill the chicken to scare the monkeys. And the
monkeys were big Chinese banks doing business in North Korea...and we’re not
talking about tens of millions, we’re talking hundreds of millions.”
BDA’s chairman, Stanley Au, had been a delegate to the China
People’s Consultative Congress, a prestigious “united front” talking shop that
showcased pro-PRC overseas Chinese. The
BDA designation was a demonstration project, meant to show the PRC what could
happen to its friends--and its banks--if the US line was not satisfactorily
toed.
Since these kinds of activities allow the United States to
throw its weight around without dropping bombs, IR types find the exercise of financial
sanctions “soft power” incredibly beguiling, even though it ignores all the
checks/balances/due process/proportionality stuff that is supposed to give
“soft power” its moral and diplomatic strength.
As a result, I have seen reporters peddle the myth that the
BDA designation “worked”.
This is what “worked” looks like:
September 2005 U.S. Treasury Department announces
designation of Banco Delta Asia as a bank of “primary money laundering concern”
April 2006 Six Party nuclear talks halt since US refuses to discuss
North Korea’s frozen accounts.
October 2006 North Korea conducts its first successful
nuclear test.
That’s not what success looks like.
Even for the Bush administration, whose attitude toward foreign policy fiascos was usually one of callous insouciance, it was a Defcon 1 disaster.
Even for the Bush administration, whose attitude toward foreign policy fiascos was usually one of callous insouciance, it was a Defcon 1 disaster.
In an undignified scramble, the Cheney hardliners, including
regime change fire-eater in chief Bob Joseph, were pushed out of the way and
Condoleezza Rice took over. Various
deals were cut in January-February 2007 and in March 2007 U.S. Assistant
Secretary of State Christopher Hill announced the Norks would be getting their
money (a whopping $25 million, half of which, by the way, was the property of
hapless joint ventures in North Korea like British American Tobacco, not even Kim
Jung Il’s) out of BDA.
In what is I think perhaps the most under-reported story of
the Bush administration, hardliners in the U.S. government worked indefatigably
to sabotage the deal negotiated by Christopher Hill. In February 2007, as the statutory eighteen
month investigatory period expired and the State Department was struggling to
cobble together a deal, Treasury announced a scorched earth final rule against
BDA citing Patriot Act Section 311.
Using the patently false statement that the rule could not
be revoked, Treasury then declared that any bank that was involved in repatriating the
North Koreans’ $25 million out of BDA would be sanctioned. The State Department frantically roamed the
financial world looking for somebody who would dare handle the
transaction. After a futile four months’
quest for a commercial bank willing to handle the deal—the Chinese banks all
demurred either out of fear or from a desire to watch the US twist painfully in
the wind--in June 2007, the State Department finally cobbled together a channel
using the New York Fed and the Russian central bank to get the cash back to the
Norks.
Turning to the current actors, in 2007 representative Ed
Royce also pitched in at the time, cosigning a letter with other anti-Nork heavyweights that raised the specter of prosecuting
Christopher Hill for money laundering for his efforts in trying to arrange the
repatriation.
And for that matter, I suspect Daniel Glaser may have wandered
off the res and delivered some back-channel threats in Macau to try to derail
the repatriation, and he was subsequently, I speculated at the time, dispatched
to “eat crow in Beijing.”
Even the designated existential menace of 2005, the frickin’
Supernote canard, gets an occasional shoutout in current coverage. Kevin Hall of McClatchy conducted a thoroughgoing
investigation of the counterfeiting boondoggle and I did my share of the debunking.
I’m assuming the hardliners obstructing the repatriation of
funds were getting their marching orders and political backing from a furious
Dick Cheney. To my mind, it is the most
remarkable example of open insubordination within the U.S. executive branch
that I can think of. Hopefully, some
insider will write it up some day.
The Obama administration was also entranced by the potential
of the financial sanctions weapon.
Stuart Levey was the highest-ranking holdover from outgoing Bush
administration other than Secretary of Defense Gates.
In his signature style, President Obama was more cerebral,
patient, and multilateral in his planning.
The pretense of independent Treasury proceedings to “protect the US
financial system” were dropped in favor of overtly legislating and applying
sanctions in the context of multi-lateral diplomacy.
To my mind the biggest genuine achievement in US-PRC
coordination under President Obama was Beijing’s decision to throw Iran under the bus and support
UNSC sanctions in 2010. The threat of US
financial sanctions was a recurring a headache for the PRC and had changed its
behavior in 2005 (though I suspect that financial channels between Beijing and
Pyongyang were kept open even as China’s big banks dropped North Korea
transactions) and I presume some combination of financial threats and political
inducements prompted the PRC’s move against Iran. Again, the inside story remains to be told.
Given the virtually total separation of the US and DPRK economies, Treasury measures that hit North Korea indirectly--by, effectively, sanctioning foreign financial institutions that do business with the DPRK, not the DPRK itself--quickly rose to the top of the agenda when it was time to "do something" about the Sony hack.
In his testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on January 13, Daniel Glaser advised that the Obama administration had crossed a Rubicon of sorts by openly deploying unilateral Treasury sanctions as a "because we can" tool of coercive diplomacy divorced from the financial violations they were originally designed to counter. The "weaponization" of US financial regulation, in other words, is pretty much complete (and the inconvenience of trying to justify Treasury sanctions using boondoggles like the Supernote canard is pretty much circumvented):
In his written statement, Royce identified the Executive Order as enabling a full-spectrum financial jihad against banks of any jurisdiction doing business with North Korea.
Financial sanctions against the DPRK, of course, brings the unwelcome issue of the People's Republic of China back to to the fore.
Given the virtually total separation of the US and DPRK economies, Treasury measures that hit North Korea indirectly--by, effectively, sanctioning foreign financial institutions that do business with the DPRK, not the DPRK itself--quickly rose to the top of the agenda when it was time to "do something" about the Sony hack.
In his testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on January 13, Daniel Glaser advised that the Obama administration had crossed a Rubicon of sorts by openly deploying unilateral Treasury sanctions as a "because we can" tool of coercive diplomacy divorced from the financial violations they were originally designed to counter. The "weaponization" of US financial regulation, in other words, is pretty much complete (and the inconvenience of trying to justify Treasury sanctions using boondoggles like the Supernote canard is pretty much circumvented):
E.O. 13687 [signed by President Obama on Jan. 2, 2015; gives Treasury the authority to sanction the DPRK government and Workers' Party of Korea for the Sony hack and "other egregious acts"--ed.] represents a significant broadening of Treasury’s authority to increase financial pressure on the Government of the DPRK and to further isolate the DPRK from the international financial system. With the issuance of E.O. 13687, Treasury, for the first time, has the authority to designate individuals and entities based solely on their status as officials, agencies,instrumentalities, or controlled entities of the Government of the DPRK or the WPK. Treasury also now has the authority to designate those acting on their behalf or providing them with material support.
In his written statement, Royce identified the Executive Order as enabling a full-spectrum financial jihad against banks of any jurisdiction doing business with North Korea.
[T]he significance of this new Executive Order may come from the broad power it gives the President to target anyone who is a part of the North Korean government or is assisting them in any way for anything. That is, if the Administration chooses to use it to its full advantage.
We need to step up and target those financial institutions in Asia and beyond...
In his verbal opening remarks, Royce referred to the BDA sanctions as a success, a characterization I hope that readers of this post will take with a grain of salt.
Financial sanctions against the DPRK, of course, brings the unwelcome issue of the People's Republic of China back to to the fore.
In the matter of North Korea, despite Kim Jung Un's geostrategic footsie with Park, Abe, & Putin, the foreign
relationship, now as in back in 2005, that still matters most is the People’s Republic of
China. Glaser, in his testimony, described the PRC as still "taking the lion's share" in terms of providing North Korea's international financial facilities. With a lot of American levers
against the PRC losing their effectiveness, I suspect President Obama is loath
to surrender the nuclear option: the threat that Chinese banks can be blocked
from the global financial system. When
the financial sanctions weapon is trotted out, it is a signal that the PRC is
supposed to take heed and “do something.”
But actively and aggressively wielding that weapon is another matter.
But actively and aggressively wielding that weapon is another matter.
Sanctions that cut PRC institutions from the US-controlled international financial system is a wasting asset (though
not evaporating quickly enough to satisfy RMB triumphalists, perhaps) as the
PRC has prioritized its international forex/financial policy to wean the PRC
both incrementally from the US dollar and from the need to clear transactions
through the US and its allies.
I also suspect that the PRC believes that in 2015 the Obama
administration is not going to risk accelerating this process of
disintermediation over the case of a hack against a Japanese entertainment
company that North Korea may or may not have committed.
It's worth noting that the testimony of Song Kim, the Obama administration's special representative for North Korea policy, was markedly short of fire-eating and notably larded with "doors open" verbiage, which leads me to believe that the Obama administration is actually more interested in fostering a Burma-type strategic realignment by North Korea toward the US tolerated by the PRC in a spirit of forbearance, and not really that enthusiastic about a regime change/collapse scenario that might please Ed Royce but also trigger a Chinese intervention.
So I suspect the current posturing on financial sanctions is more an exercise in political kabuki before the new Republican-controlled Congress than a genuine attempt to relive the dubious glories of 2005.
It's worth noting that the testimony of Song Kim, the Obama administration's special representative for North Korea policy, was markedly short of fire-eating and notably larded with "doors open" verbiage, which leads me to believe that the Obama administration is actually more interested in fostering a Burma-type strategic realignment by North Korea toward the US tolerated by the PRC in a spirit of forbearance, and not really that enthusiastic about a regime change/collapse scenario that might please Ed Royce but also trigger a Chinese intervention.
So I suspect the current posturing on financial sanctions is more an exercise in political kabuki before the new Republican-controlled Congress than a genuine attempt to relive the dubious glories of 2005.
By the way, despite the US Treasury final rule, Banco Delta
Asia is still in business.
Thanks to its local retail operations and, perhaps, a generous helping of F*ck You, OTFI, sub rosa support from
Beijing, it seems to be doing fine.
3 comments:
The effect of the US actions will in time be not an iron curtain between Russia and the EU, but a division between Russia, Asia, South Africa and South America, and the so-called west, the EU and US. I.e. a division along the world's south. The EU will want to participate in China's silk road schemes and will in time move away from the US which means the US risks to isolate itself with its completely destructive policies worthy of the Mafia, not a civilized state.
China of course long understood the US tactics of encircling China with US bases - hence the sudden US change of mind about the human rights abuses of Burma and in time of North Korea, the two last points along the border of China not "fortified" yet by the US. With respect to North Korea, South Korea may in fact be the obstacle, not the north: South Korea wants Russian gas and oil. A pipeline across North Korea to South Korea built by Russia will bring the two Koreas closer together while distancing the US: the North's nuclear weapons can then be used to insist that the US pull out of South Korea including its nuclear weapons. South Korea is more interested in uniting with North Korea without a war and will likely agree with such a deal. Which means the combination of China and Russia will become the new guarantor of peace in Asia, not the US.
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