If history has taught us anything…it’s that it's hard to
build an isthmian canal across Central America.
That’s a lesson Chinese telecom entrepreneur Wang Jing is
probably taking to heart now that 80% of his paper wealth evaporated in the PRC stock market
unpleasantness, and he has to take a long hard look at how to come up with the
$50 billion needed to build his canal through Nicaragua.
Reuters recently tossed Wang another anvil, running a dire report
that the social and ecological impact statement commissioned by HKND,
the Chinese developers for the current project, concluded that the
project was "fraught with risks."
I
must say that the actual report is 11,000 pages in 14 volumes and, as
far as the article is concerned I wonder if the conclusions were "fed"
rather than "read" if you get my drift; and the inevitably hedged
takeaway is that the canal "was likely
to have an overall positive impact on Nicaragua, the
second-poorest country in Latin America, but only if it follows
international standards."
Don't make the complacent judgment that the good canal got built in Panama, and the PRC is getting the booby prize in Nicaragua.
I think a close study of history is also trying to teach us that…an isthmian
canal really should be built in
Nicaragua!
The Panama Canal is a tribute to the energy, integrity, and
skill of the US engineering, construction, and sanitary team, which overcame a
host of dire problems and erected one of the great monuments of modern civil
engineering.
But in its intellectual, moral, strategic, and technical
foundations, in its conception, marketing, and remembrance, the Panama Canal is
a masterpiece…of BS.
The official narrative, enshrined for general audiences in
David McCullough’s The Path Between the
Seas, is the Panama Canal as a triumph of American can-doism, especially the
will and vision of Theodore Roosevelt.
As president, Roosevelt engineered legislation in favor of the Panama
route over Nicaragua, managed the secession of the province of Panama from the
Colombian republic, and drove the titanic project to completion.
The cornerstone assumption of this narrative was that
Roosevelt was the ultimate straight shooter, he saw the superiority of the Panama route, and he
made it happen.
Not quite so, as two very interesting but relatively obscure
books tell us.
The first book, How
Wall Street Created a Nation by Ovidio Diaz Espino lays out the financial
machinations coordinated by William Cromwell, the Panama Lobby’s fixer, to
produce an immense payday for Wall Street speculators in Panama stocks.
The second book, The
Cowboy and the Canal: How Theodore Roosevelt Cheated Colombia, Stole Panama,
and Bamboozled America by J.M. Carlisle, lays out the evidence that a key
member of the Panama ring was Douglas Robinson, Roosevelt’s financial adviser,
personal fixer…and his brother-in-law.
Both of them draw on a forgotten classic of investigatory journalism, The Untold Story of Panama, by Earl Harding, the journalist who unearthed the story for Joseph Pulitzer 100 years ago.
Interesting stuff.
Scandal has burbled around the selection of Panama from the
beginning thanks to the well-advertised disappointment and resentment of the
powerful Nicaraguan faction in the US Senate.
Opponents of the Panama scheme held congressional hearings and their
objections (before approval of the Panama project) and accusations (afterward)
of skullduggery received an extensive airing in sympathetic press outlets.
Joseph Pulitzer’s papers pushed the story and Pulitzer and a
number of other newsies were indicted for libel for challenging the honesty and
integrity of the Panama crowd. According
to Diaz Espino, Roosevelt suspected his own VP, Douglas Fairbanks, of leaking the
story, tapped his phone (yes, there were apparently phones in 1909), and had
the Secret Service tail him for months.
But the massive evidence of profiteering and skullduggery
has been shrugged off since it was believed Teddy made the right call, put that
ditch in Panama where it oughta be, made the dirt fly and took no guff!
Well, let me take issue with that. The advantages of the
Nicaraguan route had been recognized ever since the 1850s, when it served as a
vital link between the eastern and western United States a) during the Gold
Rush and b) before the construction of the transcontinental railroad.
Cornelius Vanderbilt, the sharpest knife in the robber baron
toolkit, staked his bets on the Nicaragua route over the Panama route for two
good reasons.
First, the Nicaraguan route was 300 miles closer to the United States on the Atlantic side alone, and shaved 500 miles off the voyage to San Francisco from the Pacific side as well. Transit across Nicaragua was a major time and money saver for travelers anxious to hit the goldfields, and for the steamship operators that carried the passengers, freight and, on the return, the gold (a few days gained in depositing specie in New York and collecting interest was a serious deal).
Second, a natural transitway almost completely across Nicaragua already existed, making it possible to cross to the Pacific side with reduced muss, fuss, and capital expenditure if little comfort.
First, the Nicaraguan route was 300 miles closer to the United States on the Atlantic side alone, and shaved 500 miles off the voyage to San Francisco from the Pacific side as well. Transit across Nicaragua was a major time and money saver for travelers anxious to hit the goldfields, and for the steamship operators that carried the passengers, freight and, on the return, the gold (a few days gained in depositing specie in New York and collecting interest was a serious deal).
Second, a natural transitway almost completely across Nicaragua already existed, making it possible to cross to the Pacific side with reduced muss, fuss, and capital expenditure if little comfort.
The San Juan River empties into the Caribbean on Nicaragua’s
east coast. Vanderbilt’s boats were able
to navigate up the San Juan—albeit via some nasty rapids—up to Lake
Nicaragua. On the west bank of Lake
Nicaragua, it was a 12-mile descent overland to the Pacific Ocean.
Let me repeat that.
In 1855, only 12 miles of the Nicaraguan route was not water-accessible.
Vanderbilt obtained an exclusive transit concession from the
Nicaraguan government, including rights to construct a canal. Vanderbilt was unable to pull off British
financing for the canal, which was something of a pipe dream at the time, and
concentrated his efforts on dominating and milking the extremely profitable
transit traffic until a host of political and commercial aggravations--
including multiple filibustering expeditions by William Walker that targeted
Vanderbilt’s Nicaraguan interests--caused the tycoon to turn elsewhere to
augment his fortunes.
Panama, on the other hand, mainly attracted people who
looked at a map and saw that the isthmus at that point was very, very skinny.
Ferdinand de Lesseps, the builder of Suez, liked what he saw
on the map and staked his reputation, prestige, and the savings of thousands of
loyal stockholders on the idea that money, will, and French elan could carve a
notch through Panama in the form of a sea-level or “tide water” canal.
The story ended miserably in 1889. De Lesseps’ equipment, technology, and
engineers were unable to make much of a dent in the Panamanian jungle and the
workforce was decimated by yellow fever and malaria. The Panama company had been intentionally underfunded
to generate market excitement through a limited issuance of shares, and then
desperately Ponzi’d up in a series of stock schemes to keep the dividends
flowing and confidence up while the project floundered. Finally, the bad news and bad management
caught up with de Lesseps, resulting in bankruptcy, a titanic scandal over
influence peddling, fraud, and misrepresentation, and a jail term for his son,
Charles.
The Panama debacle further strengthened the hand of the
Nicaraguan faction in the U.S., led by Senator John Morgan of Alabama, who saw
the project as a ticket to economic rejuvenation for the Gulf ports of his
beloved Dixie (he had been a Confederate general and, more recently, the Grand
Dragon of the Alabama Ku Klux Klan), as well as a payday for himself.
In 1902, the US government’s Isthmian Canal Commission, as
expected, recommended the Nicaragua route.
However, in a major surprise, Roosevelt met with the commissioners and
told them to reverse themselves. The
stage was set for a big, expensive, and dirty lobbying/speechifying battle in
Congress between the Nicaragua and Panama outfits, which the Panama faction won
thanks to the superior finances, organization, wits, and energy of William
Cromwell.
But more help from T.R. was needed.
The shorthand for the key legislation, the Spooner Act, was
that it gave the project to Panama.
Actually, it gave first dibs to Panama, but if the Colombian
government didn’t grant the U.S. the concession it desired, then it would be
Nicaragua.
Colombia, of course, tried to make use of this leverage to
extract a good deal, too good a deal as far as the US was concerned. The US
government, instead of throwing up its hands and moving on to Nicaragua, facilitated
the secession of the province of Panama, recognized it as an independent state,
and negotiated a favorable deal for the canal zone with Panama’s newly minted Envoy
Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the United States —who happened
to be the French leader of the Panama ring.
A sleazy, oft-told story, but recounted in new depth and detail by Diaz
Espino.
There are quite a few indicators that the fix was in for
Panama despite its disadvantages.
First, consider the $40 million paid to the Compagnie Nouvelle, the French outfit
that was successor to the rights of de Lesseps’ busted company, by the US
government to acquire its Panama rights and property.
The $40 million price tag was pretty dubious and was itself
a pure product of deal engineering. The
leaders of the Ring told the French—who had optimistically put a figure of
over $100 million on their overgrown cuttings, rundown buildings, and abandoned
equipment—they had to come in at $40 million so the aggregate price estimate
for the Panama project would be $5 million less than Nicaragua.
More significantly, the French rights were a wasting
asset. They expired in 1904 (a legally
questionable extension to 1910 could complicate matters, I guess, but the
Colombian government would have been happy to repudiate it), so if the US had decided
to wait out the French, they could have negotiated with the Colombian
government for all the rights—which Colombia was apparently prepared to offer
for $25 million, which is a bargain of at least $15 million if you just
consider the discount off the French number and a lot more than that when you
realize it included the Colombian rights as well .
And of course, if the Colombian negotiations hadn’t worked
out the US could grab Panama anyway—as the US eventually did—and pay zero to the
Colombians.
As it finally worked out, the US government paid $10 million to the new government of Panama for the canal rights, something of a bargain.
At the same time the US paid $40 million to Compagnie Nouvelle for the company's derelict and dubious rights, rights whose legal standing with Colombia--which, on top of everything else had lost sovereignty over the territory in which the concession was granted--were extremely tenuous and, as far as the newly minted government of Panama was concerned, would seem to be ripe for repudiation or renegotiation, one might think.
Not quite a bargain at $40 million. Add the $10 million paid to Panama, and the cost basis for Panama was now $5 million more, instead of less, than the Nicaragua estimate.
As it finally worked out, the US government paid $10 million to the new government of Panama for the canal rights, something of a bargain.
At the same time the US paid $40 million to Compagnie Nouvelle for the company's derelict and dubious rights, rights whose legal standing with Colombia--which, on top of everything else had lost sovereignty over the territory in which the concession was granted--were extremely tenuous and, as far as the newly minted government of Panama was concerned, would seem to be ripe for repudiation or renegotiation, one might think.
Not quite a bargain at $40 million. Add the $10 million paid to Panama, and the cost basis for Panama was now $5 million more, instead of less, than the Nicaragua estimate.
So a key component of the rush for Panama was paying out, apparently
quite unnecessarily, $40 million to the stockholders of a French company, of
whom a large number were reasonably suspected of being American
speculators. For his services to the Compagnie Nouvelle in securing the US
government payday, William Cromwell demanded over $800,000 (multiply by 24 to
get current dollars), reportedly the highest legal fee in US history to that
time. How much eventually ended up in
his pocket and how much was distributed elsewhere is unclear, but Cromwell’s
lobbying efforts were both effective and extremely expensive.
Beyond the financial/legal issues, the Panama route had two
other signal disadvantages compared to Nicaragua. First, Panama was notoriously unhealthy,
considered a death trap compared to what was known of Nicaragua, and the US
medical team had to expend enormous scientific and institutional resources
during construction to avoid duplicating the massive die-off of workers and
staff experienced by the French.
And there was the awkward matter of the Culebra Cut (known
as the “Gaillard Cut” during the period of US control)—an excavation of an
inconvenient mountain at the continental divide near the Pacific end of the
canal and a challenge that had vanquished de Lesseps. Inconvenient not just because it was there,
and it was a bit high, but because it was a massive pile of gooey clay that
often slid catastrophically into the cut after rainstorms, carrying machines
and people with it.
It is standard procedure to wax rhapsodic over the immense
amounts of dirt removed from the Culebra Cut by the Bucyrus excavators during
the US construction effort, over 100 million tons. It should be also noted that thanks to the
need to drastically widen the banks of the cut beyond the original estimate to
keep them from slumping, the actual amount excavated during the project was two
times the estimate, and included 23 million tons of uninvited material that had
slid into the cut during landslides. And
the headaches weren’t over when the canal was built. Over the life of the canal, there have been 60 documented landslides in the Culebra area and the canal has been shut down
two dozen times, most recently in 1986.
Landslide dirt removed from the canal since it entered into operation: another
45 million tons.
Fact is, the entire mountain is moving continually into the
canal in a leisurely fashion, like a glacier of clay crap.
The full arsenal of rhetorical devices was deployed selling
the Panama canal while denigrating the Nicaraguan route (and the obverse was
completely true as well, to be sure); but most of the exercise was a parade of
dubious assertions masquerading as fact.
On the important issue of costs, George Morison--the member
of the Isthmian Canal Commission characterized by McCullough as the paragon of
technical integrity and foresight who convinced President Roosevelt of the
superior merits of Panama--extoled the rigor that went into the Panama cost
calculations that had produced the vital talking point that the Panama canal
would come in at $5 million less than Nicaragua, as opposed to the wild-and-wooly
pig in the pokery guesses of the Nicaragua camp.
I fully believe that
the Panama Canal…will cost a great deal less than the Nicaragua Canal…that the
difference will be very much greater than has been estimated even in the report
of the Isthmian Commission…The Commission, in an effort to put everything on an
even basis, has perhaps overstepped the mark…The same percentage has been added
for contingencies …although at Panama a very large portion of these
contingencies have already been met and provided for in the work already done,
and although the opportunities for investigation and examination are very much
greater at Panama than at Nicaragua.
(The Isthmian Canal, Address by George S. Morison to the
Massachusetts Reform Club, April 24, 1902)
In the end, the Panama Canal came in at twice the estimate
in the enabling legislation, which relied on the figures worked up by Morison and
his fellows in the Commission (but, it should be said, about $23 million under
the construction budget calculated by the engineers during the actual execution
of the project).
Perhaps the most boondoggling element of the 1902 debate was
the marketing of Panama as a “tide water” canal i.e. a straight, Suez style cut
coast to coast without locks per de Lesseps’ original concept.
As a matter of philosophy the sea level canal—wide as you
want, with no restrictive and accident-or sabotage-prone lock bottlenecks—was
considered the beau ideal of canal
building.
And a very convenient, perhaps essential, truth, at least
for the Panama group, was that a sea level canal was considered impossible in Nicaragua.
As Thomas Morrissey wrote in Donegan and the Panama Canal:
Many congressmen had
preferred the Panama site to Nicaragua because only Panama could have a sea
level canal. Ferdinand de Lesseps had
wanted a sea level canal; Roosevelt wanted a sea level canal; Wallace [the
first Chief Engineer] wanted a sea level canal; Secretary of War Taft
wanted a sea level canal; Stevens [the second Chief Engineer] wanted a sea
level canal; Bunau-Varilla [the French leader of the Panama ring] believed that
the United States should first build a lock canal, and later convert it into a
sea level canal. Roosevelt appointed an
international commission to advise him.
It also recommend a sea level canal.
George Morison, pretty much alone of the Panama camp, did
state a preference for a lock canal at Panama, but merely on the grounds of the
extra time it would take to build a tide water canal, not cost or technical
issues. In a 1902 address, Morison
stated:
The best possible
solution would be the tide water canal when it is done…But the difficulty in
building the tide-water canal is principally one of time. It would probably take at least 20 years to
build a tide-water canal at Panama. It
might take 25 or 30. This is a very
serious thing…
In actuality, a tide water canal was a completely
impractical approach because of the factor of the Chagres River, a sizable,
unruly stream given to unnerving overnight rises of a dozen feet during flash
floods. It criss-crossed the planned
path of the canal several times on the way to the Caribbean and presented
major, perhaps insoluble problems for a tide water canal, basically a ditch at
sea-level.
Two years into the actual construction of the canal, in
1906, after much debate and hesitation and in response to the determined
advocacy of the Chief Engineer, John Stevens (who changed his mind after
arriving at the job site and confronting the Chagres River and Culebra Cut
challenges), Congress acknowledged reality and the insistence of the engineers
and specified a lock canal in legislation.
Even so, the sea level canal idea refused to die. In the
1930s, the United States spent $75,000,000 constructing a set of locks
in the Canal Zone as part of a stealth program to build a sea level
canal--and then abandoned them.
At
the end of the World War II, conversion of the Panama Canal to a sea
level canal idea received another airing as a measure to secure it
against atomic attack. This gambit foundered on the grounds of its
military and scientific absurdity, and because it was now understood a
sea level canal would cost on the order of $2.5 billion dollars--in 1947
dollars, when a dollar was, as they say a dollar, or you might say, ten
2015 dollars.
Well,
the lobbyists for the project said $2.5 billion. But it might have
been $4.7 billion (that was the revised estimate in 1956); or maybe it
was actually $10 billion, as some civil engineers estimated in the
1950s.
Eventually, the tide turned and in 1956 Maurice Thatcher, a member of
the Isthmian Canal Commission, who also served as
civil governor of the Canal Zone, told Earl Harding that:
"...of
all the engineers then living, who had experience in building or
operating the canal, not one approved the Panama sea-level project."
The sea-level canal--a killer argument for the Panama route in 1902--looks like a technical and financial dog.
My theory, and it isn’t unreasonable, is that persistent advocacy
of the tide water canal during the Congressional debate was not only based on the
fantasy that a sea level canal could be built only in Panama and not in
Nicaragua; but also the fact that a lock-based Panama canal looked…too much
like Nicaragua.
Since de Lesseps’ time it was accepted that Nicaragua was a
superior site for a lock-based canal, so suggesting a lock-based canal was
needed in Panama might have sounded the death knell for the hopes of the
“Panamaniacs.”
But that’s what we ended up with after the Nicaraguan route
was decisively squelched, the Panama ring had gotten its payday, and it was
time to actually build the canal.
A look at some maps illustrates the point.
Panama originally looked like this:
With the adoption of the lock scheme, it now looks like
this:
That big lake that now takes up much of the Canal Zone is Gatun
Lake, created by throwing up a massive dam on the troublesome Chagres
River. It serves as the “top tier” of the
passage, the water supply for the lock systems on either side, and a buffer
against extreme fluctuations in river flows…
…just as Lake Nicaragua serves as the main reservoir/transit
artery/buffer for the Nicaraguan route.
So, think of the Panama Canal as a clone of the Nicaragua
scheme…but 300 miles further away from New York.
If you can’t spare a thought for Nicaragua getting
sidelined, Colombia getting hosed, Panama enduring 100 years of colonial
occupation, the French shareholders getting reamed, or the possibility that
several hundred West Indian laborers might have lived if they were working in
healthier conditions in Nicaragua…
…consider that John Q. Taxpayer got hooked for millions of
dollars that ended up in the pockets of a few Wall Street financiers who had
bought up Compagnie Nouvelle stock…
…and O! the market inefficiencies as shippers spent millions
on unnecessary fuel, time, and interest to lug their goods to American markets
all the way from Panama over a century instead of having access to the closer,
cheaper Nicaragua route. An eyecatching
statement in T.J. Stiles’ biography of Cornelius Vanderbilt, The First Tycoon, declared that the
Commodore’s costs per voyage in 1856 were $5000 less than the Panama route on the Pacific side alone.
The Panama Canal has more than a whiff of
“expensively managed engineering
kludge founded on nationalist posturing and surrounded by a miasma of
corruption” somewhat similar to China's boondogolicious Three Gorges
Dam.
Espino Diaz tells the story of how the depredations of the
Panama ring were executed, covered up, disclosed, suppressed, and almost
forgotten over 50 years.
Suffice to say it’s clear now that the ring spent years and
hundreds of thousands of dollars setting up their payday from the U.S.
government purchase of the Compagnie Nouvelle interest at an inflated price.
And the ring was composed of Wall Street insiders, including
J.P. Morgan, who had the closest connection to Washington and the Roosevelt
administration.
One wonderful story about the winding down of the ring is
how the US government was persuaded to hand over the $40 million dollar Compagnie Nouvelle payout—to that date,
the largest payout ever made by the US government-- to J.P. Morgan, himself the
leader of the ring, instead of to the French company. I suspect it was engineered that way so that
Morgan would be spared the awkwardness of presenting himself and his Wall
Street associates to the French banks as the primary beneficiaries of the
payout, and could instead discretely handle the distributions himself.
No smoking gun directly implicates Theodore Roosevelt in the
Panama profiteering scheme. However,
Douglas Robinson’s involvement, and how much he may have benefited, is well
documented. He was a signer of the
original secret covenant that formed the ring in 1900, and ponied up $200,000
to fund the careful, under-the-radar purchase of outstanding French Panama
shares at somewhere for 3 cents to 20 cents on the dollar, often from peasants
who had risked and lost their entire savings on de Lessep’s patriotic folly. Assume that Roosevelt’s brother-in-law made
at least a million dollars. Don’t
assume TR didn’t at least have an inkling.
T.J. Carlisle points out that William Taft’s brother,
Charles, was also part of the ring, which gives an idea of what a colossal
insider sh*t show this was.
Given the storm of opposition and resentment Roosevelt had
aroused with his Panama grab, the shaky technical and legal foundations of the
enterprise, and the dubious family angle, it’s not surprising that TR sometimes
seemed nervous and defensive beneath the bully bluster.
Espino Diaz records Roosevelt anxiously rehearsing the
defense of his Panama adventure for his January 1904 State of the Union address
and asking his cabinet, “Well, have I answered the charges? Have I defended myself?”
Defense Secretary Root “sardonically” replied, “You
certainly have, Mr. President. You have
shown that you were accused of seduction and you have conclusively proved that
you were guilty of rape.”
When the U.S. colonial presence in Panama became a big nationalist issue after World War II, the Nicaraguan alternative received another look.
Anastasio Somoza--remember him?--immediately phoned Washington to offer his cooperation. The Hearst papers, which had pushed a Nicaragua canal for decades, even after Panama was built (as a spare!), took up the cause and editorialized:
The Nicaragua Canal, if built, would be accorded every facility for its defense by the Nicaraguan Government, which has proved itself utterly unreceptive to Communist infiltration, and apparently unsusceptible to Communist propaganda..."
It was probably a good thing for Nicaragua that the U.S.
didn't take up Somoza on his offer. The US was persistently interested
in a new canal...and obsessed with the idea of building it using nuclear explosives.
In the
1960s, the US government studied the feasibility of performing the necessary
excavations for a new canal on the the isthmus with,
natch, nuclear explosives. According to a published contemporary report, nuclear explosives could do the job for $1.3 billion, as
opposed to over $5 billion for conventional construction. Proof of concept was demonstrated by the
detonation of a buried string of five one-kiloton devices in Nevada in 1968
producing a 900-foot long, 80 foot deep ditch in a test somewhat disturbingly
named “Project Buggy”. (Lewis, Richard S. Panama Junction, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists May
1968)
In his book Emperors in the Jungle: The Hidden History of the U.S. in Panama,
John Lindsay Poland describes the isthmian "nuclear canal" as the
keystone of the AEC's Plowshares peaceful nukes program for almost a
decade.
It was the subject of detailed studies by the Army Corps of Engineers "Nuclear Cratering Group" and Lawrence Livermore Laboratories, Oval Office palaver with Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson, field research in Central America, test shots in the Nevada desert...and negotiations with an understandably wary Panamian government that resulted in a provisional treaty for the nuclear project.
It was the subject of detailed studies by the Army Corps of Engineers "Nuclear Cratering Group" and Lawrence Livermore Laboratories, Oval Office palaver with Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson, field research in Central America, test shots in the Nevada desert...and negotiations with an understandably wary Panamian government that resulted in a provisional treaty for the nuclear project.
An interesting mighta been scenario.
If the United States had built a canal in Nicaragua, radioactive or otherwise, Somoza would probably still be in power...and the PRC would be thinking about having to tunnel through the earth's core to get its ships to East Coast ports.
Picture credits:
Panama Compagnie Nouvelle Stock Certificate: www.hugovandermolen.nl
Old Panama: Wikipedia
Current Panama Canal: BBC
Planned Nicaragua Canal: Havana Times
Old Panama: Wikipedia
Current Panama Canal: BBC
Planned Nicaragua Canal: Havana Times
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