The personal blog of Peter Lee a.k.a. "China Hand"... Life is a comedy to those who think, a tragedy to those who feel, and an open book to those who read. Now an archive for my older stuff. For current content, subscribe to my patreon "Peter Lee's China Threat Report" and follow me on twitter @chinahand.
[This is actually the first half of a lengthy piece I had posted earlier today. After some reflection, I
decided it really worked better as a standalone. The second half of the
piece is up as The Ultimate Pivot Pricetag: A Luxury Resort on Scarborough Shoal. Together, the two pieces provide a picture of the past and a possible future for the Shoal.]
The PRC is in a pretty solid position, legality-wise in
occupying Scarborough Shoal.
And that means it’s pretty much free to build on it.Even island-build it.
The United States and the Philippines know that.
Losing Scarborough Shoal was the price of the pivot.
It’s just hard to admit it.
Back in May 2012, a little-known figure in the US
government, one Hillary Clinton, declared
that the United States took no position on the sovereignty of the Scarborough
Shoal.
[Clinton] voiced
concern about Scarborough Shoal, repeating that Washington does not take sides
on competing sovereignty claims there but has a national interest in
maintaining freedom of navigation as well as peace and stability.
Unsurprisingly, the fact that Hillary Clinton affirmed US
neutrality on the issue of Scarborough Shoal sovereignty is not on the lips of
every China pundit handwringing over current PRC banditry in the South China
Sea and searching for pretexts to block PRC island-building on the Shoal.
Perhaps China hawks find Clinton’s statement something of an
embarrassment, especially since it undercuts the policy/legal justification for
some of the more extravagant plans for frustrating the PRC’s purported Scarborough
schemes—like the brilliant idea of sending SEALS to covertly sabotage PRC dredgers.Or the even more brilliant idea of sending 4
A-10 Warthogs (air to surface combat) and 2 HH-60G Pave Hawks helicopters
(insertion and extraction of special ops personnel)to put some credibility behind the threat.Which we already did.
If the PRC can island-build Scarborough Shoal unchecked, it
would represent an embarrassing piece of blowback for the pivot, and a
pivot-sapping political incubus for pro-US political and military figures in
the Philippines.
The best lawfare gambit available is to declare that
dredging the shoal would violate environmental protection standards in UNCLOS;
however, the idea that PRC could be targeted by a R2P2 (Responsibility to
Protect Polyps) military operation has, for some reason, not acquired its sea
legs, perhaps because the idea that the US would engage in an act of war to enforce
environmental norms in a treaty it has not even ratified has not quite caught
on.
The Scarborough Shoal dilemma is well understood in Manila.
As the crisis evolved in 2012, the Philippines had expressed
hopes for a US statement that the Mutual Defense Treaty covered Scarborough
Shoal, something along the lines of the US declaration that the Senkakus fell
under the US-Japan security treaty.
Remember, pivoteers, that the US returned the Senkakus to
Japanese administration in 1979 but has pointedly never acknowledged Japanese
sovereignty over them even as the Obama administration affirmed they were
covered by the security treaty as “territory administered by Japan”.The sovereignty issue was supposed to be
worked out in negotiations involving China and Japan but the Japanese
nationalized several of the islands instead in 2014, a big middle finger to the
United States as well as the PRC.
So, in theory, the Philippines might hope that Scarborough Shoal
could merit similar consideration from the United States, as a disputed
sovereignty territory that the US has decided, nevertheless, to include under
its defense umbrella.
Problem is, as Hofstra’s Julian Ku points
out, the MDT affirms that the obligation of the United States to come to
the aid of Philippine armed forces when they are under armed attack in areas
under their jurisdiction.Since
Scarborough Shoal is not under Philippine jurisdiction, and there are no
Philippine armed forces there to suffer attack, that dog didn’t hunt, at least
in 2012.
In May 2012, Hillary Clinton’s refusal to put Scarborough Shoal
on the US-Philippine agenda was seen as a humiliation for the Philippines, a
sign that the Philippines was a second-tier ally compared to Japan.
In retrospect we might say that yes, it was an affirmation
that by virtue of the Philippines’ eviction of US military forces in 1992, it
only rated second-tier ally treatment compared to Japan… and it was time for
the pro-US element in the Philippines pick up its game.
China hawks in the Philippines (and, I suspect in the United
States) did not want to see a positive or dignified future for an essentially
non-aligned Philippines mired in protracted and inconclusive bilateral
negotiations with the PRC over Scarborough Shoal, fishing rights, hydrocarbon
plays and whatnot, perhaps generously larded with the corruption allegedly associated
with the PRC-friendly posture of the previous Arroyo government, while at the
same time free-riding off the Mutual Defense Treaty.
Instead, leadership in the Foreign Affairs and Defense
ministries pushed for overtly siding with the United States and upgrading the
relationship to a more robust level (culminating in the de facto return this
year of the US military to Philippine bases under the Enhanced Defense
Cooperation Agreement or EDCA), thereby promising the overmatched and
underequipped Philippine military and security forces more lethal if not necessarily more effective support from the US against internal as well as
external threats.
From that perspective, the Scarborough dispute--a sovereignty beef which
could not bring US military power to bear on the Philippines' behalf
but virtually dictated bilateral engagement with China--was a dead end.
As
I’ve written here, a flock of China hawks sabotaged the mid-year 2012
bilateral negotiations conducted by President Aquino through his envoy, Antonio
Trillanes, for both sides to withdraw from the shoal.
As the bilateral crashed and burned, the Philippine government
abandoned the bilateral track and turned toward internationalization of
the
Philippines dispute via UNCLOS…full pivot membership...and an emerging
maritime focus that gave the US Navy a potential role in the disputes...
…while leaving the PRC in occupation of Scarborough Shoal.
The pivot had a cost, in other words, and that cost was
Scarborough Shoal.
And UNCLOS isn't going to help.
The Shoal is above water at high as well as low tide, so it
falls outside of the purview of UNCLOS—and the Philippines’ UNCLOS
arbitration.
If the Scarborough Shoal was under water some or all of the
time, UNCLOS would rule and the arbitration commission could assign it to the
Philippines as part of its EEZ endowment—but it ain’t.
Best UNCLOS can do is either declare that the Shoal is
capable of sustaining a human population and economic life, meriting a 200
nautical mile EEZ, unlikely well impossible in its current configuration, or
only a 12-mile territorial sea.
As to whose territorial sea it is—and to whom Scarborough
Shoal belongs—well, UNCLOS got nuttin’.
To be harsh, the awkward fact is that the Philippines did
not “lose” Scarborough Shoal; it threw it away.
I imagine awareness of this politically toxic
sacrifice underlies the ostentatious US breast-beating over Chinese plans for
Scarborough Shoal, dictates useless Warthog flybys, and contributes to Ash
Carter’s determination to up the US-Philippine military game and demonstrate heightened American commitment to the alliance.
It might even explain the cancellation of Carter’s
China trip in favor of a swing through India, Malaysia, and the Balikatan joint
exercises in the Philippines.
There's a Philippine presidential election coming up, after all.
[This is actually the second half of a lengthy piece I had posted originally posted under this title today. After some reflection, I decided it really worked better as a standalone. The first half of the piece is up as The Price of the Pivot: Scarborough Shoal.]
I’ve been a somewhat
skeptical concerning Western handwringing about perceived PRC intentions to
islandbuild Scarborough Shoal, seeing them as perhaps pivot-promoting alarmism.
But, as Freud said, sometimes a cigar is a cigar and
sometimes a threat to build the shoal is…a threat to build the shoal.
My rethink was prompted by the appearance on a Chinese
military enthusiasts’ forum of this plan to convert Scarborough Shoal into a
world class tourist destination…
…and, more importantly, a piece by Minnie Chan in the South
China Morning Post on April 25, reporting
that according to “a source close to the PLA Navy”:
China will start reclamation
at the Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea later this year and may add an
airstrip to extend its air force’s reach over the contested waters…
SCMP, in Hong Kong, is now owned by Alibaba’s Jack Ma and is
not the usual outlet for regional pivot-building scaremongering.And Minnie Chan has been in the China
defense-reporting game for a good while, and her sources are PRC and
mainland-related, not so much Pentagon or Filipino.So if she’s reporting this, good chance it’s
getting floated by the PRC side.
And, if references to Scarborough Shoal island building are
turning up in the public sphere, rest assured the PRC had already signaled this
gambit to the US government privately.I
don’t believe President Obama has to read the South China Morning Post, peruse
Bill
Gertz, or refresh his Super Camp
Military Forum browser tab (the extremely obscure source for the notorious
Scarborough reclamation plan image) to find out what deviltry the PRC is
promising in the South China Sea.
So the China hawk uproar over Scarborough Shoal island
building over the last month has, I suspect, a basis in representations of the
PRC government to the US.
As I wrote
in Asia Times, floating a Scarborough island-building scheme might seem to
be an own-goal by the Chinese, reinforcing the theme of the PRC as an
irresponsible, aggressive revisionist power at the same time the PRC Ministry
of Foreign Affairs is rather cannily and cleverly cobbling together a narrative
that disputes between China and its neighbors are best handled bilaterally.
However, my thesis is that the PRC is concerned that the
United States will look for some way to side overtly with the Philippines to
enforce its UNCLOS-defined rights after the judgment goes against China, is
prepping an escalation pathway to match any US moves, and is carefully signaling
what the path might be and where it might end.
I await the judgment of legal scholars, but I wouldn’t be
surprised if a) EEZs are under the Philippines’ “jurisdiction” for the purposes
of the MDA and therefore b) if Philippine naval/air assets experience interference
by China in those EEZs c) even if the encounters are with PRC "white hulls" i.e. maritime patrol vessels (I
recall seeing rumblings from the USNWC that the converted frigates in the PRC
coast guard should be considered “weaponized” because of the fact of their bulk
and, in any case, the frigates still retain a couple sets of anti-aircraft
guns) and not the PLAN d) the US can invoke the MDT to intervene to protect Philippine military
forces against attack.
Which means that the PRC has to be prepared to escalate its
game and plan for the contingency that it will come into direct confrontation
with US Navy vessels if it tries to mess with the Philippines.
That doesn’t necessarily mean armed confrontation.Probably more a careful, steplike exercise in
“hassling” by the PRC.
Moves up the escalation stepladder could involve close approaching, impeding, and then jostling
US Navy ships FONOPing alone or participating in Philippine military escorts of fishing and oil
exploration vessels seeking to exploit the EEZ claims validated by UNCLOS.
There is an existing playbook for this sort of
harassment.Interested readers and fans
of 1990s arena rock are welcome to view this video showing a Soviet naval
vessel bumping a US Navy vessel during a FONOP in the Black Sea.If all goes according to plan, the foreign
boat approaches with its crew on deck wearing life jackets, the officers gather
at a suitable vantage point to stare meaningfully at their opposite numbers on
the US ship, the helm is given a healthy jerk, the fender-bender is applied,
and the caravan moves on.
And if these moves prove ineffective, indeed are welcomed by
the US hawks as a welcome escalation in tensions that build the case for the
pivot, the PRC tit-for-tat could culminate in…
…the appearance of a luxury resort on Scarborough Shoal!
In other words:
Okinotorishima-zation!
Which is, in my opinion, what the apparent PRC threats of
island building at Scarborough Shoal are all about.
For those of you who don’t obsessively follow and memorize
China Matters, Okinotorishima is the secret shame of UNCLOS and the Achilles’
heel of US pivot policy.I guess that’s
why you don’t hear too much about it in the western press.
A
full airing here, but Okinotorishima was a Japanese stunt that took two
rocks—an even smaller above surface holding than Scarborough Shoal—poured in
more than half a billion dollars to cofferdam and reinforce them…
…and claimed a 200 nautical mile EEZ around them.
As far as I can tell, the reason Japan was able to declare a
200 mile EEZ around this island-building excrescence is because it’s out in the
middle of the ocean and there were no surrounding countries that could claim
injury.Although the PRC and South Korea
both voiced objections to UNCLOS, they apparently went nowhere.
The idea that the PRC would island-build Scarborough Shoal
in order to extend a military threat to Luzon is, to my mind, idiotic.
In my opinion, the only reason this argument is advanced is
to raise a “Red Dragon Loose in SCS” military threat ruckus to obscure the
unpleasant fact that there is no effective way to challenge PRC sovereignty
claims or legal way to prevent it from building whatever it wants on
Scarborough Shoal.
Imputing a threat to
US forces in the Philippines from the PRC on Scarborough Shoal, on the other hand,
allows these pesky diplomatic/legal inconveniences to be swept aside by
executive order on grounds of national security.
The superior PRC dodge would be to build an ostensibly
civilian outpost at Scarborough per the leaked plan ("Hotel", "Tropical
Travel & Holiday Area", maybe a casino to really cheese off the
Philippines),i.e. non-military along the
lines of Okinotorishima (which has a helicopter pad but is plausibly
100%
civilian).
PRC news reports also added an extra wrinkle with reports of
plans for floating nuclear power stations in the SCS and also Bohai Bay.
To my mind, this prospect is appalling enough that the pivot
into the South China Sea should be jettisoned immediately for negotiations to
keep nukes out of the SCS, but that’s just me.
In the context of the US-PRC competition in the SCS,
unfortunately, a floating nuclear station next to Scarborough Shoal makes a lot
of sense.It would provide
desalinization and power generation capabilities that affirm the habitability
of the island (supporting claims for 200 nautical mile EEZ), would help the
island withstand a US-led blockade, and by its presence would make the US think
twice about firing a few dozen HIMARS missiles at the island to flatten it.
Plunking an Okinotorishima clone in the South China Sea, nuclear
or not, would confound pivot planners with the dilemma of either conceding the
legitimacy of the faux-island and its EEZ claims (200 nautical miles would be a
completely unviable option given the proximity of Scarborough to Luzon, but the
island might very well rate a good deal more than the 12 nautical miles it’s currently
expected to get) or suggesting that the Japanese ditch their $500 billion plus
investment for the sake of consistency and pivot credibility…
…that’s the kind of price tag that might get the pivot’s
attention...
The PRC is in a pretty solid position, legality-wise in
occupying Scarborough Shoal.
And that means it’s pretty much free to build on it.Even island-build it.
The United States and the Philippines know that.
Losing Scarborough Shoal was the price of the pivot.
It’s just hard to admit it.
Back in May 2012, a little-known figure in the US
government, one Hillary Clinton, declared
that the United States took no position on the sovereignty of the Scarborough
Shoal.
[Clinton] voiced
concern about Scarborough Shoal, repeating that Washington does not take sides
on competing sovereignty claims there but has a national interest in
maintaining freedom of navigation as well as peace and stability.
Unsurprisingly, the fact that Hillary Clinton affirmed US
neutrality on the issue of Scarborough Shoal sovereignty is not on the lips of
every China pundit handwringing over current PRC banditry in the South China
Sea and searching for pretexts to block PRC island-building on the Shoal.
Perhaps China hawks find Clinton’s statement something of an
embarrassment, especially since it undercuts the policy/legal justification for
some of the more extravagant plans for frustrating the PRC’s purported Scarborough
schemes—like the brilliant idea of sending SEALS to covertly sabotage PRC dredgers.Or the even more brilliant idea of sending 4
A-10 Warthogs (air to surface combat) and 2 HH-60G Pave Hawks helicopters
(insertion and extraction of special ops personnel)to put some credibility behind the threat.Which we already did.
If the PRC can island-build Scarborough Shoal unchecked, it
would represent an embarrassing piece of blowback for the pivot, and a
pivot-sapping political incubus for pro-US political and military figures in
the Philippines.
The best lawfare gambit available is to declare that
dredging the shoal would violate environmental protection standards in UNCLOS;
however, the idea that PRC could be targeted by a R2P2 (Responsibility to
Protect Polyps) military operation has, for some reason, not acquired its sea
legs, perhaps because the idea that the US would engage in an act of war to enforce
environmental norms in a treaty it has not even ratified has not quite caught
on.
The Scarborough Shoal dilemma is well understood in Manila.
As the crisis evolved in 2012, the Philippines had expressed
hopes for a US statement that the Mutual Defense Treaty covered Scarborough
Shoal, something along the lines of the US declaration that the Senkakus fell
under the US-Japan security treaty.
Remember, pivoteers, that the US returned the Senkakus to
Japanese administration in 1979 but has pointedly never acknowledged Japanese
sovereignty over them even as the Obama administration affirmed they were
covered by the security treaty as “territory administered by Japan”.The sovereignty issue was supposed to be
worked out in negotiations involving China and Japan but the Japanese
nationalized several of the islands instead in 2014, a big middle finger to the
United States as well as the PRC.
So, in theory, the Philippines might hope that Scarborough Shoal
could merit similar consideration from the United States, as a disputed
sovereignty territory that the US has decided, nevertheless, to include under
its defense umbrella.
Problem is, as Hofstra’s Julian Ku points
out, the MDT affirms that the obligation of the United States to come to
the aid of Philippine armed forces when they are under armed attack in areas
under their jurisdiction.Since
Scarborough Shoal is not under Philippine jurisdiction, and there are no
Philippine armed forces there to suffer attack, that dog didn’t hunt, at least
in 2012.
In May 2012, Hillary Clinton’s refusal to put Scarborough Shoal
on the US-Philippine agenda was seen as a humiliation for the Philippines, a
sign that the Philippines was a second-tier ally compared to Japan.
In retrospect we might say that yes, it was an affirmation
that by virtue of the Philippines’ eviction of US military forces in 1992, it
only rated second-tier ally treatment compared to Japan… and it was time for
the pro-US element in the Philippines pick up its game.
China hawks in the Philippines (and, I suspect in the United
States) did not want to see a positive or dignified future for an essentially
non-aligned Philippines mired in protracted and inconclusive bilateral
negotiations with the PRC over Scarborough Shoal, fishing rights, hydrocarbon
plays and whatnot, perhaps generously larded with the corruption allegedly associated
with the PRC-friendly posture of the previous Arroyo government, while at the
same time free-riding off the Mutual Defense Treaty.
Instead, leadership in the Foreign Affairs and Defense
ministries pushed for overtly siding with the United States and upgrading the
relationship to a more robust level (culminating in the de facto return this
year of the US military to Philippine bases under the Enhanced Defense
Cooperation Agreement or EDCA), thereby promising the overmatched and
underequipped Philippine military and security forces more lethal if not necessarily more effective support from the US against internal as well as
external threats.
From that perspective, the Scarborough dispute--a sovereignty beef which could not bring US military power to bear on the Philippines' behalf but virtually dictated bilateral engagement with China--was a dead end.
As
I’ve written here, a flock of China hawks sabotaged the mid-year 2012
bilateral negotiations conducted by President Aquino through his envoy, Antonio
Trillanes, for both sides to withdraw from the shoal.
As the bilateral crashed and burned, the Philippine government
abandoned the bilateral track and turned toward internationalization of the
Philippines dispute via UNCLOS…full pivot membership...and an emerging maritime focus that gave the US Navy a potential role in the disputes...
…while leaving the PRC in occupation of Scarborough Shoal.
The pivot had a cost, in other words, and that cost was
Scarborough Shoal.
And UNCLOS isn't going to help.
The Shoal is above water at high as well as low tide, so it
falls outside of the purview of UNCLOS—and the Philippines’ UNCLOS
arbitration.
If the Scarborough Shoal was under water some or all of the
time, UNCLOS would rule and the arbitration commission could assign it to the
Philippines as part of its EEZ endowment—but it ain’t.
Best UNCLOS can do is either declare that the Shoal is
capable of sustaining a human population and economic life, meriting a 200
nautical mile EEZ, unlikely well impossible in its current configuration, or
only a 12-mile territorial sea.
As to whose territorial sea it is—and to whom Scarborough
Shoal belongs—well, UNCLOS got nuttin’.
To be harsh, the awkward fact is that the Philippines did
not “lose” Scarborough Shoal; it threw it away.
I imagine awareness of this politically toxic
sacrifice underlies the ostentatious US breast-beating over Chinese plans for
Scarborough Shoal, dictates useless Warthog flybys, and contributes to Ash
Carter’s determination to up the US-Philippine military game and demonstrate heightened American commitment to the alliance.
It might even explain the cancellation of Carter’s
China trip in favor of a swing through India, Malaysia, and the Balikatan joint
exercises in the Philippines.
There's a Philippine presidential election coming up, after all.
In sum, there is no need for the PRC to island-build the shoal to
shield it from US-backed sovereignty challenges or UNCLOS-related embarrassment.
So I’ve been a somewhat
skeptical concerning Western handwringing about perceived PRC intentions to
islandbuild Scarborough Shoal, seeing them as perhaps pivot-promoting alarmism.
But, as Freud said, sometimes a cigar is a cigar and
sometimes a threat to build the shoal is…a threat to build the shoal.
My rethink was prompted by the appearance on a Chinese
military enthusiasts’ forum of this plan to convert Scarborough Shoal into a
world class tourist destination…
…and, more importantly, a piece by Minnie Chan in the South
China Morning Post on April 25, reporting
that according to “a source close to the PLA Navy”:
China will start reclamation
at the Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea later this year and may add an
airstrip to extend its air force’s reach over the contested waters…
SCMP, in Hong Kong, is now owned by Alibaba’s Jack Ma and is
not the usual outlet for regional pivot-building scaremongering.And Minnie Chan has been in the China
defense-reporting game for a good while, and her sources are PRC and
mainland-related, not so much Pentagon or Filipino.So if she’s reporting this, good chance it’s
getting floated by the PRC side.
And, if references to Scarborough Shoal island building are
turning up in the public sphere, rest assured the PRC had already signaled this
gambit to the US government privately.I
don’t believe President Obama has to read the South China Morning Post, peruse
Bill
Gertz, or refresh his Super Camp
Military Forum browser tab (the extremely obscure source for the notorious
Scarborough reclamation plan image) to find out what deviltry the PRC is
promising in the South China Sea.
So the China hawk uproar over Scarborough Shoal island
building over the last month has, I suspect, a basis in representations of the
PRC government to the US.
As I wrote
in Asia Times, floating a Scarborough island-building scheme might seem to
be an own-goal by the Chinese, reinforcing the theme of the PRC as an
irresponsible, aggressive revisionist power at the same time the PRC Ministry
of Foreign Affairs is rather cannily and cleverly cobbling together a narrative
that disputes between China and its neighbors are best handled bilaterally.
However, my thesis is that the PRC is concerned that the
United States will look for some way to side overtly with the Philippines to
enforce its UNCLOS-defined rights after the judgment goes against China, is
prepping an escalation pathway to match any US moves, and is carefully signaling
what the path might be and where it might end.
I await the judgment of legal scholars, but I wouldn’t be
surprised if a) EEZs are under the Philippines’ “jurisdiction” for the purposes
of the MDA and therefore b) if Philippine naval/air assets experience interference
by China in those EEZs c) even if the encounters are with PRC "white hulls" i.e. maritime patrol vessels (I
recall seeing rumblings from the USNWC that the converted frigates in the PRC
coast guard should be considered “weaponized” because of the fact of their bulk
and, in any case, the frigates still retain a couple sets of anti-aircraft
guns) and not the PLAN d) the US can invoke the MDT to intervene to protect Philippine military
forces against attack.
Which means that the PRC has to be prepared to escalate its
game and plan for the contingency that it will come into direct confrontation
with US Navy vessels if it tries to mess with the Philippines.
That doesn’t necessarily mean armed confrontation.Probably more a careful, steplike exercise in
“hassling” by the PRC.
Moves up the escalation stepladder could involve close approaching, impeding, and then jostling
US Navy ships FONOPing alone or participating in Philippine military escorts of fishing and oil
exploration vessels seeking to exploit the EEZ claims validated by UNCLOS.
There is an existing playbook for this sort of
harassment.Interested readers and fans
of 1990s arena rock are welcome to view this video showing a Soviet naval
vessel bumping a US Navy vessel during a FONOP in the Black Sea.If all goes according to plan, the foreign
boat approaches with its crew on deck wearing life jackets, the officers gather
at a suitable vantage point to stare meaningfully at their opposite numbers on
the US ship, the helm is given a healthy jerk, the fender-bender is applied,
and the caravan moves on.
And if these moves prove ineffective, indeed are welcomed by
the US hawks as a welcome escalation in tensions that build the case for the
pivot, the PRC tit-for-tat could culminate in…
…the appearance of a luxury resort on Scarborough Shoal!
In other words:
Okinotoroshima-zation!
Which is, in my opinion, what the apparent PRC threats of
island building at Scarborough Shoal are all about.
For those of you who don’t obsessively follow and memorize
China Matters, Okinotorishima is the secret shame of UNCLOS and the Achilles’
heel of US pivot policy.I guess that’s
why you don’t hear too much about it in the western press.
A
full airing here, but Okinotoroshima was a Japanese stunt that took two
rocks—an even smaller above surface holding than Scarborough Shoal—poured in
more than half a billion dollars to cofferdam and reinforce them…
…and claimed a 200 nautical mile EEZ around them.
As far as I can tell, the reason Japan was able to declare a
200 mile EEZ around this island-building excrescence is because it’s out in the
middle of the ocean and there were no surrounding countries that could claim
injury.Although the PRC and South Korea
both voiced objections to UNCLOS, they apparently went nowhere.
The idea that the PRC would island-build Scarborough Shoal
in order to extend a military threat to Luzon is, to my mind, idiotic.
In my opinion, the only reason this argument is advanced is
to raise a “Red Dragon Loose in SCS” military threat ruckus to obscure the
unpleasant fact that there is no effective way to challenge PRC sovereignty
claims or legal way to prevent it from building whatever it wants on
Scarborough Shoal.
Imputing a threat to
US forces in the Philippines from the PRC on Scarborough Shoal, on the other hand,
allows these pesky diplomatic/legal inconveniences to be swept aside by
executive order on grounds of national security.
The superior PRC dodge would be to build an ostensibly
civilian outpost at Scarborough per the leaked plan ("Hotel", "Tropical Travel & Holiday Area", maybe a casino to really cheese off the Philippines),i.e. non-military along the
lines of Okinotorishima (which has a helicopter pad but is plausibly 100%
civilian).
PRC news reports also added an extra wrinkle with reports of
plans for floating nuclear power stations in the SCS and also Bohai Bay.
To my mind, this prospect is appalling enough that the pivot
into the South China Sea should be jettisoned immediately for negotiations to
keep nukes out of the SCS, but that’s just me.
In the context of the US-PRC competition in the SCS,
unfortunately, a floating nuclear station next to Scarborough Shoal makes a lot
of sense.It would provide
desalinization and power generation capabilities that affirm the habitability
of the island (supporting claims for 200 nautical mile EEZ), would help the
island withstand a US-led blockade, and by its presence would make the US think
twice about firing a few dozen HIMARS missiles at the island to flatten it.
Plunking an Okinotoroshima clone in the South China Sea, nuclear
or not, would confound pivot planners with the dilemma of either conceding the
legitimacy of the faux-island and its EEZ claims (200 nautical miles would be a
completely unviable option given the proximity of Scarborough to Luzon, but the
island might very well rate a good deal more than the 12 nautical miles it’s currently
expected to get) or suggesting that the Japanese ditch their $500 billion plus
investment for the sake of consistency and pivot credibility…
…that’s the kind of price tag that might get the pivot’s
attention...
...and perhaps rebuke the strategists who decided to sacrifice the shoal in a geopolitical gambit.
I’m expecting tactical nuclear weapons to reappear overtly in the US
military equation for Asia…
…but only after the US Navy gets its chance to feast at the
pivot trough for its long-for but perhaps strategically less-than-vital
conventional forces buildout in Asia.
US land based tactical nukes for the army and air force
were pulled out of Asia at the end of the Cold War and it would require major
political and diplomatic handwringing to put them back. The US Navy got out of
the tactical nuke business for surface vessels worldwide at the same time.The Pentagon then stripped the Navy of its
submarine tactical nuke, the nuclear-tipped Tomahawk cruise missile, the
TLAM-N, formally and irrevocably retiring it in 2013 over the objections of
Japan and a certain, Tomahawk-lovin’ segment of the US defense industry.
The US rejection of tactical nuclear weapons in Asia,
however, is a matter of situational analysis, not principle or service scruples.The US maintains a reported stash of 200
air-delivered tactical nuclear weapons with its NATO allies in Europe because
otherwise NATO would consider itself at a fatal disadvantage against the larger
Russian forces, which also have tactical nuclear weapons.
The key issue, as I write at AT:
The
United States denuked its local posture in Asia for a variety of righteous and
practical reasons but the bottom line was that the US believed it could kick
China’s behind with conventional forces, particularly the high-tech,
high-precision weaponry it developed in its “Revolution in Military Affairs”
starting in the 1990s.Accurate bombs
& missiles and stealthy aircraft could deliver the same devastating punch against
PLA military assets as crude nuclear attacks without the literal and figurative
fallout.
Well…
Well, the job of deterring/containing/defeating the PRC using conventional means gets bigger and harder every day!
Cue that brawny bad boy, AirSea Battle, for a region-wide full
spectrum conventional military confrontation with the PRC!
Well, cue JAM-GC instead, for a couple reasons.First off, AirSea Battle had a fatal flaw: it
lacked the indispensable word “Land” and thereby invited the jealousy and
opposition of the US Army.Second,
ix-nay on the attle-bay, which apparently had too much of a China-containment
knuckledragger vibe.
ASB was formally retired and replaced with the more
benign-sounding Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons
(JAM-GC pronounced: Jam, Gee-Cee).Perhaps “Concept” was omitted from the acronym because it diluted the resolve
embodied in the term “JAM”.
Scenarios for wars with China have been played in countless
publications.One of the most gripping
depictions of a scuffle over Taiwan was provided by Popular
Mechanics:
The 20 remaining missiles re-enter the
atmosphere over Okinawa. Kadena's Patriot batteries fire missiles in response,
but they are off-network and in disarray—10 missiles are struck by multiple
interceptors, but an equal number slip through the defensive screen and hit Kadena.
Some of the GPS-guided warheads contain bomblets that crater the base's two
runways. Others air-burst over the base, devastating barracks, radar arrays and
hangars. Kadena is far from destroyed, but until its runways can be repaired,
it is out of the fight. The F-15s on the way to Taiwan must bank for Guam, 1300
miles southeast—they have the range to reach the base there, but only Kadena is
close enough to stage efficient combat patrols. Also, F-22 stealth fighters
based at Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii, now cannot land on the base's shattered
runways and reinforce the F-15s. With Kadena's satellites gone, the Nimitz and
its flotilla of eight escorts, including Aegis-guided missile destroyers and a
pair of submarines, are steaming toward an enemy possessing one of the world's
largest submarine fleets and an arsenal of land-, air- and sea-launched
antiship missiles.
About 8 hours after the mass raid on
Taiwan, klaxons start blaring aboard the Nimitz and her escorts. There are more
missiles in the air, this time headed straight for the carrier group. The
Taiwan Strait is still more than 1000 miles away, but the war has come to the
Nimitz. Skimming the surface of the Pacific are four supersonic missiles flying
faster than their own roar.
Yowza.PM actually
offered a twofer of competing scenarios.It is a bit disconcerting that the US loses in one scenario and is only
able to prevail in the second thanks to some experimental missile defense Wunderwaffe imported from the Nevada
Test and Training Range for the occasion.
There’s a problem with these scenarios.They’re both bullsh*t.
The image of the Nimitz bravely chugging through the global
commons amid a hail of PLA munitions while the Pentagon anxiously flings
missile defense assets at the problem is not a central part of the US scenario.
The precise character of what the US plans to do under
JAM-GC is classified, but in addition to “joint accessing the global commons”,
it involves offensive operations outside “the global commons” i.e. inside the
PRC mainland.Massive operations.A core element of the US scenario for a war
over Taiwan is the United States dishing it out on with attacks on PRC missile,
airforce, and command & control facilities deep in the mainland, some of
which are located around Chinese cities.
US strategic doctrine is "never cross swords with a nuclear power" and we haven't to date, not even with North Korea, and for good reason.
Reportedly war games for many of these scenarios
start out as conventional exchanges and end up nuclear because of the intense
offensive operations needed to degrade the PRC’s burgeoning military capability--a contingency AirSea Battle & JAM-GC planners have tried to evade to an almost laughable degree, I suspect, because it challenges the logic of deterrence through a buildup of conventional forces.
An important RAND study,The U.S.-China Military Scorecard, for instance, provides over 400 pages of conventional warfighting goodness, including chapters on "U.S. Penetration of Chinese Airspace" and "U.S. Capability to Attack Chinese Air Bases". However, the authors take nukes off the table as a matter for JAM-GC because, well, whatever happens in the course of the US campaign against mainland targets, the PRC strategic nuclear strike capability will remain untouched (we're not gonna bomb it! Honest! Trust us!)...
The nuclear scorecard evaluates
crisis stability in the bilateral nuclear relationship
rather than the advantage enjoyed by
one side or the other. Specifically, the scorecard
examines the survivability of both
sides’ second-strike capabilities in the face of a first
strike by the other. When both sides
maintain a survivable second-strike capability, the
incentives for both the stronger and
weaker parties to strike first diminish and stability
is, in that sense, enhanced.
...so, even if the PLA is crumbling under US conventional strikes, the Chinese mainland is in flames, Taiwan declares independence, anti-government insurrections break out in Hong Kong, Xinjiang, and Tibet, the Chinese
command-and-control structure melts under US cyberattacks, the reign of
the red mandarins is headed for the sh*tter, CCP leadership unity implodes, appeasers and dead-enders fight for control of the nuclear button, and commanders slide into the Use It or Lose It mindset, the PRC will certainly drop everything to make sure
Mr. Nuke stays in his cage! Fer sure!
I wonder how many people in the Pentagon and the White House are convinced by RAND's advertorial for the "stabilizing" character of conventional war inside China, given the way the war games scenarios reportedly play out. Not many, I think. Anyway, hope.
In my Asia Times piece, I look at this interesting
development and opine the attractions of a conventional seven day dubious
battle under JAM-GC auspices followed by a nuclear exchange will wane as the PRC continues its military
buildout, and that tactical nuclear weapons will be reintroduced into the Asian
nuclear equation by the US to preserve US military dominance vis a vis the PRC.
The LRSO is the replacement for the elderly/tending towards
obsolescence nuclear ALCM (Air Launched Cruise Missile).The ALCM is only launchable by (non-stealthy)
B52, is itself non-stealthy, has a limited range and therefore would place
itself and its aircraft at risk to those radars and missile defenses the pesky
PRC persists in provocatively placing on its perimeter. (Maybe the Pentagon should
start calling this the “6P threat”. Don't forget to credit China Matters!).
The LRSO is a stealthy nuclear tipped cruise missile with a
more extended 3000 km range and will be launchable from the B2 stealth bomber
as well as the LRSB, the stealthy Long Range Strike Bomber now on the
drawing board.
The LRSO is officially marketed as a strategic weapon but,
unsurprisingly, given its dialable yield and stealthiness, apparently has a
significant tactical component.
The Federation of American Scientists parsed public
statements concerning the LRSO and commented:
It seems clear from
many of these statements that the LRSO is not merely a retaliatory capability
but very much seen as an offensive nuclear strike weapon that is intended for
use in the early phases of a conflict even before long-range ballistic missiles
are used. In a briefing from 2014, Major General Garrett Harencak, until
September this year the assistant chief of staff for Air Force strategic
deterrence and nuclear integration, described a “nuclear use” phase before
actual nuclear war during which bombers would use nuclear weapons against
regional and near-peer adversaries.
The staff officer who came up with that new segment of the
conflict spectrum between “conventional war” and “nuclear war” and called it “nuclear
use” deserves a medal, don’t you think? Like Homer Simpson:
Character 1: "First, the award for the alumnus who's gained the most
weight: Homer Simpson!" Homer: "Oh my God!" Character 1: "How did you
do it, Homer?" Homer: "I discovered a meal between breakfast and
brunch."
For that matter, can anybody think of a “regional/near-peer
competitor” that might require the attentions of a nuclear cruise missile
during a “nuclear use” activity?Anybody?Anybody? Bueller?
The way I think it’s supposed to work, the LRSO is loaded
aboard a B2 bomber in the US, which flies into the middle of the Pacific, stealthily
drops the missile (well, maybe 16 missiles) without
detection by PRC radars and missile defenses and well outside the dreaded first
island chain that is the focus of purported PRC A2/AD intentions, and lumbers
home while the missiles (stealthy, probably redirectable, maybe with a
supersonic engine) fly into China and “let freedom ring”.
(I, by the way, consider it rather interesting that the PRC
does not use the term A2/AD, which is the Pentagon term of art for “PRC wants
to deny us access to our rightful waters”; they call it fan jieru 反介入i.e.
“anti-intrusion” with a homeland-protection inference, which pivoteers prefer
to translate as “anti-intervention”, which has more of an “interfering with
Taiwan invasion” vibe to my ear).
Lot of advantages to US military planners to this scenario.
First off, each LRSO W80-4 warhead will have a dialable
yield between 5 and 150 kilotons.There will be 500+ of these warheads if the Pentagon
has its way (otherwise, there would be no operational home for the warheads
coming off the ALCMs, and decommissioning those gadgets would be such a waste!). A single B2 with two 8-missile launch pods could probably carry over 2 megatons' worth of arms which, if I'm doing the math right, is about 150 times the yield of the Hiroshima blast.
Adding up all the available warheads translates into a cumulative 75 megatons of
"tactical" nukes, which is really a fresh strategic punch
For perspective, the largest thermonuclear
device that ever entered the US arsenal was the Mark 41, with a theoretical
yield of 25 megatons and an expected fireball 4 miles in diameter. It would destroy pretty much everything in an 8 mile radius and be able to cause third-degree i.e. major burns 32 miles away.
With all due respect to the conventional forces the US is amassing in the Western Pacific and the legions of analysts beavering away at JAM-GC scenarios, Mr. Nuke, as represented by the LRSO, is more likely to deliver a credible deterrent and confidence in US victory in a confrontation with the PRC.
The LRSO scenario has political/operational advantages as well.
Basing outside the region for delivery by strategic bomber
means no problems of nuke-averse allies or, for that matter, risky naval
deployments on subs or otherwise.
And, since the missile is stored in the homeland and can probably
be rolled out in a conventional as well as nuclear configuration, the PRC
talking point that the US is targeting China with a new generation of tactical
nuclear weapons can be evaded.Victory!
The LRSO will be
ready by 2030 (at the latest; in my AT piece I used the figure 5 years based on
what I’d read) and, if the Pentagon has its way, several hundred will be
nuclear tipped.The arms control community
is in a tizzy at this unambiguously destabilizing innovation, which will
probably elicit a host of PRC countermoves including “Launch on Warning”,
MIRVing, and whatnot.It looks like a heated
argument is shaping up between the “more
is always better” vs. “arms
races are bad” crowds.
Count on the “let’s do both!” gang prevailing. i.e. selling the LRSO as
a valuable “bargaining chip”.
Because, as I've argued frequently, US planners see "heightened tensions" as a vital driver/competitive advantage for the military-heavy US agenda in Asia and a bulwark against Asian nations wasting their energies by doing something stupid like focusing on regional economic integration and a security architecture that includes China instead of confronting it...
...with the assumption that the costs of any miscalculation will be borne by Asia, and not the US homeland.
Your pivot at work, ladies and gentlemen. Soon to be nuclear.
