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The Red Womb of Empire

Reflections on the Gettysburg Address and the Civil War

Abraham Lincoln was a fine man, a skillful politician, and a great president.  Freed the slaves, of course.  His address at the dedication of the military cemetery in Gettysburg on November 19, 1863--150 years ago today--is magnificent and heartfelt oratory.

It is also a determined piece of goalpost shifting designed to cope with the fact that Lincoln's Civil War was a bloody, improvised botch that he rescued by abandoning the positions that had won him the Presidency…

…and by redefining not only that war, but all American wars to come.

Lincoln, as is well known, was no abolitionist in 1860 (i.e. he had no plans to change the status of slaves inside the current slave-holding states).  He ran for president on the Republican ticket on a platform of halting the expansion of slavery into the territories, something that the Southern-centric administration of James Buchanan and the deadlocked US Congress had been unable to achieve.

Southern arrogance, presumption, and scheming historically relied on the belief that the North lacked both the will and the means to do anything except bargain away its free-soil convictions when faced with serial Southern extortion by threat of secession.  When Lincoln won re-election, the South concluded that Northern forbearance was at an end, and decided to finally make good on its threats.

Southern confidence at secession was bolstered by slave state gains in the 1850s: the Dred Scott decision overturning the Missouri Compromise restrictions on territorial slavery as unconstitutional, the success of Southern intransigence over the Kansas issue in obtaining Buchanan’s recognition of a fraudulent pro-slavery Kansas constitution, the superior ability of the Southern cotton economy to weather the Panic of 1857, and the political dominance of a militant and confrontational anti-North/pro-slavery consensus in the South.  

Before Lincoln’s inauguration, with secession abrewin’, Kentucky’s John Crittenden tried to broker a compromise that would have extended the 36 degree 30 minute latitude line (the southern border of Missouri and the demarcation line for slavery in the Louisiana Territory since 1830) out to the California border.

Lincoln rejected the compromise, since the extended line would have permitted slavery in New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Arizona.  He had run on a platform of restricting slavery in the territories, not expanding it, and was understandably loath to abandon his platform and his deeply held convictions even before he took office.

The South’s response to the Lincoln challenge to its political grip in Washington and over national slave policy in the territories was a wave of southern state secessions initiated by South Carolina even before Lincoln was inaugurated.

Ironically—an irony little acknowledged in the universal hagiography surrounding Lincoln and his prosecution of the Civil War—southern secession and the departure of the obstreperous southern delegations from Washington and their enablers from the White House basically assured that in 1860 the disposition of the remaining territories would be determined by the anti-slavery, North-dominated government without the need for a civil war.

Indeed, a Congress freed of Southern disruption was something of a progressive Golden Age, as the Federal government legislated a slew of “national improvements” and social legislation—including, of course, prohibition of slavery in the territories-- that the southern delegations had always blocked as favoring the integrated economies of the north at the expense of the Cotton Kingdom.

Alternative scenarios for a Confederate States of America allowed to secede abound, no doubt. 

It can be said with some confidence that the South would have done rather well, perhaps successfully executing filibusters like the seizure of Cuba (a plan supported by President Buchanan and thwarted only by the sabotage of Northern anti-slavery zealots) as part of a new slave empire, the promotion of slavery-friendly coup d’etats in Central American states like Nicaragua (William Walker, the entrepreneur of Nicaraguan regime change, was a Southern darling), and annexation of more of Mexico.

The North probably also would have done reasonably well, thanks to its diversified economy and the discovery of gold in California.  Foreign trade would have taken a huge knock, at least in the short term (cotton exports were the mainstay of US exports and, indirectly, through the tariff on goods purchased overseas with cotton revenues, served as the foundation of federal government finance as well).  

It can also be said with some confidence that the United States would not have tried to hollow out the southern slave economy by offering free refuge to southern slaves fleeing the CSA.  The northern anti-slavery platform was an expression of the desire to keep slave labor bottled up in its southeastern homeland, and prevent the establishment of slave economies in new territories that would close off opportunities to white labor. 

Maybe the CSA slave economy would have persisted into the 20^th century; maybe a domestic reform movement would have mediated a transition to a post-slavery economy; maybe a titanic rebellion would have brought a bloody end to the unjust Confederate regime. 

Really can’t say.

In any case, Abe didn’t let ‘em go.  After making sure that the CSA fired the first shot at Fort Sumter, Lincoln sent his armies into the South.

In 1860, both sides had the expectation of some sort of sharp, decisive military confrontation: either a Northern triumph that would discredit the CSA as a viable nation and bring the seceding states back into the Union, or convincing Southern victories that would demonstrate to the Union, Great Britain, and France that the CSA could hold its own in a defensive war and should be allowed to depart the Union.

The Saudi-Israeli-French Axis of Anxiety Over US-Iran Rapprochement

As US-Iran rapprochement inches toward at least partial consummation in Geneva, I wish to offer a few observations:

1)       The Iran nuclear weapons threat has always been a McGuffin, an excuse for various powers to advance an anti-Iran agenda.

2)      Chief among the usual suspects is, of course, Israel under PM Netanyahu.  If the Israeli government is able to spin Iran as a nuclear (almost) capable existential threat to Israel, then Israel can make an absolute claim on US sympathy, support, and protection.  If Iran returns to good relations with the United States, the US will arguably become less willing to bear the sizable political, diplomatic, and economic cost of deferring to Israel’s priorities—on the Palestinian question, on regional security, and its obstinate refusal to acknowledge its nuclear arsenal and integrate it into the international arms control regime.

3)      The other regional power most interested in thumping the Iran-threat drum is Saudi Arabia.  However, I would argue that the high-profile anti-Iran stance of the Kingdom (probably symbolized but not necessarily created by the notorious Prince Bandar) has little to do with the threat of “Iran hegemonism” (a canard frequently retailed in the big-name press) and a lot to do with Saudi Arabia’s decision to go pro-active against the popular democratic agitation expressed by the Arab Spring uprisings by supporting conservative Sunni theology and governance, not just in Shi’ite inflected countries like Bahrain, Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria, but also in nations like Libya (where Saudi Arabia and its creature, the Gulf Co-Operation Council were the primary motive force in demanding intervention against Gaddafi) and Egypt.  It’s easy for Saudi Arabia to piggyback on the anti-Iran campaign promoted by the US and Israel and cite Iranian subversion as a pretext for the campaign of conservative Sunni rollback; if Iran is removed from the league table of existential enemies subverting the Sunni heartland, Saudi Arabia is left in the exposed position of protecting Wahhabi obscurantism against liberal democracy.  That’s not a happy place to be.

4)      Western observers have been rather surprised by France’s unapologetic sabotage of the Iran nuclear negotiations in Geneva at Israel's behest.  I saw some left-of-center complaining that France’s motivation was the greedy desire to muscle in on the lucrative Saudi arms business.  Perhaps, but I think the strategic nature of French involvement should be emphasized.  Recall that France’s traditional sphere of influence in the Middle East has been the Levant—that chunk of coastline that includes southern Turkey, Syria, and Lebanon.  France claims a paternal interest in the bloody, fascistic and pro-Israeli antics of the Lebanese Maronite community, a Catholic grouping whose origins date back to the Crusades and is perhaps the most conspicuous legacy of the French enthusiasm for meddling in the Middle East.  Before Syria blew up, France was at the center of an initiative to install Bashar al-Assad in the affections of the West.  Also, recall that the Libyan adventure was a creature of French enthusiasm; that France was also easily the most eager advocate of a US military strike on Syria after somebody crossed President Obama’s gas warfare red line.  With the United States displaying a desire to tilt toward Iran, if only a little bit, the Middle East jigsaw puzzle has been shaken up and France has the best potential of any Western power to shape and profit from the new alignment.  We can justifiably bitch about France carrying Israel’s water, but if the US pivots toward Asia, as it has promised, there is a strong case for redefining the Arab Middle East as a Mediterranean construct, with France playing the role of keystone (and Iran scolder-in-chief).  If Iran wants a European ally, well, Germany is probably there for the asking.

For the edification of China Matters readers, I offer two pieces from the archives below the fold.

First, a piece on the longstanding Saudi eagerness to push dissent into the sectarian pigeonhole, not only in Bahrain but in the entire Persian Gulf region. Hopefully, this provides a corrective to the rather ludicrous assertions of Iranian subversion, typified by allegations that the minority Assad regime is suicidally promoting sectarianism in Syria. The truth is, the Sunni affiliation of the Syrian majority is considered to be a dragon to be awakened in the service of conservative Saudi rollback against non-sectarian democracy, both in the kingdom and in the region.

Second, a discussion of the perennial question of whether Israel can pose a credible unilateral threat to Iran’s nuclear program with a military strike. When I originally wrote the post, it was considered unlikely that Saudi Arabia would provide refueling facilities to Israeli fighter bombers, and plausible that the US occupying forces in Iraq might provide the service. How things have changed. Under the current circumstances, I would say that Saudi Arabia’s enthusiasm for fighting to the last American has simply been transferred to Israel. I think that neither Israel nor Saudi Arabia have the stomach to bomb Iran and, perhaps, start a regional war without strong US backing of the sort that the Obama administration appears loathe to provide; hope I’m right. In any case, the real game is in Syria and western Iraq, regions that if not for that exasperating problem of al Qaeda blowback, would be viewed with unalloyed joy as fertile fields for conservative Sunni rollback and continued bloodshed, no matter what happens with Iran.

Reuters Concern-Trolls China Over Philippine Typhoon Relief

Reuters’ concern-trolling over the low-key Chinese response to the Philippine Haiyan supertyphoon disaster is revealing, in a relatively inadvertent way.

Yesterday it was

China's Meager Aid to the Philippines Could Dent Its Image

Today it is

No Sign of Help for Philippines from China’s Hospital Ship

The Chinese government has not been particularly forthcoming in aid to the Philippines, especially in comparison with the high profile pledges by the United States and Japan, and the dispatch of the US aircraft carrier George Washington and its strike group to provide relief.

There’s a dearth of hard data on exactly why the PRC hasn’t gone all out in opening the aid floodgates to the Philippines, with whom China is locked in an antagonistic maritime dispute.  China’s activist hardliner newspaper, Global Times, did weigh in with one editorial urging the government not to snub the Philippines; for the rest, Reuters has been forced to rely on the usual suspects—pundits, Twitterers, and Weibo posts—in order to weave a narrative out of the fact that China has provided less aid than the United States and Japan.

The story could have been as easily spun as “US, Japan Go All Out to Exploit Supertyphoon to Bolster Strategic Alliance With the Philippines,”  which, indeed, is a certain part of what’s going on.  Japan, in particular, is eager to use the disaster to strengthen the case for expanding the regional footprint of its Self-Defense Force (in anticipation of the day when the pacifist constitution is revised and the SDF is rebranded as a conventional—and rather large—national military).  

One can almost view the Reuters articles as part of that campaign, highlighting the contrast between the US/Japanese and Chinese responses in order to gain an additional PR value for the West.

But Reuters’ framing that the Chinese regime is clumsily botching the only reasonable policy option—backing up its regional power pretensions with a high profile assumption of disaster relief responsibilities—is remarkably blinkered in a way that implies that flooding the Asian zone with more reportorial resources is simply creating an echo chamber of mutually reinforcing punditry and prejudices, and making it easier to superimpose Western preconceptions on the Asian reality: an exercise in Orientalizing that Edward Said would find quite familiar.

There are, I would aver, other forces at work in China, ones that preclude the new PRC administration of Xi Jinping from blithely laying himself down in the Procrustean bed of western liberal and U.S. great power preconceptions of how China should be responding to the Haiyan disaster at this particular moment.

I see Xi Jinping asserting tight central control and management over China’s media and public opinion space in order to consolidate his own power and, quite possibly, in anticipation of domestic rumpus attending some badly needed and long-expected economic, financial, and political reforms. 

One of the relief valves permitted for Chinese public opinion is the vociferous abuse heaped on countries with whom the PRC are at odds, like the Vietnam and the Philippines.  Reasserting government management of that space means not giving China’s easily riled netizens (and the occasional dissident activists who welcome any expression of on-line discontent as an opportunity to delegitimize the PRC regime) something to bitch about, reinforce their feelings of individual agency, and resist the top-down authoritarian guidance that seems to be Xi Jinping’s preferred governance model.

In my most recent article for Asia Times, Controlling the Media is Xi’s Message, I posit that the PRC regime is taking care not to get out in front of Chinese public opinion (which is pretty negative and uncharitable toward the Philippines, despite the awful Haiyan disaster) by supplying aid beyond the minimum demanded by neighborly compassion, unless it is recognized inside China as a matter of overwhelming moral and practical necessity.

Also, undoubtedly Xi would prefer that the relief be reframed in terms of a regional role that China not only can but must fill, ideally at the urgent behest of the Philippines, and not just because Reuters has written a couple bitchy headlines.

Perhaps the real reason is that Xi has his eye squarely on the domestic ball of public opinion, and does not want to be seen getting all soft and squishy, pursuing international popularity will o' the wisps when his main business is to convince the Chinese populace that the CCP has the domestic dissent/control/reform agenda well in hand. 


Those with longer memories (a characteristic of the Chinese Communist Party hierarchy) might remember how foreign aid issues got rolled up in a spate of horrific school bus accidents that claimed dozens of lives in China in the winter of 2012. Netizen scorn was heaped on the government for concurrently providing school buses to Macedonia as an aid gambit even as China's own children perished on antiquated and unsafe buses.

More recently, the Chinese government came in for considerable criticism in the wake of Cyclone Fitow. In a few hours in October (in another one of those unprecedented calamities probably exacerbated by global warming and now recurring with such frequency that the previous instances are quickly forgotten), that storm dropped a half-meter or so of rain on northern Zhejiang province - more than the region had seen in a century - flooding 70% of a sizable city called Yuyao. There was considerable local disgruntlement at the provincial government's inability to provide prompt relief.

…

With the Fitow context (and with the current example of the admittedly lesser losses and suffering that the Haiyin super-typhoon inflicted on the Chinese mainland), it would seem logical that the Xi government would not be interested in squandering its messaging victory by expending moral, political, and economic resources on the Philippines while the local situation is far from bright, thereby inviting netizen criticism of the government in the (for China) still privileged space of protected expression reserved for outpourings of nationalist and xenophobic bile.

The United States, as part of its pivot to Asia, is eager to identify and advertise through the Western media roles for China that the PRC finds awkward and unpleasant to fill.  Disaster relief for Supertyphoon Haiyan is not the first, and will probably not be the last.

PSA: Watch “The Molly Maguires” on Netflix

Maybe somebody on the Netflix website has film-curatorial ambitions and is pushing for people to see and reassess Martin Ritt’s “The Molly Maguires,” a largely forgotten film that is, rather surprisingly, available on the Netflix on demand service.  If so, good for him or her.  “The Molly Maguires” definitely deserves another look.  (if you don’t know who the Molly Maguires were, get thee to a Wikipedia entry.  OK, if you’re too lazy to click on the link, the Molly Maguires were militant Irish mineworkers who used violence and sabotage to struggle against the brutal union-busting tactics of the mineowners in Pennsylvania coal country in the 1870s, as well as sticking it to scabs, Germans, and Welshmen.  Today we’d call them terrorists.)

The movie was an expensive flop when it came out in 1970.  It was derided as the last gasp of old-fashioned Hollywood studio filmmakers desperately trying to come to terms with the revolutionary transformation of audience, artistry, and attitude that brought us Bonnie & Clyde, Easy Rider, etc. etc. etc.

Four decades letter, stripped of the expectations and prejudices of its time, The Molly Maguires is a powerful piece of work.

Consider it the anti-Doctor Zhivago, a thinking-person’s epic, set in the turmoil of America in the midst of the industrial revolution instead of Russia during the Soviet revolution.  But there are problems that contributed to its negative critical reception and dismal box office.

Instead of lots of pretty white snow, you’ve got tons of dirty black coal.  Instead of a love affair involving the luminous Julie Christie, you’ve got a fraught and unfulfilled bromance between Richard Harris (a detective infiltrating the Mollies) and Sean Connery (the leader of the local Molly cell), their charisma smothered under lumpy clothes, soup-strainer moustaches, and Amos-and-Andy levels of facial coaldust.

And instead of a gauzy depiction of bourgeois romance with its hopes and dreams and fears, you get an unblinking look at the ruthless, iron-hard determination of the most gifted and ambitious members of the working class to escape the miseries of their birth and circumstances.

The film was produced and directed by Martin Ritt.  Presumably Ritt was able to get The Molly Maguires green-lit because he was riding a string of winners featuring Paul Newman, including Hud, the film that defined Newman’s career, and Hombre, another hard edged depiction of American history leavened with plenty of action, gunplay, and dramatic catharsis.   

Anyway, Ritt was given $11 million—a gigantic budget for the time--and he put all the money on screen.  A replica of a Pennsylvania coal mine, reputed the largest indoor set ever built, was constructed on a Hollywood soundstage.  On location in Eckley, Pennsylvania, Ritt recreated an 1870s mining town accurately enough that it still serves as the heart of a Pennsylvania state historical museum.   Ritt and his cinematographer, James Wong Howe, also shot around the existing coal operations in the area (one of the more affecting scenes shows two proletarian lovers trekking to their picnic spot through a blasted moonscape of tailings ponds and dead trees), and in the 19^th century prison and courthouse in Pennsylvania in which the Mollies had been held and tried.

True to his epic/art-house ambitions, Ritt tried to get the picture shot in black and white but was understandably turned down by the suits at Paramount.  Instead, Ritt managed to express his artistic side with the understated ochres of Howe’s photography, a wordless 15 minute prologue, and the remarkable decision to not let Sean Connery speak until 45 minutes into the movie.

The Molly Maguires was a labor of love for Ritt and his screenwriter, Walter Bernstein.  Ritt has described it as his favorite of his own films.  Ritt and Bernstein had been blacklisted as a result of the Hollywood red scare in the 1950s and at the heart of the movie they placed the conundrum of Richard Harris, the tough immigrant striver infiltrating the Molly Maguires, as he is torn between his desire to nail the Mollies and climb the company ladder into the middle class and his class-based sympathy for the conspirators and their desperate recourse to violence.

Ritt, known as an actor’s director, makes all the right choices in eliciting credible and moving performances from his cast despite the difficult material.

There is a wonderful moment when Harris secretly reports to the company police about Molly-related mischief.  The captain peremptorily orders Harris to give up the names, and one can imagine Ritt, carrying in his heart his memory of the HUAC experience, instructing Harris to hold his reply for an extra beat and…

…well, no spoilers here.  But just to warn you, there’s no uplift and you won’t come out of the theater (or, rather, your Netflix-watching den) humming the theme song.

No wonder the movie didn’t do great.  Ritt claims he couldn’t get work for years as a result of The Molly Maguires (he made his comeback with the equally labor-themed but considerably sunnier Norma Rae, starring Sally Field).  The powers that be supposedly decided that Sean Connery was box-office poison if he wasn’t playing James Bond, and Richard Harris, instead of catapulting to stardom, became a perennial supporting player (low point: exhorting Bo Derek to endure as her naked torso is slathered for sacrifice by the native folk in Tarzan; high point: going out as Dumbledore in the first two Harry Potter movies).

The Molly Maguires is without compromise, a remorseless, two-hour look at what people have to do when they’re at the bottom of the ladder and the only choices they are offered are bad ones.  The sacrifices that the Mollies and the miners make are absolute, without the feel good “triumph of the spirit” sentiments of Hollywood’s usual depictions of labor struggles that threaten but don’t quite upset the existing order.  Joe Hill, in other words, isn’t alive as you or me.  He’s just fucking dead.